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Abstract  
 
Designing and implementing the Reduced Emissions from Avoided 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) depend on mutually interlinked 
actors, policies and socioeconomic factors across global, national and local 
levels. Unpacking the interaction between REDD+ design and implementation 
processes could holistically identify sources of institutional impediments to the 
programme’s effectiveness in the context of sustainable development.  This 
thesis examines the process of designing REDD+ rules at the global level and 
the implementation of these rules at the national and local levels in Kenya. The 
study develops and applies an integrated institutions and development analytical 
framework (IDAF) within which iterative document analysis, quantitative 
vulnerability indexing, project inventories and interviews are applied to gather 
empirical evidence.  
Results reveal that multilevel institutional impediments face REDD+ design and 
implementation. At the global level, resource endowment determines actors’ 
ability to design and implement methodological, financial and safeguard design 
rules for REDD+. However, due to resource limitation and reliance on REDD+ 
funds, the input of African States into the technical and institutional REDD+ 
design  is weak. This creates gaps in technical capacity and funding required for 
implementing the global rules at the national level. In Kenya, the national 
implementation relies on expertise and funds from multilateral intermediaries 
but this support plays into national institutional gaps e.g. path dependency and 
sectoral competition for funds to create implementation deficits. Efforts to avoid 
‘institutional complexities’ in delivering carbon funds confine REDD+ 
activities within the State-based forestry sector but exclude key land use sectors 
such as lands and agriculture. This sectoral exclusion subdues cross-sectoral 
expertise required for REDD+ implementation but most importantly, fails to 
  
ix 
 
attend to underlying drivers of deforestation such as resettlement and 
agricultural mechanisation.   
Even though delivery of carbon and associated funds are emphasised at the 
global/national levels, local level implementation of the Kasigau project relies 
more on delivery of pro-poor livelihoods that keep the poor out of forests. 
Benefit sharing mechanism with regards to livelihoods is a key source of 
interplay between REDD+ design and on-ground implementation but this 
interplay is a source of certain institutional conflicts: first, the interplay 
complicates multilevel institutional arrangements for REDD+. For supporting 
local livelihood needs, the local community favourably perceives the private 
actor implementing the Kasigau project but negatively perceives State regimes 
that have historically monopolised local resource decisions and benefits. This 
raises concerns as to whether the State, as the legitimate representative of local 
communities’ interests in REDD+, can ably do so as expected by the UNFCCC. 
Second, the interplay elicits carbon-livelihood tension. Projects avoid 
investing/implementation within poor communities whose livelihood status 
could complicate delivery of carbon funds. Projects target relatively richer areas 
endowed with humid forest resources at 0.728; p<0.01, land title deeds at 0.552; 
p<0.01 and better access to water at 0.475; p<0.01. This raises concerns about 
emission leakage when deforestation shifts to forests hosted in poorer 
communities. Carbon-livelihood tension also renders equitable and pro-poor 
strategies in REDD+ ineffective. Strict carbon standards limit trade-offs 
between pro-poor livelihoods and forest protection especially when fluctuating 
carbon prices constrain funds needed for project operations and local 
livelihoods.  
This study presents one of the first multilevel scientific analyses of REDD+ and 
contributes empirical evidence to literature on REDD+ governance. It reveals 
that the main sources of REDD+ implementation deficits emanate from the 
global and national institutional processes. As such, ensuring equity and rights 
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in REDD+ implementation is necessary but not sufficient for effective REDD+ 
implementation unless national level institutions are reformed and global 
carbon conditions and pricing harmonised with local livelihood needs.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
‘After briefly reviewing how the often-recommended solutions have worked 
in the field, I suggest that institutional theorists move from touting simple, 
optimal solutions to analysing adaptive, multilevel governance as related to 
complex, evolving resource systems’ 
 [Ostrom 2008:1] 
 
1.1.   Introduction  
The severity, complexity and cross-boundary nature of climate change causes 
and impacts has informed a variety of global environmental regimes. These 
regimes bring together multiple State and non-State actors to collectively 
formulate and implement climate change solutions in the context of sustainable 
development.  The United Nations programme on Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is a global regime designed to 
mitigate climate change (UNFCCC, 2007). REDD+ includes schemes to 
provide payments for forest carbon to incentivise forest protection and avoid 
greenhouse gas (GHGs) emissions, mostly in developing countries (Stern, 
2006). The incetives are also expected to enhance sustainable forest 
management, biodiversity with benefits to livelihoods and development (Bond, 
2010, Angelsen 2008c). Designing the rules governing the implementation of 
REDD+ is referred to as REDD+ institutional design. The institutional design 
brings together multiple actors to negotiate and contribute resources and 
expertise in designing various REDD+ components within the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The resulting rules are 
implemented within national policies and local settings of developing countries 
where forests are hosted.  The overall aim of this thesis is to analyse the process 
  
2 
 
of designing REDD+ rules at the global level and the implementation of these 
rules in an African policy and socioeconomic setting. In doing so, this research 
will identify sources of institutional conflicts in designing and implementing 
REDD+ in the context of sustainable development. This Chapter first outlines 
the study’s background and the research needs. It then presents the study’s main 
aim, objectives and contributions to literature and policy.   
 
1.2.   General background of climate change and forests 
Global climate change presents the greatest threat to humanity in current times. 
Climate change results from anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gasses 
(GHGs) mainly carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere. The GHGs trap 
radiated heat from the earth’s surface and retains it within the atmosphere 
resulting in persistent increase in atmospheric temperature (IPCC, 2000). Since 
1980s, the average global surface temperature has risen by 0.74°C resulting in 
a range of social and ecological impacts on human welfare  (IPCC, 2007a).  
The impacts of climate change are vast, interlinked and widely documented. 
They range from imbalances in global hydrological cycles (IPCC, 2013), 
regional precipitation declines  (Malhi and Wright, 2004), threat to food security 
(IPCC, 2013, Challinor et al., 2014) and overall deterioration of human 
wellbeing at the local level (UNDP, 2007).  These impacts are however 
disproportionately distributed across regions. More severe impacts are felt in 
developing countries which contribute relatively low GHGs emissions 
compared to developed countries (IPCC, 2013, UNDP, 2007). For instance, 
Africa contributes less than 3% of the global GHGs emissions (UNDP, 2007), 
yet suffers the most impacts compared to other regions of the world (Hulme et 
al., 2001, Lobell et al., 2011, IPCC, 2007a, IPCC, 2013, IPCC, 2014).  
Africa is particularly vulnerable to climate change due to its economic 
dependence on agricultural activities that are directly linked to climatic 
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variables such as rainfall, yet the continent’s low income status impedes its 
ability to tackle associated impacts of climate change (Morton, 2007). Due to 
climate change, rainfall variability in Africa has become a major concern since 
the mid-1970s (Malhi and Wright, 2004). Varying rainfall over time and space 
already causes severe declines in yields of rain-fed crops resulting in hunger 
among smallholder farmers who are the main food producers and the majority 
in Africa (World Bank, 2008). In the absence of appropriate remedies, crop 
yields in some African countries could decline by as much as 50% by 2020 
(IPCC, 2007c). Expectedly, such yield declines would further constrain food 
access due to increases in prices of major food crops such as wheat, rice and 
maize (IFPRI, 2010). Efforts to cope with problems of food insecurity drives 
many smallholders-who are the main food producers- to enchroach forests for 
alternative farming niches or charcoal procudction (Lawlor, 2014, Lambin and 
Meyfroidt, 2011). 
Efforts to address climate change causes and impacts have evolved since the 
1992 Conference on Environment and Development  (UNCED, 1992). The 
UNECD meeting achieved a key milestone in the global fight against climate 
change by bringing together over 190 States to collectively commit to an 
international climate convention, the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 1992). The 
UNFCCC was established as a platform for States and non-State actors to 
negotiate  ways of solving climate change threats in the context of sustainable 
development  (Matthew and Hammill, 2009, UNFCCC, 1992). Sustainable 
development is defined by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED, 1987:43) as:  ‘development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs’. Article 3.4 of the UNFCCC declares that climate change policies 
should aim to achieve sustainable development outcomes such as conservation, 
socioeconomic development and poverty alleviation in developing countries 
(UNFCCC, 1992). 
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Through the UNFCCC, the international community has established mitigation 
and adaptation as means to addressing climate change (UNFCCC, 1998). 
Mitigation involves anthropogenic interventions to reduce the sources or 
enhance the sinks of GHGs (IPCC, 2001b). Adaptation on the other hand refers 
to the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to climatic impacts 
in a manner that moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. Both 
mitigation and adaptation are expected to achieve sustainable development by 
spatially and temporally harmonising socioeconomic development with 
environmental conservation in a manner that safeguards  the wellbeing of 
current and future generations (UNFCCC, 1992). The UNFCCC talks have 
specifically achieved commitments on mitigation through negotiated policy 
instruments targeting payment/markets for ecosystem services (PES).  PES 
allows GHGs credits-CO2 equivalent to be traded between States and non-State 
Parties, thus enabling Parties to offset and maintain their emissions within 
allowable levels (Thomas and Twyman, 2005). 
The role of forests in global climate change mitigation through carbon markets 
is now widely recognised (IPCC, 2007b, Stern, 2006). Through their ecosystem 
services, forests regulate the global carbon cycle (Brown and Lugo, 1982). 
Forests absorb CO2  from the atmosphere and store it in their biomass thus 
preventing its release into the atmosphere  (Brown and Lugo, 1982). Forests 
store close to half of the terrestrial carbon, but if destroyed e.g burnt, the stored 
carbon would be released into the atmosphere causing further global warming 
(IPCC, 2000). 
Forests were therefore included in the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol as part of the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The Kyoto Protocol is the first 
international agreement on climate mitigation (UNFCCC, 1998). It committed 
industrialised nations to utilise carbon markets in meeting their emission 
reduction targets of 5.2% below 1990 levels during the 2008-2012 commitment 
period. In the search for a post-Kyoto climate agreement, REDD+ emerged. 
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REDD+ allows developing countries to fully commit their forests to 
international carbon markets as a means to mitigating climate change.  
 
1.3.   REDD+  
REDD+ is a UNFCCC programme designed to mitigate climate change and 
achieve sustainable development through forestry activities (UNFCCC, 2010). 
REDD+ was formally recognised as part of the UNFCCC climate regimes in 
2007 during 13th Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC. The main 
justification for REDD+ is drawn from the scientific evidence that deforestation 
causes 10-20% of global GHG emissions (IPCC, 2007b) even though this figure 
is reducing according to the latest IPCC report (IPCC, 2013). Avoiding this 
deforestation could cost-effectively (Angelsen, 2008b, Stern, 2006) offset about 
10-30% of annual GHGs emissions (Canadell and Raupach, 2008, IPCC, 2007b, 
Ciais et al., 2014). Geographically, deforestation mainly occurs in developing 
countries where most tropical forests support livelihoods and development 
(IPCC, 2000, IPCC, 2007b, Lawson, 2014). As such, the basic principle about 
REDD+ is that developing countries that are able to protect their forests and 
avoid emissions, should be financially compensated for doing so (UN-REDD, 
2010). Since its formal recognition as part of the international climate agenda, 
REDD+ has attracted interests from diverse actors with mixed implications for 
sustainable development, especially for developing countries where it is 
spatially and institutionally targeted. In the mix of multiple actors and hopes, 
key research questions have emerged.  
 
1.4.   Research need 
REDD+ is designed at international climate negotiations but implemented at 
national and local levels in developing countries. The design process  involves 
multiple actors drawn from global level organisations, such as UN agencies and 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies, national level State agencies 
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as well as local community alliances, all playing varying roles in informing 
locally implementable REDD+ rules (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011). For 
instance, States provide expertise, resources, legal framework and enforcement 
mechanisms for REDD+ within national jurisdictions  (Phelps et al., 2010b). 
Non-State actors such as the private sector, multilateral and bilateral actors are 
involved in mobilising resources for REDD+  (Bernard et al., 2014, Reinecke 
et al., 2014, Peskett et al., 2011, Rosendal and Andresen, 2011, Thompson et 
al., 2011). The local communities on the other hand, mainly expect livelihood 
benefits and recognition of their forests rights (Ghazoul et al., 2010, Griffiths 
and Martone, 2009, Pokorny et al., 2013, Schroeder, 2010). 
The multi-actor aspect of REDD+ remains the main source of institutional 
complexity for the programme’s design and implementation (Corbera, 2012, 
Angelsen et al., 2012, Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012, Visseren-Hamakers et 
al., 2012, Corbera and Schroeder, 2011). On one hand, actors’ roles are expected 
to be complementary through expertise and resources (Angelsen, 2008b, 
Corbera and Schroeder, 2011). On the other hand, studies confirm that actors 
have varying interests in REDD+ ranging from profit generation, economic 
development and livelihood benefits (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012). The 
actor interactions in REDD+ design process potentially create either 
institutional coherences or conflicts that affect the programme’s implementation 
at the national and local levels (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012).  As such, there 
is need to unpack such complex interactions to determine how decisions are 
made and to understand the compatibility of resulting REDD+ design rules with 
existing circumstances of targeted developing countries (Meridian Institute, 
2009, Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012).  
Compatibility of REDD+ with a developing country circumstances can be 
viewed in the context of national policies as well as sub-national and local 
socioeconomic circumstances (Angelsen et al., 2009). Existing national policies 
can impede or promote the implementation of REDD+. Scientific evidence 
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shows that national policies, especially those outside forestry sector, are key 
drivers of deforestation in many developing countries (Brown et al., 2008). As 
such, there is growing call for research that informs the necessary institutional 
reforms needed to address underlying drivers of deforestation for REDD+ to be 
effective (Alemagi et al., 2014, Brockhaus et al., 2013, Minang et al., 2014b).  
Scientific evidence continues to emphasise that globally designed REDD+ rules 
carried within sub-national projects will have to be filtered through sub-national 
and local socioeconomic settings as part of implementation (Wertz-
Kanounnikoff and Kongphan-apirak, 2009, Lin et al., 2014). Sub-national and 
local circumstances are diverse. They include various types of forests and their 
distribution, ownership, use and management (Bluffstone et al., 2013), land 
tenure systems (Chhatre et al., 2012), poverty rates, water access (Jindal et al., 
2008) as well as existing conservation interventions such as Integrated 
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) (Blom et al., 2010).  It is an 
established fact that poor socioeconomic development impeded the 
implementation of CDM in most poor countries and communities (Pearson et 
al., 2006, Saunders et al., 2002, Silayan, 2005). Even in REDD+, studies already 
caution about potential exclusion of poor communities especially in dryland 
areas (Bond, 2010) due to certain globally linked rules that may not resonate 
with socioeconomic circumstances of certain communities (Thompson et al., 
2011, Vatn and Vedeld, 2013). As such, there is need to verify the compatibility 
between global REDD+ rules and existing socioeconomic circumstances so as 
to avoid mistakes made in the CDM (Ebeling and Yasué, 2008).  
Global decisions on REDD+ now include a range of safeguard measures 
(UNFCCC, 2010: appendix 1/CP. 16) aimed at ensuring that REDD+ design 
and implementation are in line with sustainable development. These safeguards 
include social measures for ensuring equity and rights of local communities to 
participate and benefit from REDD+.  In doing so, REDD+ activities are 
expected to alleviate poverty and reduce resource inequalities. The safeguards 
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also include environmental measures including stabilisation of natural resource 
base through forest and biodiversity protection as well as sustainable forest 
management. Key international agencies such as the World Bank that are 
currently involved in REDD+ view these safeguards as a potential opportunity 
for REDD+ to spur pro-poor development among communities who were 
otherwise excluded from the CDM (UN-REDD, 2010, World Bank, 2011). 
Some scholars however acknowledge that implementing the safeguards in 
practice could be influenced by the local circumstances mentioned above 
(Chhatre et al., 2012, McDermott et al., 2012). At the same time, some studies 
acknowledge that the local circumstances could foster support and offer lessons 
for achieving the safeguards (Blom et al., 2010, Sills et al., 2009).  As such, 
there is additional need for scientific evidence on the interactions between 
ongoing REDD+ demonstration projects with local settings to identify enablers 
and impediments of safeguards (Angelsen et al., 2012, Visseren-Hamakers I, 
2012, UNFCCC, 2013, UNFCCC, 2011 ).  
In summary, this section shows that designing and implementing REDD+ in the 
context of sustainable development is determined by mutually interlinked 
actors, policies and socioeconomic factors across global, national, sub-national 
and local levels.  Therefore, there has been growing call for multilevel analysis 
of REDD+ to provide scientific insights and distil informative lessons needed 
for the programme’s effective design and implementation (Visseren-Hamakers 
et al., 2012, Corbera, 2012, Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2013). To contribute to 
addressing this research need, this thesis pursues a multilevel analysis of 
REDD+. 
 
1.5.   Study aim and objectives  
The overall aim of this thesis is to analyse the process of designing REDD+ 
rules at the global level and the implementation of these rules in an African 
policy and socioeconomic setting. In doing so, this research will identify 
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sources of institutional conflicts in designing and implementing REDD+ in the 
context of sustainable development.  
The study takes Kenya as a case country for understanding how global rules are 
implemented. The study achieves its aim through the following specific 
objectives:  
1. To explore the process of designing REDD+ at the global level with specific 
focus on the agency of African States in the process:  
i. To explore actors and their roles in designing REDD+ rules at the 
global level.  
ii. To explore the representation of Africa (African States) in the global 
REDD+ design process.  
2. To analyse how global REDD+ rules are implemented at the national level: 
i. To analyse the participation of sectors and stakeholders related to 
deforestation in implementing global REDD+ rules at the national 
level. 
ii. To analyse the interplay between global REDD+ rules and national 
sectoral policies on forests, land and agriculture. 
3. To analyse the interactions between globally linked REDD+ projects with 
sub-national socioeconomic factors:  
i. To develop a sub-national vulnerability index map for Kenya. 
ii. To evaluate the design of REDD+ projects and their spatial locations 
across the vulnerability map. 
iii. To assess the linkages between REDD+ projects design and sub-
national socioeconomic development.  
iv. To analyse how the linkages between REDD+ projects and 
socioeconomic development relate to global and national processes.  
4. To analyse the interaction between globally linked REDD+ projects with 
local livelihood assets: 
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i. To evaluate the design and community engagement modalities of a 
globally linked REDD+ project.   
ii. To identify the livelihood assets that are influential to the project’s 
activities (forest protection).  
iii. To analyse project impacts on livelihood assets and forest 
conservation.  
iv. To assess ways in which the local community can contribute to 
REDD+ design and implementation.  
v. To analyse the role of the State in the project’s implementation.  
5. To identify and analyse lessons that a globally linked REDD+ project can 
draw from pre-REDD integrated conservation and development projects 
(ICDPs): 
i. To assess design differences and overlaps between the REDD+ and 
ICDPs. 
ii. To identify positive lessons from the ICDPs and whether they are 
adopted by the REDD+ project. 
iii. To analyse how the REDD+ project corrects negative experiences 
and the associated implications. 
6. To identify sources of institutional conflicts in designing and implementing 
REDD+ in the context of sustainable development: 
i. To review empirical findings on objectives 1-5. 
ii. To discuss the empirical findings and identify areas of conflict and 
synergies in designing and implementing REDD+.  
iii. To provide policy recommendations needed for effective design and 
implementation of REDD+ in the context of sustainable development.  
1.6.   Kenya   
Kenya was chosen as a case country for understanding how global rules are 
implemented at the national level (see subsection 4.2.2 for the justification).  
Kenya is located in East of Africa at 0.4252° S, 36.7517° E. Eighty percent 
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(80%) of Kenya’s terrestrial land is classified as semi-arid to arid (ASALs) 
while the other parts are humid and semi-humid. Kenya’s economy and 
livelihoods depend more on agriculture and tourism, both of which significantly 
depend on forest provisioning services (Republic of Kenya, 2010a). The country 
experiences climatic vulnerability especially from high rainfall variability. This 
manifests through frequent droughts and hunger that have evolved from 20 year  
cycles two decades ago to a three year cycle a decade ago and now almost yearly 
(Republic of Kenya, 2010a).  
Kenya hosts a diversity of forests including indigenous closed canopy, 
plantation forests, mangrove and woodlands. The current forest cover is 6% of 
the country’s land area, approximately half the coverage five decades ago 
(Republic of Kenya, 2013a). According to  FAO (2010b),  Kenya loses about 
12,000 hectares of closed canopy forests annually. Kenya has however prepared 
a very ambitious climate change action plan through which the country hopes 
to address climate vulnerabilities and  reverse forest losses (Republic of Kenya, 
2013b).  
Kenya is actively involved in the the international climate negotiations and is a 
signatory to the UNFCCC (in 1994) and the Kyoto Protocol (in 2005). The 
country has prepared climate plans in line with these international 
commitments. The plan targets REDD+ as a key intervention for achieving 
emission reduction commitments, protecting forests and supporting climate 
compatible development. Specifically, REDD+ would achieve this through 
rehabilitation of degraded lands and protecting existing forests, especially those 
in dryland areas. Rehabilitating and protecting dryland forests are targeted as 
cost-effective strategies because of the available land, relatively low 
populations, yet increasing forest exploitation in these areas.  Kenya alongside 
47 other developing countries (16 from Africa) are now participants to the 
REDD+ readiness process within the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPC) and the UN-REDD. The country host some of the first 
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generation carbon projects working in diverse agroecologies(Cerbu et al., 2011, 
Diaz et al., 2011). e.g. dryland forests that dominate most parts of sub-Sahra 
Africa. As such, Kenya’s REDD+ institutions and actions provide a suitable 
case for understanding how global REDD+ is implemented within national and 
local settings (see detailed justification in section 4.2.2).  
 
1.7.   Empirical and applied contributions of the study 
This study adopts a multilevel, mixed method and interdisciplinary analysis of 
REDD+ and makes multiple empirical and applied contributions to literature 
and policy. The key contributions include:  
This study contributes new scientific evidence from a multilevel analysis of a 
global environmental regime. This is an important contribution to literature on 
REDD+ governance. Research on REDD+ has mainly focused on specific 
components of REDD+ e.g. global governance, national safeguards or local 
livelihood impacts (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012).  However, there is little 
empirical analysis linking global REDD+ design process to implementation at 
the national and local levels in a coherent manner. It has been acknowledged 
that multilevel analysis can be complex but is best placed to unlock institutional 
bottlenecks and opportunities for achieving sustainable development through 
REDD+ and emerging global environmental regimes targeting national and 
local actions (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012). In pursuing a multilevel 
analysis, this study makes a methodological contribution by developing and 
demonstrating the application of an integrated institutions and development 
framework (IDAF). The IDAF focuses on the process of designing 
environmental rules at the global level and their implementation in practice. It 
can be adapted for analysing different global environmental regimes targeting 
national and local level implementation, especially in developing countries.  
This study contributes to literature on institutional interplay. Specifically, the 
study analyses the interplay in the process of designing global REDD+ rules 
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and the implementation of resulting rules at the national level. Through this, the 
study demonstrates evidence that institutional interplay is not just about the 
established rules, as assumed in most studies, but is also embedded in the 
process of making the rules themselves. This brings a new insight to the theory 
of institutional interplay. The theory emphasises that if interacting institutions 
have similar objectives then the outcome of the interactions would be positive. 
However, this study demonstrates that even though interacting institutions could 
have similar objectives, a negative interplay may result from the process of 
designing these institutions. As such, studies should shift analytical focus to the 
institutional processes as a crucial source of interplay. Evidence on global and 
national institutional processes especially areas of negative interplay between 
REDD+ design rules and national sectoral policies is informative to policy 
reforms needed for addressing underlying drivers of deforestation in Kenya and 
elsewhere.   
In analysing how REDD+ projects interact with sub-national development 
factors, the study empirically links quantitative vulnerability analysis to a 
climate policy. This is a crucial contribution to literature on climate compatible 
development (Stringer et al. 2014, Mitchell and Maxwell, 2010). The analysis 
provides useful insights for the ongoing formulation of climate compatible 
development policies in Kenya and other African countries as well.   
Finally by assessing the implementation of a globally linked REDD+ project at 
the local level, this study contributes empirical evidence to literature on REDD+ 
implementation at the local level. A novel contribution of this analysis is the 
evidence on how people, local assets and interventions can contribute to 
implementing REDD+. This is particularly new because while most empirical 
studies evaluating the implementation of REDD+ projects (Boyd et al. 2007, 
Mustalahti et al., 2012) have commonly investigated the impacts of REDD+ 
project(s) on the local people’s livelihoods, these studies do not explicitly reveal 
how the local settings could support REDD+ itself. By revealing which local 
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assets are crucial for REDD+ implementation, this study unpacks opportunities 
and potential strategies that Kenya national climate plan and sub-national 
projects could adopt to ensure effective REDD+ implementation. 
 
1.8.   Definition of key terms 
In global environmental governance literature, various terms e.g. ‘institutions’ 
‘actors’ among others have been used and interpreted differently in various 
contexts.  It is therefore important to provide working definitions for such terms 
as applied in this thesis.  
Institutions:  This thesis adopts a combination of definitions drawn from both 
political ecology and political economy perspectives to define institutions as 
formal and informal rules as well as interactions among actors involved in 
making and implementing these rules within particular socioeconomic contexts 
(see subsection 2.4.1). 
Policy implementation deficit: This thesis adopts the definition by Jordan 
(1999) to define implementation deficit as failure by a policy to meet the 
original goals either because the policy itself is not translated into action or the 
policy is translated into action but fails to sufficiently solve the targeted 
problem(s). 
Sustainable development: The thesis adopts the definition by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WECD) that defines 
sustainable development as   ‘development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ 
(WCED, 1987:43) (see subsection 2.2.1).  
Actors: This thesis adopts the definition provided in the earth system 
governance framework and the policy process analytical framework to define 
actors as individuals, organisations and groups involved in decision making on 
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a particular policy regime (Biermann et al., 2010, Keeley and Scoones, 2003) 
(see subsection 2.4.3).   
Agency: This thesis adopts the definition of agency provided in the earth system 
governance framework (Dellas, 2011) to define agency as the ability of actors 
to participate in policy making process and prescribe rules that define ways and 
means of interactions between humans and their natural environment (see 
subsection 2.4.4).  
Livelihoods:  This thesis draws from the sustainable livelihood framework to 
define livelihoods as capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) 
and activities required for a means of living (Chambers and Conway, 1992; 
DFID, 1999) (see subsection 2.5.1). 
1.9.   Thesis outline 
The thesis is structured into ten Chapters. Each Chapter is organised into 
sections and subsections. Chapter 2 that comes after this introduction broadly 
discusses forests, their functions, threats and management efforts, their 
ecosystem services and role in regulating climate change in the context of 
sustainable development.  The Chapter shows that forests ecosystem services 
such as carbon capture and storage provided the basis upon which REDD+ 
emerged as a cost-effective and pro-poor climate change mitigation policy 
targeted at developing countries.  
Chapter 3 analyses the pertinent conceptual and methodological literature 
relevant to the aim of the study. Technical arguments about REDD+ are first 
presented followed by institutional and implementation debates respectively. In 
the debates, the Chapter reveals that harmonising actor interests and policies in 
REDD+ remains a key source of concern in designing and implementing 
REDD+ thus the need for multilevel analysis of the programme’s processes. 
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Chapter 4 describes the study design, area and methods. The Chapter justifies 
the suitability of Kenya as a case country and outlines the process of selecting 
the case projects and field sites within Kenya. The Chapter then discusses the 
development of an integrated institutions and development framework (IDAF) 
as a suitable methodological framework to guide data collection and analysis. 
The Chapter argues for mixed method approach encompassing both 
participatory methods for collecting primary data and quantitative secondary 
data as crucial for complementing evidence drawn from various levels of 
REDD+ governance and as framed by the IDAF.  
Chapter 5 presents and discusses results on designing REDD+ at the global level 
with specific focus on the agency of Africa in the design process (objective 1). 
The Chapter then analyses how the global REDD+ rules are implemented at the 
national level and the resulting interplay with the national policies (objective 2). 
The Chapter reveals that underrepresentation of African States in the global 
design process creates implementation deficits at the national level. Key 
implementation deficits relate to poor national capacity to understand and assess 
the technical rules on REDD+ and negative interplay between the global 
REDD+ rules and sectoral policies among others.   
Chapter 6 analyses the interactions between sub-national REDD+ projects with 
varying sub-national socioeconomic settings and identifies ways in which 
projects’ design and choices are linked to the global and national processes 
(objective 3). The Chapter reveals that strict global carbon standards steer a 
majority of projects in Kenya to invest mainly in developed areas to the 
exclusion of poor ones. Relatively developed areas are deemed favourable for 
delivering carbon funds and more profits for investors. The Chapter further 
argues that forests in poor areas may become more exposed to exploitation in a 
manner that could reverse the gains made by protecting forests in relatively 
richer areas.  
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Chapter 7 analyses the implementation of a globally linked REDD+ project ‘the 
Kasigau Corridor project’ at the local level. The Chapter evaluates how the 
project’s activities interact with existing households and community livelihood 
assets. It then identifies ways in which these assets can promote or impede the 
project’s work, specifically focusing on how the project design is fitted into the 
local context (objective 4). The Chapter shows that while the project is globally 
standardised to deliver carbon, the local livelihood setting pushes the project to 
consider livelihood issues beyond carbon.  The Chapter reveals that supporting 
pro-poor assets and equitable benefit sharing are crucial strategies for project 
implementation but these strategies can only work out under enabling national 
and global institutional arrangements.     
Chapter 8 analyses the implementation lessons that REDD+ can draw from 
ICDPs operating in the same local settings. The Chapter further analyses 
whether REDD+ is any different from these ICDPs in effective and equitable 
governance of forests and its services at the local level (objective 5).  The 
Chapter shows that while ICDPs provide diverse lessons, these lessons are more 
useful for REDD+ if they are adopted through a clear process that is cognisant 
of relevant stakeholders such as the State. Otherwise learning lessons only 
through local communities disconnects the project from key institutions and 
stakeholders in a manner harmful to the project’s sustainability.    
Chapter 9 synthesises and discusses empirical findings presented in Chapter5-8 
and link these to the overall aim of the thesis and in the context of the IDAF. 
The Chapter offers an overall discussion of the findings and identifies key 
institutional conflicts and synergies in designing and implementing REDD+ in 
the context of sustainable development (objective 6). The Chapter reveals that 
key institutional conflicts in REDD+ design and implementation mainly revolve 
around crosscutting issues related to actor representation in REDD+ decisions, 
institutional interactions between REDD+ rules and national policies and most 
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importantly the global carbon requirements versus local livelihood 
expectations.  
Chapter 10 finally offers general conclusions; reflections and highlights future 
research needs.  The Chapter specifically emphasises that the local settings 
present diverse lessons and opportunities for REDD+ design but the main 
institutional gaps emanate from the global and national processes where 
multiple actor interests need to be harmonised.     
 
1.10.   Conclusion 
This Chapter has stated the need for a multilevel scientific analysis of REDD+, 
a global climate change policy designed for implementation in developing 
countries. The Chapter has presented the overall aim of the study and an outline 
of the specific interlinked objectives for achieving this aim. The key empirical, 
methodological and applied contributions the study makes have also been 
explained. The next Chapter provides broad overview of forest carbon markets 
within which REDD+ emerged before tackling the scientific debates in the 
subsequent Chapter.  
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Chapter 2   
    Forestry carbon markets and the  
 emergence of REDD+ 
 
 
2.1.   Introduction 
This Chapter sets the scene by unveiling the broader spectrum of forestry 
concepts and carbon markets that have informed REDD+ as a multilevel climate 
policy. The Chapter has five sections. The second section broadly discusses the 
value of forests in supporting livelihoods and ecosystem services across local, 
regional and global levels. This section shows that these multiple forest 
functions face threats from anthropogenic development and livelihood 
activities. These threats complicate forest conservation efforts in developing 
countries and exacerbate greenhouse gas (GHGs) emissions. The third section 
discusses the inclusion of forests as part of the climate change agenda, 
specifically targeting payment for ecosystem services (PES) as a way of 
engaging multiple actors, including the private sector, in collectively managing 
forests and responding to climate change. The section explains the emergence 
of compliance forestry carbon markets under the Kyoto Protocol and the 
voluntary carbon markets with varying actors and standards. Within this nexus 
of carbon markets, the fourth section discusses the emergence and justification 
of REDD+ as a cost-effective programme that allows developing countries to 
fully commit their forests to international carbon markets as a means to 
mitigating climate change in the context of sustainable development. The fifth 
section offers concluding remarks and links the present Chapter to the next one. 
 
2.2.   Forests 
This section discusses forests in terms of their ecosystem functions, threats and 
conservation efforts. The section shows that forests provide mutually dependent 
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ecosystem functions across local, regional and global levels. Specifically, there 
is close mutual dependence between forests’ provisioning services for 
livelihoods/development and global needs for regulating services. However, 
conservation and development agendas for forests are not always compatible, 
particularly as use of forests for livelihoods/development can extract forest 
stocks and reduce their capacity to deliver other ecosystem services (Martin et 
al., 2010). Efforts to conserve forests have attempted to manage the trade-offs 
between conservation and development through Integrated Conservation and 
Development Projects but with minimal success (Minang and vanNoordwijk, 
2013). This section then goes on to consider the emergence of Payment for 
Ecosystem Services (PES), as a means for reconciling development and 
conservation in the context of sustainable development.   
 
2.2.1.   Forest ecosystem services   
Forests are a crucial part of the global biosphere covering nearly one third of 
the earth’s surface (FAO, 2010a). They provide multiple ecosystem services 
across local to global levels. Ecosystem services are goods and services 
generated from natural biogeochemical processes taking place within forests 
(IUFRO, 2009). Biogeochemical processes involve nutrient cycling through 
natural interactions between trees, soils and the atmosphere (IPCC, 2000). For 
instance, through the process of  photosynthesis forests capture CO2 from the 
atmosphere into biomass that in turn replenishes soil nutrients needed for forest 
growth (IPCC, 2000). Such cycles support provisioning, regulating and cultural 
service (Figure 2.1).  
Forest provisioning services are direct products that people extract for 
livelihoods and development. Provisioning products such as firewood, fruits 
honey, timber, chewing sticks,  water and rainfall are useful for local livelihoods 
and national development  (Locatelli et al., 2011, Eastaugh, 2010). Roughly 
about 400-500 million people, mostly in developing countries depend on these 
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products  for livelihoods (Locatelli et al., 2011). Specific examples from Africa 
e.g. Ghana, Burkina Faso and Mali (Nkem et al., 2008), Zambia (Kalaba et al., 
2013a, Kalaba et al., 2013b) Kenya (Thenya and Kiama, 2008), and South 
Africa  (Eastaugh, 2010, Shacklton et al., 2007) indicate that the people do not 
only draw livelihoods from forests but use them for coping as well, especially  
during climatically induced agricultural failures. About 6% of Africa’s GDP 
depends on forest provisioning products e.g. honey exports from Zambia, 
Rwanda, Ethiopia; timber exports e.g. acacia from Senegal and Eretria among 
others (Eastaugh, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2.1: Forest ecosystem services and their linkages.  
Source: Modified from IUFRO (2009)  
 
Forest regulating services constitute indirect services such as carbon capture and 
storage that support the global biosphere e.g. climate regulation.  Forests reserve 
half of the world’s terrestrial carbon;  283 Gt in biomass, 38 Gt in dead wood 
and 317 Gt in soil, (IPCC, 2007b).  They capture carbon and reduce its 
atmospheric concentration. Cultural services from forests are equally essential 
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in developing countries and encompass products such as special tree leaves and 
barks with medicinal values or services such as spiritual shrines or recreational 
areas. Some cultural sites and products within forests are gaining economic 
value in most developing countries as touristic sites and artistic commodities. 
However, many of these cultural services still have no monetary value.  A key 
point in the forests ecosystem services is that they are mutually interlinked 
(IPCC, 2000). Extraction of forest provisioning services such as firewood and 
timber reduces forests stocks and the capacity to deliver regulatory services such 
as carbon capture for climate regulation (Eastaugh, 2010, IUFRO, 2009). As 
such, exploiting forests’ provisioning services has been singled out as key threat 
to forests.  
2.2.2.   Forest threats  
Globally, approximately 13 million hectares of closed canopy forests are being 
lost annually due to livelihood activities and large scale commercial activities 
drawn from forests provisioning services (FAO, 2010a). The UN-REDD (2008) 
links almost half of deforestation in tropical areas to livelihood activities such 
as charcoal burning and small scale agriculture, especially in Africa. Severe 
livelihood driven forest losses occur when the provisioning services are 
overexploited for coping with climatically induced agricultural failures due to 
lack of other livelihood options and poverty (e.g. Kalaba et al., 2013a, Nkem et 
al., 2012, IUFRO, 2009).  
Commercially driven forest losses mainly result from a nexus of illegal logging 
for the timber industry and agricultural exports (Lawson, 2014, Eastaugh, 
2010). Illegal logging, especially in tropical areas, mainly occurs through 
corrupt government departments controlling most forests in developing 
countries (Brown and Bird, 2008). Illegal logging for timber degrades tropical 
forests as indigenous forests are converted to fast growing plantation forests to 
meet the timber demand (Lawson, 2014).  In some instances, e.g. Kenya 
(Ndungu Land Commission, 2004), cleared areas are not replanted but are either 
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allocated to human settlement or sold to private actors for commercial 
agriculture and other investments (Klopp, 2000). Illegal logging and irregular 
allocation of tropical forest areas were responsible for half of the tropical 
deforestation between 2000 and 2012  (Lawson, 2014). Recent debates further 
indicate potential for severe forest losses that are likely to result from emerging 
land grabs for commercial agriculture targeted at export markets for food and 
biofuel (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010, Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011).  In sum, 
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries results from a 
complexity of interlinked livelihoods and development factors spanning across 
multiple sectors (e.g land agriculture and forests), actors (commercial 
government and local communities) and levels (local, national and global). 
Efforts to conserve forests have mainly attempted to reconcile conservation and 
development aims.     
    
2.2.3.   Forest conservation efforts 
Efforts to conserve forests range from global declarations and agreements to 
practical activities, all emphasising sustainable forest management. Sustainable 
forest management principles were adopted in the 1992 Conference on 
Environment and Development  (UNCED, 1992).  In the 2012 Earth Summit,  
forests were identified as a key resource requiring global conservation efforts to 
support future needs (UN, 2012). The United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals also include forest conservation as part of achieving environmental 
sustainability (UN, 2000). Drawing on these declarations, forest concerns are 
now addressed through a range of international policy instruments such as the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), International Trade on Timber 
(ITTO) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) (UNCED, 1992).   
These global agreements have partly been translated into practical efforts 
through integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs). ICDPs are 
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project-based initiatives targeted to conserve forests and biodiversity while 
supporting socioeconomic development activities in local settings of developing 
countries (Minang and van Noordwijk, 2013, Roe, 2008, Blom et al., 2010). 
These ICDPs have been executed within various conservation paradigms 
including the protected area approach (Brandon and Wells, 2009), community 
afforestation (Boyd et al., 2007), participatory forest management and 
alternative livelihoods (Wells, 2003, Minang and van Noordwijk, 2013). 
The success of ICDPs in addressing deforestation is contested by many scholars. 
ICDPs have been criticised for failing to address underlying drivers of 
deforestation due to path dependency in the design and implementation of the 
projects (Blom et al., 2010, Brandon and Wells, 2009). In this, others believe 
that the ICDPs have failed to clearly define the link between poverty and 
conservation (McShane and Newby, 2004). There are those who further claim 
that ICDPs activities were short term and unsuitable to achieve any meaningful 
forest conservation, coupled with poor monitoring and reporting (Blom et al., 
2010, Roe, 2008). Some scholars have gone ahead to claim that if ICDPs 
succeeded, then the current land-based emission problems would not exist  
(Minang and van Noordwijk, 2013). In the context of ICDP failures, new 
conservation strategies such as Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) have 
emerged.  
PES has gained legitimacy as a tool for actively engaging multiple actors 
including non-State ones, such as the private sector, in forest conservation 
(Wunder and Albán, 2008). PES is defined in Wunder (2005:2) as ‘a voluntary 
transaction where a well-defined ecosystem service is bought by a buyer from 
an ecosystem service provider if and only if the ecosystem service is secured’. 
PES is used for a variety of forest ecosystem services including biodiversity 
(e.g. fees set on wildlife tourism), landscaping, catchment management, and 
carbon sequestration for climate regulation (Wunder, 2005, Swingland, 2002). 
Some scholars argue that PES provides economic incentives for landowners to 
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protect forests as part of economic investment, ensuring equity if compared to 
State managed ICDPs (Pagiola et al., 2002, Farley and Costanza, 2010, Jack et 
al., 2008). Other scholars contest PES on sustainability grounds arguing that 
PES markets are created and legitimised through time-bound international 
agreements which are mainly legitimate over specific time period (Corbera et 
al., 2007). Additionally, internationally legitimised PES markets are unlikely to 
achieve legitimate and equitable outcomes especially with regards to local 
communities who are often excluded from higher level decisions (Pagiola et al., 
2005, Corbera et al., 2007). Despite the pros and cons, PES has gained 
considerable attention in the efforts to tackle climate change through carbon 
markets to which forests have been included as part of climate change agenda.  
 
2.3.   Forests in climate change  
This section analyses forests as part of international climate change agenda 
within the UNFCCC. It bases its critique on Figure 2.2 and demonstrates the 
emergence of REDD+ as a forestry carbon market mechanism for mitigating 
climate change in the context of sustainable development.    
2.3.1.   Climate change and sustainable development 
Climate change actions are aimed at achieving sustainable development (UN, 
1992). The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 
1987:43) defines sustainable development as:  ‘development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs’. Sustainable development emerged as a solution to 
climate change given that development itself causes climate change.  Climate 
change is specifically linked to imbalances in resource use in which 
industrialised nations hosting only  20% of the world’s population, produce 57% 
of the total world’s Gross Domestic Product and are responsible for emitting 
46% of global GHG (IPCC, 1990). Yet the impacts of climate change including 
hunger, pest and diseases, floods are felt more in the developing countries. For 
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instance, Africa contributes less than 3% of the global GHG emissions (UNDP, 
2007), yet is world’s most climatically affected region (Hulme et al., 2001, 
Lobell et al., 2011, IPCC, 2007a, IPCC, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Chronological framework for climate change actions, institutions 
within which REDD+ emerged as part of broader collective efforts to achieve 
sustainable development.    
 
Sustainable development therefore encourages collective effort to spatially and 
temporally harmonise development with environment and human wellbeing in 
a manner cognisant of future needs and ecological limits to economic growth 
(WECD, 1987). In other words, actions to achieve sustainable development 
must ensure environmental and social outcomes with equitable positive effects 
on current and future generations (WCED, 1987). In the context of sustainable 
development, international climate negotiations have established mitigation and 
adaptation as main responses to climate change under the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 
1992) and in these, forests are included as discussed next. 
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2.3.2.   Mitigation and adaptation  
Efforts to tackle climate change have been framed around mitigation and 
adaptation.  Mitigation involves anthropogenic intervention to reduce the 
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gasses (GHGs) that are responsible 
for climate change while adaptation refers to adjustment in natural or human 
systems in moderating climate change harm and exploiting beneficial 
opportunities (IPCC, 2001b).  Mitigation is ideally a global scale agenda aimed 
at reducing global atmospheric GHG concentrations. It differs from adaptation 
which mainly aims to regulate climate risks within specific local or national 
contexts (Thomas and Twyman, 2005).  
 
In the context of forests, the two measures overlap considerably especially 
because forest provisioning services for adaptation are dependent upon 
regulating services that control the carbon cycle for climate change mitigation 
(Duguma et al., 2014a, Locatelli et al., 2011). For instance, most rain-fed 
farmers extract forest goods and services e.g. charcoal, and crop cultivation in 
moist forests areas as ways of adapting to climatically induced crop failures and 
in doing so, cause forest losses, subsequent release of carbon into the 
atmosphere and reduction of forests capacity to absorb carbon  (IPCC, 2000, 
Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011). In a somewhat circular manner, the deforestation 
and associated climatic changes drive precipitation losses and cause more 
pressure on forests for adaptation (IPCC, 2007c, Malhi and Wright, 2004). 
Given this link, studies have argued that mitigation actions targeting forests in 
developing countries should also address adaptation needs to be effective 
(Eastaugh, 2010, Duguma et al., 2014b). 
 
International climate talks have however focussed on getting States to commit 
to mitigation through negotiated PES instruments that allow GHG credits-CO2 
equivalent to be traded between States and non-State Parties. As discussed in 
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the next subsection, the Kyoto Protocol is one of the first international climate 
agreements within which forestry carbon markets formally emerged as part of 
mitigation.   
 
2.3.3.  The Kyoto Protocol: establishing forestry carbon markets  
The Kyoto Protocol is the first legally binding international climate agreement, 
adopted in 1997 at the 3rd COP in Kyoto, Japan. It commits industrialised 
nations to meet emissions reduction targets of 5.2% below 1990 levels during 
the 2008-2012 commitment period. Thse commited nations can either pursue 
resource efficient technological innovations or PES in meeting their targets. The 
main mechanisms allowable under the protocol nclude: Joint Implementation 
(JI), Emissions Trading (ET) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The 
three options are all designed to achieve sustainable development outcomes 
through various activities.  The JI involves joint mitigation activities initiated 
by two or more industrialised countries. JI activities may, for example, involve 
initiating efficient energy sources such as wind power in place of coal based 
energy plants (UNFCCC, 1998). In ET schemes, a central authority in an annex 
I country (e.g. a governmental body), sets emissions limits and offers emission 
permits for firms to purchase resulting in overall emission reduction. While ET 
and JI largely target energy activities in industrialised and middle income 
countries, the Clean Development Mechanism is targeted at developing 
countries and includes forestry activities. 
 
2.3.4.   Forestry carbon in the Clean Development Mechanism   
The CDM allows industrialised nations to finance afforestation and 
reforestation (A/R) activities to meet part of their Kyoto commitments. 
Developing CDM A/R projects involves nine stages starting from initial project 
idea to the emission certification stage (Pearson et al., 2006). The CDM A/R 
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initiatives, however, registered minimal success both in terms of portfolio and 
regional distribution.   
Currently, CDM A/R constitutes less than one percent of the total CDM activity 
portfolio while the majority (close to 80%) of projects occur in the energy sector 
(Christman, 2014).  The portfolio imbalance is partly attributable to early 
climate science (IPCC, 1990) that emphasised fossil fuels as the main cause of 
climate change (Gullison et al., 2007). However, some scholars argue that the 
scope of CDM A/R excluded other possible forestry activities such as avoiding 
deforestation and agriculture which dominate the land use sector in developing 
countries (Zomer, 2009, Saunders et al., 2002).  REDD was specifically  
excluded from the CDM on grounds that it is subject to uncertainty and leakage 
that could compromise the credibility of carbon credits and affect CDM market 
efficiency (Saunders et al., 2002).  
Debates on regional imbalances in the CDM are concerned that more than one 
third (80%)  of the CDM activities are hosted in middle income countries such 
as China while certain low income regions such as Africa host less than one 
percent of such activities, none of which are A/R (Christman, 2014, Pearson et 
al., 2006, Silayan, 2005).  The studies mainly attribute regional imbalances to 
poor institutional and socioeconomic capacity which limits the ability of low 
income developing countries to develop, implement and enforce the required 
CDM compliant standards.     
In the context of strict CDM requirements, voluntary forestry carbon markets 
emerged as an alternative platform. These markets include a diversity of actors 
and activities that are not bound by the Kyoto commitments (Bond et al., 2009).  
They operate within multiple and flexible market standards such as Plan-Vivo, 
World Bank’s Bio-Carbon Funds, Voluntary Carbon Standards (VCS) among 
others (Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez, 2014). In these diverse options, various 
actors can execute a wider range of forestry activities e.g. avoided deforestation 
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or agroforestry, that were excluded in the CDM  (Paiva et al., 2014). The 
voluntary market is now the main source of carbon credits for a variety of buyers 
and it currently take up close to one third of the total forestry carbon portfolio 
worldwide (Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez, 2014). It is within this thriving 
voluntary framework that REDD+ formally emerged. 
 
2.4.  Emergence of REDD+: rationale  
REDD+ was proposed as a formal voluntary initiative in 2005 at the 11th 
Conference of Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC in Montreal Canada by the 
Governments of Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica (Ghazoul et al., 2010). The 
proposal was followed by a work programme on REDD+, ‘the Bali Action Plan’ 
which was adopted for negotiations at the 13th COP in Bali (decision 2/CP 13). 
The basic argument about REDD+ is that countries that are able to protect their 
forests and avoid emissions should be financially compensated for doing so 
(UN-REDD, 2010). In this basic principle, REDD+ has become a multi-actor 
programme framed around particular scientific, geographic and economic 
rationales.  
Scientifically, REDD+ is justified on account that it could curb deforestation 
and halt associated emissions (Canadell and Raupach, 2008, IPCC, 2007b). 
Geographically, the said deforestation mainly takes place in developing 
countries where most tropical forests support livelihoods and economies (IPCC, 
2000, IPCC, 2007b). Economically, arguments for REDD+ centre on its cost-
effectiveness if compared to other options such as industrial energy cuts 
(Angelsen, 2008b, Stern, 2006). The economic rationale further builds on the 
expectation that REDD+ funds could spur sustainable development in 
developing countries (UN-REDD, 2010). Specifically, REDD+ could support 
pro-poor livelihoods and development that reduces inequalities and enhance 
conservation in poor areas which have been reportedly frontiers of deforestation 
and forest degradation (UNCED, 1992). The sustainable development report 
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concerns that poverty and resource degradation coexist and that poor areas are 
frontiers of forest resource degradation and inequalities (WECD, 1987). Pro-
poor REDD+ therefore is linked to the fact that poorer people in the society 
depend more forests for livelihoods thus they require more attention in efforts 
to address deforestation and forest degradation (Bond, 2010, Enright, 2012). As 
such, pro-poor approaches to implementing REDD+ has occupied place in 
REDD+ implementation debates with  varying perception about what constitute 
‘pro-poor’ in practice and why it is crucial for REDD+ (see section 3.5.6).   
 Drawing on this set claims, the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC has made 
a series of decisions on the REDD+ design components. For instance, decision 
2/CP. 13 and decision 4/CP 14 mainly focused on collecting scientific and 
policy views on methods, finance and safeguards. The options were mainly 
adopted in decision 1/CP. 16 while decision 2/CP 17 mainly adopted the 
technical and financial options. In the COP 19 (decisions 19,10,11,12,13 and 
14/ CP. 19),  the design components were re-affirmed into a single REDD+ 
institutional framework ‘the Warsaw Framework for REDD+’ that is expected 
to gain final agreement in COP 21 scheduled for Paris in 2015. The Warsaw 
Framework principally involves results based funding of REDD+ activities and 
national monitoring, verification and reporting (MVR). The framework 
recognises various modes of implementing REDD+ subject to coordination 
from the national government.  
2.5   Conclusion 
This Chapter has discussed forests from a broader perspective including their 
role in climate change mitigation in the context of sustainable development. The 
Chapter also shows that REDD+ has emerged as a cost-effective and pro-poor 
climate change mitigation policy targeted at developing countries that were 
otherwise excluded from the CDM. The Chapter however shows that REDD+ 
is still being designed within the UNFCCC. A range of scientific debates have 
emerged to inform the design process as analysed in the next Chapter.   
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Chapter 3   
Scientific debates on REDD+   institutional 
design and implementation 
 
 
3.1.   Introduction  
This Chapter analyses scientific concepts and theories relevant to the REDD+ 
institutions and their implementation. The Chapter is divided into seven 
sections. The second section makes a case for why REDD+ is crucial for science 
and policy based on its key institutional differences from past forest 
management interventions such as ICDPs and the CDM. The third section 
analyses the technical debates around expected REDD+ performance standards 
such as additionality, reference levels, and emission reversals. The section 
shows that these technical measures form the basis for what is eligible for 
REDD+ and shapes institutional debates. In the fourth section, institutional 
debates are analysed by first defining institutions not only as rules and 
regulations but also the process and actors involved in designing these rules. 
The section then focuses on actor agency as a suitable institutional concept for 
analysing actor interactions and contributions to the REDD+ design process at 
the global level. The section defines agency, analyses ways of exercising it and 
outlines how it can be measured. The fifth section then analyses the 
implementation debates by first outlining the broader theories of institutional 
implementation. The section then narrows down to analyse debates on expected 
REDD+ implementation outcomes in the context of sustainable development. 
Throughout the analysis, research gaps are highlighted and linked to specific 
Chapters. To frame the analysis, the sixth section discusses suitable frameworks 
for linking REDD+ institutions and their implementation in the context of 
sustainable development.  
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3.2.   What makes REDD+ important for science and policy? 
REDD+ brings multiple promises and hopes in forest governance and 
sustainable development. These hopes are partly based on the unique 
institutional features that make REDD+ different from its predecessor forestry 
programmes such as the CDM and ICDPs (Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1: Ways in which REDD+ differ from the CDM and ICDPs: These 
differences are based on standardised features drawn from policy documents.    
 
Feature  REDD+  CDM ICDPs  
    
Institutional 
framework  
Internationally negotiated under 
the UNFCCC. Could be legally 
established following the 
Warsaw framework (decision 
9/COP 19).  
Legally documented as 
part of Kyoto Protocol 
with ratification by 
member states. Mainly 
requires action by 
developed countries. 
Country-specific, 
defined within 
particular national 
sector  
Market 
mechanism/s
ector  
Voluntary market  Compliance  market  Donor based, may 
involve voluntary PES 
in some instances 
Forest 
management 
approach 
Focus more on protecting 
existing forests (avoided 
deforestation) 
Reforestation and 
afforestation involving 
newly planted and 
naturally regenerated 
forests 
Socioeconomic 
development to 
incentivise forest 
conservation  
Project cycle 3 steps including readiness 
proposals, readiness preparation 
and production of results based 
carbon credits.    
Involves nine steps: 
project design (PD), 
national approval, 
validation of PD, 
registration, monitoring, 
verification, Certification.  
Often depends on donor 
and government 
approval  
Main actors  Multilateral funds, bilateral 
funds, development agencies, 
international development banks, 
national development banks, 
private sector, UN agencies 
(UNEP, UNDP, FAO, UN-
REDD), carbon consultancies, 
national governments.  
Project developers, CDM 
Policy Board, private 
sector, buyers, brokers 
and retailers, CMP, 
DOEs, DNA, consultants, 
Annex I governments 
running emission trading 
schemes. 
Donors, states and 
forestry or agriculture 
sectors 
Social 
benefits  
Safeguards established in annex 
1/CP 16. Social standards such as 
CCBS used alongside the 
emission reduction standards.  
Sustainable development 
benefits, poverty 
reductions documented as 
part of safeguards.  
Socioeconomic 
development initiative 
designed as part of 
incentives for forest 
conservation  
MVR Project based reporting nested in 
the National monitoring and 
reporting systems. Emphasis on 
performance in terms of 
additionality, leakage avoidance 
measured on the basis of 
reference levels 
Project based reporting 
and verification.  
Emphasis on additionality 
with little focus on 
permanence and leakage  
No performance based 
monitoring. No 
established verification 
standards. Activities 
monitored based on 
internal project 
procedures.  
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In this menu of differences, three key aspects make REDD+ a unique 
programme needing critical scientific and policy examination: involvement of 
multiple actors, spatial targeting at poor countries and new approaches to forest 
governance. 
In terms of actors, REDD+ has emerged as a global forest governance 
programme bringing together a diversity of actors from global to local level all 
contributing to the programme’s design and implementation (Corbera and 
Schroeder, 2011). This diversity of actors especially the formal recognition of 
indigenous people and local communities in decisions contrasts with both the 
CDM and ICDPs which were mainly under State and private sector control. 
Bringing all these actors together to negotiate and account for all their interests 
and responsibilities could result in unique institutional interplays including 
coherence, synergies and conflicts. Scientifically unpacking this interplay in the 
context of sustainable development is crucial (see section 3.4).   
Spatially targeting REDD+ at developing countries and supporting these 
countries to participate, makes REDD+ a pro-poor international forest 
governing instrument. This is mainly because such spatial targeting was not 
emphasised in the CDM. Indeed key REDD+ funders now claim that REDD+ 
will increase participation of poor areas in carbon markets (UN-REDD, 2010, 
World Bank, 2011) compared to the CDM (see section 2.4.8).  As such, 
scientific analysis that attempts to unlock whether REDD+, in its progress so 
far, is likely to be any different in terms of equitable redistribution of carbon 
markets and associated benefits, will make an important contribution to 
literature and policy (see more in section 3.5). 
REDD+ targets deforestation of existing forests as its main activity for 
generating carbon. This contrasts with the CDM which focuses on afforestation 
and reforestation while not restricting use of existing forests.   In a somewhat 
similar manner, the ICDPs promote sustainable forest use in which most 
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communities can still access and exploit forests for their livelihoods (Roe, 
2008). By contrast, performance requirements in REDD+ such as result-based 
Monitoring, Verification and Reporting system (MVR) mean that there would 
be greater restriction on forests access compared to the CDM and ICDPs even 
though these forests have been key source of livelihoods for most local 
communities. As such, understanding how the globally set REDD+ rules 
practically interplay local settings where these forests are hosted is crucial not 
only to verify the ‘implementality’ of REDD+ but also to reveal whether 
REDD+ can create a positive shift in forest governance and livelihoods 
compared to ICDPs and the CDM (section 3.5). The three features 
differentiating REDD+ from past climate and development initiatives forms the 
general basis upon which this thesis draws specific research questions and 
objectives from a range of existing literature analysed in this Chapter. The next 
section begins with analysing the technical debates upon which other 
institutional and implementation debates build. 
 
3.3.   Debates on REDD+ technical design  
Technical debates in REDD+ have centred on measures for monitoring, 
verifying and reporting  (MVR) REDD+ activities (Angelsen, 2008c). The 
MVR measures are technically interlinked and aimed at ensuring that REDD+ 
activities result in actual changes in forests cover and carbon stocks above what 
would be there in the absence of REDD+ (Obersteiner et al., 2009). This change 
is mainly calculated from a baseline scenario known as ‘reference levels’ and 
carbon stock changes known as ‘additionality’ (Angelsen, 2008a) and verified 
through performance measures such as permanence and leakage (Wunder, 
2008b).  
Reference level denotes the baseline forest cover and carbon stocks upon which 
REDD+ payments are made for additional avoidance of deforestation and 
associated emissions (Angelsen, 2008a). Setting reference levels has remained 
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contentious in REDD+ policy and research especially due to varying 
socioeconomic circumstances, forest usage and trends in developing countries 
(Verchot et al., 2009). Studies have focused on whether a national reference 
level should be set based on historical deforestation (Santilli et al., 2005) or 
above historical deforestation (Mollicone et al., 2007).  A reference level based 
on historical deforestation would mean lower baselines for countries with high 
deforestation rates and this translates into potentially higher carbon payments 
compared to low deforestation countries (Figure 3.1). In this, referencing 
REDD+ based on historical deforestation is criticised as a means to rewarding 
deforestation (Olander et al., 2008, Asner, 2009).  
 
Figure 3.1: Options for forest reference levels under REDD+ and associated 
accountable emissions.  
Source: Olander et al. (2008)  
 
Most scholars however agree that the ideal reference level should be able to 
provide incentives for curbing historically high deforestation and maintaining 
historically low deforestation (Angelsen, 2008a, Busch et al., 2009, Olander et 
al., 2008). To achieve this, studies have suggested options such as global and 
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national deforestation averages (Strassburg et al., 2009) or withholding part of 
REDD+ payments for forest stocking (Cattaneo, 2010) but all these posit 
varying implications on accountable emissions and associated payments (Figure 
3.1). Nonetheless, a more conservative referencing approach that builds on 
national circumstances has been adopted in the UNFCCC negotiations 
(UNFCCC, 2013). However, some scholars have expressed concerns that high 
variations in national circumstances and spatial and temporal data limitations 
may subject such reference levels to significant assumptions and potential 
misuse by some actors to report higher carbon additionality (Strassburg et al., 
2009). 
Additionality is the amount of carbon emissions that are reduced by a particular 
REDD+ initiative over a period of time (Angelsen, 2008a). It provides a 
measure upon which carbon payments are made. Additionality is ideally derived 
from the difference between the reference level and the amount of verifiable 
carbon stocks after a period of time and is expressed in tons of CO2 per year or 
per unit area (Karky et al., 2013). Additionality depends on changes in forest 
cover, density and age (Gibbs, 2000, Karky et al., 2013). Sub-national or 
national level REDD+ projects that are able to protect larger forest areas for 
many years are likely to receive more payments (Karky et al., 2013). Given its 
role in payments, additionality is subject to verification measures such emission 
leakage and reversals during implementation (Olander et al., 2008).  
Leakage occurs in situations where drivers of deforestation are shifted to other 
areas such that emissions avoided in one geographical area are increased in 
another place (Wunder, 2008a). For example when a REDD+ project restricts 
charcoal burning in one area and shifts demand for charcoal and associated 
emissions to other non-project areas. A number of studies have emphasised 
national level MVRs as a means of confining leakage within national 
boundaries (Wunder, 2008b, Angelsen, 2008a, Angelsen et al., 2008, Minang 
and van Noordwijk, 2013). Some scholars however think that a national MVR 
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system could affect a country’s commitment to REDD+ especially in instances 
where internal leakage from common sub-national activities such as agriculture 
significantly affect payments (Olander et al., 2008). It has been suggested that 
such sub-national leakages could be minimised if REDD+ adopts a landscape 
approach in which all land uses are incorporated as part of REDD+ schemes 
(FAO, 2011, Minang et al., 2014a, van Noordwijk et al., 2013, Zomer, 2009). 
Proponents of the landscape approach argue that activities such as agroforestry, 
if supported by REDD+, could supply households with forest goods such as 
firewood and poles in situations where forest access is restricted for REDD+. In 
any case, most agricultural areas with substantial tree cover, depending on a 
country’s forest definition, could be counted as part of REDD+ especially if 
remote sensing monitoring tools are applied (Zomer, 2009). 
Emission reversal involves the situation where emissions that are already 
captured are released into the atmosphere due to rampant deforestation events. 
In this, REDD+ activities are expected to ensure that emissions are permanently 
reduced. Emission permanence mainly depends on deforestation threats or short 
forest harvesting periods. If forests under REDD+ are cleared in a shorter 
duration e.g. less than 30 year period, then emissions would be reversed 
(Dutschke and Wertz-Kanounnkoff, 2008). It has been argued that the major 
threat to emission permanence is underlying drivers of deforestation such as 
governance failures that promote unexpected forest losses (see section 2.2.2).  
Measures suggested to ensure permanence include incorporating project credit 
buffers, commercial insurance and sharing liability between Parties (Dutschke 
and Wertz-Kanounnkoff, 2008) and institutional reforms to counter underlying 
drivers of deforestation (Brockhaus et al., 2013, Minang et al., 2014b). 
Overall, the technical debates indicate that implementing REDD+ is subject to 
multiple implications for various actors and actions both in terms of credibility 
in emission reduction and benefit sharing. The implications have attracted 
diverse institutional debates on actor interactions, their influence on REDD+ 
    
 
39 
 
process and potential implications (Angelsen 2008b).  The technical debates lay 
the foundation for institutional debates that are discussed in the next section. 
 
3.4.   Debates on REDD+ Institutional design 
This section builds on the technical debates analysed in the previous section to 
analyse the institutional debates framing the design of the technical provisions.  
    
3.4.1.   Conceptualising institutions in REDD+ 
‘Institutions’ is a broad and ambiguous concept interpreted differently in 
different fields. In the context of sustainable development, institutions can be 
viewed from the perspective of political ecology or political economy (Howard, 
1990, Holling, 2001).  Table 3.2 offers a range of specific definitions aligned to 
these fields.  Political ecology literature defines institutions from a broader 
perspective that includes formal and informal rules and the processes of making 
the rules. For instance, Leach et al. (1999) equate institutions to a set of informal 
and formal rules as well as procedures that govern the formulation of rules and 
assignment of roles, including interactions with resources.  In the context of the 
sustainable livelihoods framework, Scoones (1998; 2009) emphasises that 
institutions are part of continuous social negotiations.   
On the other hand, the political economy perspective emphasises formality of 
institutions and mainly argues that institutions are formal rules that are legally 
specified in legislation (de-jure) and factually implemented in practice (de-
facto). Some political economy literature e.g. Glaeser et al. (2004) even 
criticises a large cadre of institutional research as  conceptually flawed, and 
irrelevantly focused on ‘fuzzy policies’ which according to Voigt (2013) do not 
contain meaningful information to steer decisions, performance and 
enforcement.  
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Table 3.2: Various definitions of institutions; political ecology1, political 
economy 2   
 
The two perspectives of institutions therefore differ on whether informal and 
frequently changing rules and regulations should be considered as part of 
institutions or be ignored as ‘insignificant’.  Both perspectives however agree 
that institutions constitute a set of rules and regulations that constrain 
behaviours and shape decisions and flow of resources. A central institutional 
aspect captured in the political ecology perspective is that institutions involve a 
process and continuous negotiations among different actors with varying 
interests. This suggests that institutions are not just the set of rules but also the 
process of making these rules e.g. actor interactions, their influence and roles in 
the process of making the rules.  
In the context of REDD+, institutions include both formal and informal rules 
and the process negotiating these rules.  Formal rules are structurally negotiated 
and formally specified in agreements and protocols at global and national levels. 
Negotiating these formal rules also involves informal processes including 
lobbying, informal side events at the UNFCCC, and SBSTA meetings among 
Definition   Reference  
Institutions may thus be formal or informal, often fluid or ambiguous 
and usually subject to multiple interpretation by different actors. They 
are part of a continuous social negotiation-rather than fixed ‘objects’ 
or ‘bounded social systems. 
 
(Scoones, 1998: 12)
1
 
Institution refers to the shared concepts used by humans in 
repetitive situations organized by rules, norms, and strategies 
 
Ostrom (2007:23)
1 
 
Institutions are humanly created formal and informal mechanisms 
that shape social and individual expectations, interactions, and 
behaviour 
 
Agrawal et al. (2008:3)
1
 
Legal systems or electoral rules look more like “institutions” when 
they are actually used over time, in contrast, for example, to the 
presidencies of Bill Clinton or George Bush, which most people 
would not regard as “institutions.” 
 
Glaeser et al. (2004:7)
2
  
One should always aim at measuring the institution as formally 
specified in legislation (de jure) and as factually implemented (de 
facto).  
 
Voigt (2013: 3)
2
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others (Schroeder and Lovell, 2012, Schroeder, 2010). At the local level though, 
most rules and regulations governing forests are largely informal and draw on 
local narratives, informal family networks and traditions that are sometimes 
messy but are factual in mediating forest resource access, management and 
utility (Leach et al., 1997, Leach et al., 1999). Because of the way REDD+ 
operates, this thesis defines REDD+ institutions as  formal and informal rules 
and interactions among actors involved in making the rules on REDD+ design.    
Whether formal or informal, institutions are crucial for the success of REDD+. 
They expose restrictions/barriers and trade-offs that ought to be made between 
various options thereby revealing strategic intervening points for achieving 
sustainable development (Scoones, 1998). They also foster transformative 
actions in resource governance (Aligica, 2006, Berman et al., 2012, Biermann 
et al., 2012, Gupta et al., 2010, Ostrom et al., 1994a). Lederer (2011) concludes 
that, failures in REDD+ to achieve its goals will have less to do with technical 
design but more with institutional arrangements and processes. Similar views 
are expressed in Lawlor et al (2010:2): 
‘Ecologists and macroeconomists have led the advancement of the 
REDD+ agenda into mainstream climate policy. Consequently, 
academic analysis of REDD+ has tended to focus on questions of 
biodiversity, offset supply and cost-containment for cap-and-trade 
policies, and methods for measuring carbon stocks and estimating 
deforestation reference levels. There is growing recognition, however, 
that the real challenges now facing successful implementation of 
REDD+ lie with governance: how to get the institutional conditions 
right so that those closest to forests have the proper incentives to 
protect them’. 
 
Various analytical concepts have been applied in analysing REDD+ institutions. 
These range from actor agency (Brockhaus et al., 2013, Schroeder, 2010) to 
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equity and legitimacy (Lyster, 2013). The concepts are mutually interlinked in 
many REDD+ governance studies.  Given that this study is interested in the 
REDD+ institutional process, actor agency was applied as an appropriate 
analytical concept for unpacking actor interactions and their contributions to 
REDD+ design rules. Agency is a crucial analytical approach in multi-actor 
environmental regimes such as REDD+ and is also related to other institutional 
concepts such as equity and legitimacy.  
 
3.4.2.   Agency as a suitable institutional concept for analysing REDD+
         design 
Agency is an institutional concept that spans the spectrum of social sciences, 
and attempts to understand human behaviours in making joint decisions in their 
interactions with nature (Elder Jr, 1994, Archer, 2003).  Social science theories 
describe agency as a means through which humans reaffirm their positions in 
relation to others. To do so, people understand their interests and beliefs which 
they defend and push for (Kiser, 1999). They also enhance their interests by 
accepting complementary actions and intentions of others (Archer, 2003, 
Myers, 1986). By influencing and accepting others’ actions, people acquire 
authority  as decision makers but also give authority to others  (Kiser, 1999).  
In global environmental regimes, the concept of agency has gained attention as 
a means to understanding how States and non-State actors interact and influence 
each other in prescribing and implementing rules as part of environment and 
development policies such as REDD+ (Schroeder and Lovell, 2012). Agency 
has been defined as the ability of actors to participate in a policy process and 
prescribe rules governing the implementation of such policies (Biermann et al., 
2009, Paavola, 2003). Given the varied capabilities and actor contributions to a 
policy process, agency has also been defined in terms of power relations. For 
instance Brockhaus et al., (2013:2) defines agency as ‘the capacity and 
legitimacy to exercise power over other actors’. This resonates with some 
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theories of power that argue that actors who are more dependent on others are 
less powerful because those whom they depend on are often able to manipulate 
circumstances to make these weak ones lose (Lukes, 1974). In other words, 
actors with stronger agency in a policy process are likely to be more powerful 
than those with weak agency.  This thesis however does not directly pursue 
power analysis but uses measures of agency to highlight which actors are 
potentially more powerful in REDD+.   
Agency is also linked to legitimacy in that it determines how much policy 
outcomes are legitimate among interested actors (Bäckstrand, 2006).  
Legitimacy refers to the way actors perceive and accept particular rules that 
affect their behaviours (Bäckstrand, 2008) and this depends more on how their 
concerns and interests are included in the rule making process (Paavola, 2003, 
Biermann and Gupta, 2011). As such, agency in the process of prescribing 
REDD+ rules influences the effectiveness of implementing the rules by shaping 
the level to which the resulting rules account for the policy and socioeconomic 
interests of developing countries targeted for REDD+.  Agency also links to 
equity. Equity refers to fair distribution of decision making rights and benefits 
in policy formulation and implementation (Brown and Corbera, 2003). As such, 
strong actors may sometimes marginalise those with weak agency both in 
decisions and benefits (see section 3.5.5). Therefore agency provides a strategic 
analytical concept for unpacking institutions in a multi-actor environmental 
regime such as REDD+.  
Actors exercise agency in designing REDD+ at the global level based on 
established norms of participation which recognise these actors as legitimate 
decision makers (Schroeder, 2010). Expertise and mode of governance are the 
main means of formally exercising agency in global regimes e.g. making 
submissions to negotiations and commenting on draft decisions (Gupta, 2010, 
Biermann et al., 2010, Biermann et al., 2009, Dellas et al., 2011, Archer, 2003, 
Griffiths and Martone, 2009). These means are also used by actors to informally 
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lobby for their interests in the side events of UNFCCC climate negotiations 
(Schroeder and Lovell, 2012).   
 
3.4.3.  Exercising agency in a multi-actor global environmental regime  
Actors use their expertise and mode of governance to bargain for their 
preferences in designing global environmental regimes.  Expertise denotes the 
ability to generate knowledge and propose innovative solutions to global 
environmental problems (Archer, 2003, Gupta, 2010). Expertise of actors in 
global regimes builds on their ability to generate scientific information for 
solving the environmental problem in question (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004).  
Actors can contribute expertise in various ways but a key aspect in the global 
process is that actors require resources to acquire and transmit the scientific 
knowledge to global decision making platforms (Archer, 2003, Gupta, 2010). 
Resource endowment determines actors’ ability to exercise agency through 
expertise. In this, Gupta and van der Zaag (2009) argue that actors with 
relatively more resources to generate knowledge may push science and 
scientific results in specific directions and marginalise other scientific research 
questions and methodologies relevant to those with limited resources, such as 
developing countries. As an example, Pattberg (2005) highlights the private 
sector’s ability to fund scientific consultancies and develop their own 
governance protocols with little engagement of States or the local people. 
Private standards in REDD+ such as the voluntary carbon standard (VCS) have 
greater usage in most REDD+ demonstration projects and carbon buyers, the 
majority of whom are drawn from the private sector itself  (Kollmuss et al., 
2008, Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez, 2014). Such demonstration projects are now 
a key source of empirical evidence to the global negotiations thus signifying 
how resource endowed actors exercise agency through expertise more that poor 
actors. However, this has implications on legitimacy and equity at the 
implementation stage (see section 3.4 on implementation debates).  
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Mode of governance implies an organised and recognised institutional body 
within which actors’ activities and interests are embedded (Dellas et al., 2011, 
Schroeder, 2010). In the context of REDD+, agency of actors in the global 
negotiations is recognised only if they are part of a particular mode of 
governance (Schroeder, 2010). Examples of modes of governance involved in 
designing REDD+ include but are not limited to States, intergovernmental 
public bodies, intergovernmental scientific bodies, private sector business and 
industry, nongovernmental organisations, civil society,  and forest people 
organisations  (FCCC/SBSTA/2011/INF). They all pursue solutions relevant to 
their organisational principles (Vatn and Vedeld, 2013, Corbera and Schroeder, 
2011). For instance, intergovernmental scientific bodies provide a mode of 
governance for scientific actors and their scientific innovations as part of 
REDD+ methodology or safeguards (FCCC/SBSTA/2011/INF) (Chapter 5).   
Mode of governance as a source of agency has however been criticised on 
account that it confers more authority to States in REDD+ (Lawlor et al., 2010, 
Phelps et al., 2010b, Thompson et al., 2011) and other global environmental 
regimes (Okereke et al., 2009).  States arguably control most national 
institutions, citizens and enforcements mechanisms of agreed outcomes (Dellas 
et al., 2011). For REDD+, the expectation is that States would represent the 
interests of their citizens in the global process and particularly local 
communities who depend on forests targeted for REDD+ (McDermott et al., 
2012). The paradox however is that despite States being highly legitimate in the 
global REDD+ design process, studies e.g. Schroeder (2010) and  Sikor et al. 
(2010), report that local communities living within the jurisdictions of these 
States typically have weak agency in the global process. This could mean that 
agency in REDD+ through the State as the authoritative mode of governance 
potentially overlooks the interest of local communities. This argument is 
advanced in Sikor et al. (2010) who claim that States and the international 
community sometime marginalise the informal and unique economic and social 
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identity of local people, perceiving these as irrelevant to the mainstream norms 
of environmental governance. The other way of viewing the weak agency of 
local communities could be that the some States themselves could have weak 
agency in the global process and thus are unable to adequately bargain for the 
socioeconomic circumstances of their citizens (Desanker 2005). 
Whether it is the State or local communities which are marginalised from 
exercising agency, there are implications both for implementation and even 
within the REDD+ design process itself. Within the global process, a key 
implication is the emergence of new actor constellations to exercise agency on 
behalf of the marginalised actors or sometimes the dominant ones (Gupta, 2008, 
Dellas et al., 2011, Bouteligier, 2011). Such actors may emerge as arbitrators or 
‘hybrid actors’ mediating both expertise and resources between dominant and 
marginalised actors (Okereke and Dooley, 2010, Vatn and Vedeld, 2013).  
Bouteligier (2011) discusses the role of environmental consultancy firms as an 
example of such new actor constellations. These consultants have been 
commonly used by (mostly) resource endowed actors such as private businesses 
and multilateral banks to develop REDD+ strategies and sub-national 
demonstration projects deemed feasible within marginalised local communities 
in developing countries (Palmer Fry, 2011). Civil society groups and forest 
people alliances are also examples of hybrid actors who have emerged as 
advocates for local communities and indigenous people in the global REDD+ 
regime  (Schroeder, 2010).  In a similar manner, intermediary financial actors 
such as the World Bank also mediate funds and expertise between resource 
endowed actors in the developed world  and resource poor actors in the 
developing world (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2014).    
The ability of such hybrid actors to factually represent the agency of the 
marginalised is contested in various studies.  For instance Rietig (2011) and 
Schroeder (2010) argue that emerging forest people advocacy groups may only 
reinforce the authority of those who fund their participation in global climate 
    
 
47 
 
events. Also, consultancy firms may not adequately represent the interests of 
local communities because they act on the interests of those who pay for their 
services (Nepal, 2012). Similarly, the opinions of the representatives of local 
communities and States in the multilateral readiness process could be 
compromised through the financial support these local representatives and 
States receive to attend REDD+ readiness meetings (Thompson et al., 2011). 
In the context of multiple actors with some being marginalised and others 
dominating in designing REDD+, Corbera and Schroeder (2011) and Visseren-
Hamakers et al. (2012) raise concerns about potential institutional conflicts. 
Actors’ roles are expected to be complementary yet their interests and 
capabilities in informing REDD+ design vary. Such actor interactions in 
designing REDD+ have potential to create synergies or conflicts with 
implications for REDD+ effectiveness. Visseren-Hamakers et al. (2012) 
therefore recommend the need for unpacking these interactions. Chapter five of 
this thesis examines actor interactions, roles and representation in global 
REDD+ design with a focus on the agency of African States in the global 
process. Analysing agency of States such as those of Africa where REDD+ is 
targeted for implementation is crucial because these States are the authority 
expected to represent the policy and socioeconomic preferences of a country in 
the global REDD+ process and safeguard resulting rules within national 
jurisdictions. Various scientific ways exist on how to measure agency of a 
particular State in global environmental regimes.   
   
3.4.4.   Assessing actor agency   
In globally negotiated regimes such as REDD+, actors use their agency to get 
their preferences into policy decisions (Dauvergne, 2012). Measuring agency 
mainly builds on ways of exercising it including actor expertise and bargaining 
for institutional preferences relevant to an actor’s mode of governance (Dellas 
et al., 2011). Drawing on earth system governance framework (Biermann et al., 
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2010, Andonova et al., 2009, Schroeder, 2010, Dellas et al., 2011) agency can 
be measured by the level to which actors contribute to designing policy options 
and bargain for their preferences in the context of many options (Bodin and 
Crona, 2009, Sebenius, 1983). Through knowledge, an actor can design policy 
options, or give feedback on others’ options. If actors are only consulted to give 
feedback on options designed by others with no particular promise that their 
feedback will be included in decisions then their agency decreases. However if 
their knowledge is incorporated into decisions, their agency increases (Keeley 
and Scoones, 2003, Schroeder, 2010). For example, if local communities are 
consulted on already designed REDD+ rules without being assured that their 
views will be reflected, then their agency decreases compared to those who 
designed the rules. 
Various actors may contribute knowledge resulting in a menu of policy options 
(Keeley and Scoones, 2003). As such, actors must additionally bargain for their 
preferences especially in joint decision making platforms where choices have 
to be made among multiple options (Andonova et al., 2009, Schroeder, 2010, 
Schroeder and Lovell, 2012). Bargaining occurs through representation in 
policy negotiation platforms, such as COP in the case of climate regimes. 
Representation is widely discussed in the political science literature and refers 
to a way in which representatives act on behalf of their constituents and 
advocate for their preferences in a particular policy Pitkin, 1967, Dahl, 1971, 
Bauer and Britton, 2006). For instance, States acting on behalf of their citizens 
and advocating for their policy and socioeconomic circumstances in the 
negotiations (Dahl, 1971).  
Studies show that effective representation of constituents’ interests mainly  
depends on the number of representatives these constituents have in a political 
system, resource endowment  and the expertise of the representatives (Pitkin, 
1967, Rosset et al., 2013). More representatives’ increases voting and 
networking capacity to push for constituents’ preferences (Bauer and Britton, 
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2006, Pitkin, 1967) and thus increases agency. For instance, studies show that 
climate negotiations have increasingly marginalised developing countries due 
to low delegation sizes representing these countries in the negotiations  
(Saleemul and Sokona, 2001, Najam et al., 2003, UNfairplay, 2011, Mabey et 
al., 2013). Resources on the other hand give actors means to voice their 
preferences and influence other actors to support their preferences, thus 
increasing their agency compared to others  (Giger et al., 2012, Rosset et al., 
2013, Midgaard and Underdal, 1977). Representatives with diverse expertise, 
e.g. legal prowess or social networking, are able to understand the negotiation 
procedures and sell their ideas to others, thus increasing their agency compared 
to poorly composed delegations (Makina, 2013). 
In recognising their varied capabilities, actors with common interests may come 
together to form networks such as negotiation coalitions to increase their 
representation (Wolmer et al., 2006). The possibility that the preferences of an 
actor network become part of decisions depends on how strong the actors are 
bonded within a network  (Keeley and Scoones, 2003, Wolmer et al., 2006). If 
a network is loose, its preferences become weak and may not inform decisions 
(Keeley and Scoones, 2003). For example, negotiation coalitions of developing 
countries in climate regimes are often weakened by socioeconomic, cultural and 
political differences among members (Williams, 2005). Chapter five of this 
study specifically examines actor roles and representation in analysing the 
agency of actors involved in the global design process.  
This section has shown that agency is a crucial institutional concept for 
analysing how REDD+ is designed at the global level because it indicates 
whether the necessary conditions of areas and people targeted for designing and 
implementing resulting rules. The section has shown that actors have varying 
capabilities to exercise agency and this is mainly structured by their resource 
endowments.  This relative actor agency may have varied implications on 
implementing resulting rules at national and local levels. 
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3.5.   Debates on REDD+ implementation 
The previous section shows that various actors may exercise varying agency in 
designing REDD+ depending on their resource endowment, expertise and 
interests. These have implications for implementation REDD+ at the national 
and local levels. This section analyses broader concepts about institutional 
implementation and links these to REDD+.    
 
3.5.1.   Institutional interplay  
Institutional interplay theory enables understanding of how global design 
processes and rules interplay with national policies.  Institutional interplay 
involves two or more institutions interacting in a manner that affects their 
effectiveness in various ways (Young, 2002, Gehring and Oberthür, 2009). 
Interplay can be unidirectional where the institutions influence each other 
positively or negatively (Young, 2002, Gehring and Oberthür, 2009, Oberthür 
and Stokke, 2011). In multilevel interactions, interplay can be horizontal 
involving institutions of the same level or vertical involving different levels. 
Both vertical and horizontal interplay are relevant in REDD+. Vertical interplay 
occurs when global REDD+ rules are instituted into national policies while 
horizontal interplay occurs when nationally implemented REDD+ rules interact 
with national sectoral policies. Outcomes of interplay can be beneficial or 
complementary if both institutions support similar objectives (Miles et al., 
2002). For example, global REDD+ rules on halting deforestation could 
positively interplay (benefit from) national land policies that inhibit 
resettlement in forest areas. However, the effects can be adverse in case of 
diverging institutional objectives (Urwin and Jordan, 2008). This study applied 
vertical interplay to analyse how the global design process plays out in 
implementing REDD+ at the national level and horizontal interplay to analyse 
how the resulting rules interact with existing sectoral policies (see details in 
Chapter 4).   
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3.5.2.   Institutional/Policy implementation  
Institutional or policy implementation refers to translating the resulting rules 
and policies into practice through on-ground activities (Sabatier and 
Mazmanian, 1980). In the context of REDD+, this means translating the 
negotiated decisions on forest protection into practice and coordinating 
activities to deliver on sustainable development outcomes (appendix 1/CP. 16). 
Policy implementation remains a key challenge in environmental governance 
with most policy decisions characterised by implementation deficits (Leventon 
and Antypas, 2012). Implementation deficits occur when the original goals of a 
policy are not met either because the policy itself is not translated into action or 
the policy is translated into action but fails to sufficiently solve the targeted 
problem(s) (Jordan, 1999).  Implementation deficits may originate from the 
process of designing the policy itself, the way in which the policy is executed 
or both (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980). Such deficits may be evaluated in 
terms of achievement of expected outcomes (Jordan, 1999).   
In a multilevel environmental policy such as REDD+, actors interact at every 
governance level to produce policy outputs whose outcomes are expected to be 
achieved at lower levels of governance (Leventon and Antypas, 2012; Ostrom 
1994b). REDD+ implementation at the national level in most developing 
countries currently involves instituting global rules as part of national policies, 
while at the local level implementation involves execution of sub-national 
projects designed from the global process because national policies are not yet 
concluded (Cerbu et al., 2011, Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez, 2014). A key point 
in multilevel policy implementation is that each level creates sources for 
implementation deficit that affect outcomes at the next level. Given that REDD+ 
implementation is expected to achieve sustainable development outcomes, this 
implementation framework is important for examining sources of 
implementation deficits in REDD+. The next subsection analyses the 
sustainable development outcomes expected from implementing REDD+.    
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3.5.3.   Expected outcomes of REDD+ implementation 
REDD+ emerged as part of sustainable development action. Article 3.4 of the 
UNFCCC declares that climate change policies should account for sustainable 
development needs of developing countries. This declaration is adopted in 
REDD+ through its safeguard theories (Appendix 1/CP. 16, g) which declares 
that REDD+ should ‘be implemented in the context of sustainable development 
and reducing poverty while responding to climate change’.  
Through these safeguards, both sub-national and national REDD+ projects are 
expected to achieve environmental and social sustainability. Actions to achieve 
environmental sustainability range from protection of biodiversity, avoidance 
of conversion from natural to plantation forests among others. These actions 
could replenish forest ecosystem functions such as nutrient cycling, land 
productivity,  protection of water catchments (Attiwill and Adams, 1993), and 
climate regulation (IPCC, 2000), supportive to the current and future 
generations. Social sustainability measures include poverty alleviation, equity 
and rights of local communities to participate in and benefit from REDD+ 
activities and stakeholder participation in decisions. The debates on how to 
ensure environmental sustainability through forest protection have been 
presented in section 3.3. These include performance requirements such as 
additionality, avoidance of leakage and emission reversals, sustainable forest 
management and avoidance of forest degradation all aimed at increasing forests 
cover, biodiversity and carbon stocks. In the next subsections focus is given to 
social outcomes including, stakeholder participation and poverty alleviation 
/benefit sharing both at the national and local levels.   
 
3.5.4.   Stakeholder participation 
Participation in the context of REDD+ implementation refers to the contribution 
of actors in executing globally agreed decisions at national and local levels 
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(Angelsen et al., 2009). Participation enables the knowledge and interest of 
affected actors to be accounted for in implementing policies (Ribot, 2009). At 
the national level, participation of various stakeholders in instituting REDD+ 
could generate vital information on forest management and strategic ways of 
addressing drivers of deforestation (Brockhaus et al., 2013, Di Gregorio et al., 
2012). Stakeholder participation also enhances information flow and 
coordination between sub-national projects and national governments to create 
suitable multilevel governance systems for REDD+ (Murray and Olander, 2008, 
Di Gregorio et al., 2012). Some studies however are concerned that bureaucracy 
and resource centralisation regimes in developing country governments could 
impede involvement of all stakeholders in implementing REDD+ at the national 
level (Brockhaus et al., 2013). On the other hand multiple participatory 
activities could create REDD+ ‘fatigue’ and slow implementation (Di Gregorio 
et al., 2012). As such, there is a need to analyse the ways in which stakeholders 
are engaged in the ongoing implementation of REDD+ and unlock barriers that 
could impede implementation. Chapter 5 analyses how various stakeholders 
across sectors and including local communities are involved in implementing 
REDD+ at the national level.  
Existing debates on participation have been mainly concerned with the 
participation of local communities in implementing REDD+ at national and 
local levels (Cerbu et al., 2011, Minang et al., 2014b). Scholars particularly 
point out that the weak agency of these communities in the global REDD+ 
design process compromises their participation rights in implementing REDD+ 
at national and local levels (Lederer, 2012, Schroeder, 2010, Sikor et al., 2010, 
Thompson et al., 2011). The global design such as carbon accounting 
procedures may not be well understood by these local communities who may 
have more interest in livelihoods than carbon. Luttrell et al. (2012) specifically 
argue that  local support for REDD+  could be weak if local communities do not 
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perceive that, for example, carbon measures constitute fair benefit sharing 
mechanisms or are feasible with their understanding.   
While weak agency could have implications especially for implementation, 
some scholars have argued that resource endowed actors in the global rule 
making process often attempt to legitimise rules among marginalised groups 
through financial support (Bäckstrand, 2008, Bäckstrand, 2006). In such 
circumstances, marginalised actors sometimes fail to recognise that their agency 
in the process is weak and instead become more supportive of the decisions 
made by the  resource endowed actors (Bäckstrand, 2006). For instance, the 
private sector may implement sub-national REDD+ projects within local 
communities and legitimise the REDD+ rules within these communities. It is 
argued that such support has been used by some non-State actors as part of 
forum shopping to gain legitimacy over States, especially where States have 
failed to respond to the needs of these local communities (Gupta and Lebel, 
2010) yet the State is still expected implement and safeguard resulting rules 
within national jurisdictions. 
Local settings, including livelihood activities, household/community networks 
and land tenure, are crucial in shaping how people view, perceive and 
participate in REDD+ projects (Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009, Agrawal et al., 
2011, Angelsen et al., 2012, Jindal et al., 2008, Wertz-Kanounnikoff and 
Kongphan-apirak, 2009, Pokorny et al., 2013). Empirical studies on how local 
settings shape participation in REDD+ activities are however scarce as focus 
has been given to how REDD+ impact on livelihoods. A few empirical studies, 
e.g. Romijn et al. (2012), found that human capabilities, skills and education 
shape both governments’ and people’s ability to understand and implement 
carbon monitoring activities. Maraseni et al. (2014) also found that community 
networks,  e.g. Community Forest User groups in Nepal, provided local 
networks for increased exchange of information among community members 
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and subsequent understanding and participation in the Nepal’s Forest Carbon 
Trust Fund.  
Adapting project designs to local settings may also require adjustments in global 
designs to suit local settings. Corbera et al. (2009) studied Mexico's Programme 
of Payments for Carbon, Biodiversity and Agro-forestry Services (PSA-
CABSA) and found that projects make procedural changes to original designs 
to enhance participation. Corbera et al. highlight that such changes in design 
procedures subject to local settings are sources of institutional interplay in 
implementing multilevel PES schemes and are indicative of institutional 
performance of such schemes, which requires research attention. Chapter 7 of 
this thesis analyses how local communities and their assets participate in 
implementing a globally-linked REDD+ project and how this participation 
shapes livelihood benefits and subsequent poverty alleviation.  
 
3.5.5.   Poverty alleviation  
Poverty alleviation in the context of REDD+ involves development and 
livelihood impacts of REDD+ activities both at the national and local levels 
(Mwakalobo et al., 2011). Poverty is a major cause of deforestation in 
developing countries where communities depend on forests for livelihoods 
(IUFRO, 2009). As such by supporting development and livelihoods, REDD+ 
could reduce poverty and address deforestation thereby achieving its original 
goal of emission reduction and sustainable development (Pokorny et al., 2013).  
At the national level, most African governments, e.g. Kenya (Republic of 
Kenya, 2013b), the Congo basin countries (Brown et al., 2011), and elsewhere, 
e.g. Vietnam (Di Gregorio et al., 2013), already align REDD+ with their 
economic development strategies. Such economic expectations usefully 
leverage government support for REDD+ at the national level (Di Gregorio et 
al., 2012). However, there are concerns that corruption in government 
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departments may result in misuse of funds and compromise expected 
developments (Di Gregorio et al., 2012, Peskett et al., 2011). 
At the local level, REDD+ funds through sub-national projects are expected to 
support livelihoods (Brown and Bird, 2008, Schroeder, 2010, Thompson et al., 
2011, Griffiths and Martone, 2009, Leach and Scoones, 2013, Ghazoul et al., 
2010). Scholars however contest this notion based on equity grounds. Scholars, 
e.g. Ghazoul et al. (2010), think that livelihood benefits to local communities 
could be lost as forests become locked in commoditisation of carbon, potentially 
to the benefit of powerful government and business actors with greater agency 
in the global design process. 
Related to equity concerns, some studies have cautioned that a transition to a 
purely carbon based approach to REDD+ could compromise local livelihood 
benefits as project investors’ could be unwilling to fund non-carbon public 
goods such as capacity building (Brown et al., 2011, Pokorny et al., 2013) . This 
could be exacerbated by unstable carbon prices that have been shown to 
constrain funds for livelihood support (Mathur et al., 2013).  
In the context of uncertainty created by external factors such as fluctuating 
carbon prices,  some scholars argue that REDD+ may create false hopes by 
promising to alleviate poverty (Dzingirai, 2014). While such hopes may be 
sustained in some cases through project-specific strategies (Bernard et al., 
2014), failure to meet these hopes could result in livelihood disfranchisement, 
institutional conflicts and uncertainty about what people should expect from 
REDD+ (Luttrell et al., 2012, Dzingirai, 2014).  Angelsen et al. (2012) 
acknowledge that huge challenges face REDD+ implementation at the local 
level and this will require REDD+ projects to make certain choices regarding 
livelihood support to local communities. One key choice that has been 
emphasised in lietarture is the need for REDD+ to be pro-poor in order to 
succeed (Enright, 2012, Mohammed, 2011, Bond, 2010).    
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3.5.6.   Pro-poor REDD+  
From the perceptive of ecosystem services, the concept of pro-poor has been 
defined as policy actions that aim to increase the assets and capabilities of the 
poorer people in any given setting while avoiding any harm to these poor ones 
(Gross-Camp et al., 2012, Curren and de Renzion, 2006). Pro-poor actions 
became eminent in REDD+ implementation debates due to two claims; 1) that 
REDD+ is emerging as part of regulated market for ecosystem services with 
institutional architecture focused on efficiency rather than equity and this  might 
harm poorer people with scarce asset entitlements (Ghazoul et al., 2010, 
Griffiths and Martone, 2009, Corbera et al., 2007) and 2) that poorer people in 
developing countries depend more on forests and are responsible for 
deforestation and so to effectively protect forests, their needs should be 
prioritised (Mohammed, 2011, Gross-Camp et al., 2012, Bond, 2010).   
These concerns have shaped views about pro-poor REDD+ in terms of tangible 
livelihood benefits and non-tangible social benefits to the poorer people living 
in areas targeted for REDD+ implementation.  In terms of tangible benefits, 
REDD+ should support co-benefits and build livelihoods and capabilities of the 
poor people and avoid harm to them (Angelsen, 2008, Pokorny et al., 2013, 
Enright, 2012, Mohammed, 2011, Bond, 2010). Non-tangible pro-poor benefits 
largely entail inclusion and recognition of the rights and knowledge of poor 
people in REDD+ decisions and activities (Enright et al., 2012, Bond, 2010, 
Schroder and McDermott, 2014). REDD+ initiatives should inform people of 
potential harms, clarify carbon rights, legal implications etc. and these should 
be supported by transparent and democratic local institutional arrangements 
(Ribot, 2011, Martin et al, 2010). Ideally, pro-poor strategies should create a 
strong sense that the poor are gaining more relative to the non-poor (Gross-
Decamp et al, 2014). Proponents of pro-poor REDD+ add that the approach 
would make REDD+ more legitimate and effective in developing countries 
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where a majority are poor and dependent on forests (Mohammed, 2011, 
Karsenty et al., 2014).  
Some studies are however sceptical about this pro-poor notion, arguing that 
mitigation action is urgent to prevent climate change and should not be 
burdened with additional objectives such as addressing poverty and bio-
diversity (Torres and Skutsch, 2014). Others argue that pro-poor approaches 
may not necessarily improve effectiveness because there exist a complex 
relationship between multiple ecosystem services (Martin et al., 2010).  In this 
Martin et al. (2010)  and Gross-camp et al., (2012) argue that non-poor may still 
draw more benefits in PES schemes such as REDD+ given their greater 
entitlements to assets such as land that are critical for REDD+ rewards. It has 
further been argued that market mechanism through which REDD+ is evolving 
may not function efficiently with pro-poor institutions which are largely 
informal and may not support efficiency thereby weakening private sector 
commitment to REDD+ (see Bulte et al, 2008, Corbera et al., 2009). Concerns 
about asset entitlements for REDD+ implementation has invoked arguments 
that profit-seeking actors who may have strong agency in the global process 
could steer REDD+ investments away from poor communities in a bid to avoid 
high investments costs (Thompson et al., 2011, Vatn and Vedeld, 2013). A large 
cadre of literature claims that poor socioeconomic development has impeded 
CDM activities in most poor countries and communities (Pearson et al., 2006, 
Saunders et al., 2002, Silayan, 2005).  
The competing concerns reveal that pro-poor approaches could be important in 
ensuring effectiveness of REDD+ especially in terms of forest conservation and 
sustainable livelihoods. However, focusing on the poor people could, to some 
extent, compromise efficiency especially due to the low levels of asset 
entitlements (unclear tenure regimes, small land size etc.) which could impede 
efficient operations of markets for REDD+.   Global policy process on REDD+ 
have nonetheless made efforts to consider pro-poor principles in REDD+ design 
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both in terms of spatial targeting and safeguards (decision 4/COP 16). There is 
a generic notion that REDD+ is pro-poor climate policy instrument because it 
targets developing countries (Angelsen, 2008c, Pokorny et al., 2013).  It is 
viewed that REDD+ should increase participation of poor countries in carbon 
markets and achieve sustainable development (UN-REDD, 2010, World Bank, 
2011, Stern, 2006). Some studies have argued that simplified standards and 
diversified funds within REDD+ potentially enable REDD+ investments within 
poor communities, e.g. smallholders to access carbon funds, compared to the 
CDM (Bond et al., 2009, Diaz et al., 2011). Also, most proponents of sub-
national projects have justified their activities on a pro-poor basis, advancing 
claims that their projects provide better conservation and development 
alternatives in these poor areas (Cerbu et al., 2011, Wildlife-Works, 2008). 
However, while the pro-poor spatial targeting is based on the fact that REDD+ 
targets developing countries, little is known as to whether REDD+ is spatially 
pro-poor within developing countries. As such, Ebeling and Yasué (2008) voice 
the need for REDD+ to be scientifically checked against repeating the same 
CDM mistakes of maginalising the poor. Chapter 6 of this thesis draws evidence 
from Kenya to analyse whether REDD+ is actually pro-poor within a 
developing country specifically focusing on the spatial choices of globally 
linked REDD+ demonstration projects against varying sub-national 
socioeconomic circumstances.  
Empirical studies on the implications of pro-poor approach for REDD+ in 
practice have mainly interrogated development/livelihood impacts of globally-
linked REDD+ projects. Case studies both in Africa e.g Mozambique and 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Mathur et al., 2013), Tanzania (Luttrell 
et al., 2012, Mustalahti et al., 2012), Ghana (Hashmiu, 2012 ), Kenya 
(Entenmann et al., 2014) and elsewhere e.g. Brazil (Pokorny et al., 2013) and 
Mexico (Corbera et al., 2007), report that projects have achieved some positive 
livelihood impacts including employment, increased income and awareness 
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creation. A fundamental claim common across the empirical studies is that the 
acceptance and subsequent success of the projects largely depend on pro-poor 
livelihood support that incentivise forest conservation and keep people out of 
forests (Pokorny et al., 2013).  
The need for REDD+ to be pro-poor is an empirically established fact. A key 
concern raised in the empirical studies however remains on how the pro-poor 
approaches can be achieved especially with respect to equity in benefits sharing 
between projects, land owners and non-land owners. A review of projects under 
the CIFOR’s Global Comparative study reveals widely varied conceptualisation 
of pro-poor and equitable benefit sharing among these projects (Luttrell et al., 
2012). Some of the projects conceptualise benefits based on carbon rights or 
forest stewardship. Others direct benefits to those who incur costs, e.g. 
implementation, transaction and opportunity costs, while some channel benefits 
to the people thought to be effective implementers of project activities.  Luttrell 
et al. (2013) are concerned that these perceptions make it difficult to understand 
how equitable benefit sharing should be measured in REDD+ and recommend 
that REDD+ countries need to engage all affected stakeholders in defining 
common benefit sharing mechanisms. Ideally, some of these benefit sharing 
attributes are not in line with pro-poor theories outlined in the previous 
paragraphs. To inform the debates on REDD+ implementation and pro-poor 
discourse, empirical evidence on various benefit sharing mcahnisms among 
different social groups and the pro-poor strategies that work out are required 
(Luttrell et al., 2013). According to Mustalahti and Rakotonarivo (2014),  
empirical studies could clearly conceptualise pro-poor strategies in REDD+ by 
facilitating participatory wealth ranking to identify poorer members of 
participating communities. Chapter 7 of this thesis examines the 
implementation of a globally linked REDD+ project and applies wealth ranking 
to reveal how various social groups draw, perceive and expect benefits from 
REDD+. 
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Benefit sharing, from a pro-poor perpective and participation are important 
issues in REDD+ implementation debates. The challenge however is that 
REDD+, with its globally designed procedures, is new to these settings and may 
not immediately adapt to the local context, especially in terms of what forms of 
participation or benefit sharing that count in these settings. One way of adapting 
REDD+ to local contexts is by drawing lessons from pre-REDD+ ICDPs that 
have worked in these settings over many years addressing conservation and 
development (Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009).  
 
3.5.7.   Learning lessons from ICDPs 
ICDPs had been introduced in subsection 2.2.3 but this subsection briefly 
discusses their linkages with REDD+.  ICDPs are conservation and 
development initiatives that have been implemented in the local settings of 
developing countries targeting the same sustainable development goals as 
REDD+ (Agrawal et al., 2008, Brandon and Wells, 2009). In their work, the 
ICDPs have engaged local settings in different ways, establishing varied 
participation and benefit sharing approaches that could influence the way 
REDD+ is perceived, judged or accepted. Theoretical literature closely 
associates ICDPs design, activities (Minang and van Noordwijk, 2013, Blom et 
al., 2010), actors  (Cerbu et al., 2011) and investments choices (Cerbu et al., 
2011, Sills et al., 2009) with those of REDD+. Other studies suggest that 
REDD+ could build on certain positive ICDP and Community Based Natural 
Resource Mangement (CBRM) approaches such as community mobilisation 
(Minang and van Noordwijk, 2013) but  could also correct ICDP failures (se 
subsection 2.2.3). Such empirical analysis could reveal whether REDD+, in its 
multi-governance system, could create a shift in forest governance or maintain 
the status quo as in the case of ICDPs. Lessons need to be empirically analysed 
through the implementation of REDD+ (Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009, Blom et 
al., 2010). The last empirical Chapter of this thesis (Chapter 8) analyses the 
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implementation lessons that REDD+ draws from ICDPs that have operated in 
the same local setting targeted for REDD+.  
Overall, this section has presented research needs for analysing the 
implementation of REDD+ in the context of sustainable development. The key 
issues revolve around poverty alleviation, benefit sharing and participation both 
at the national and local levels. While national level benefits are still not in 
place, participation of stakeholders, including local communities, in the on-
going institutionalisation of REDD+ rules at the national level is crucial. At the 
local level, both participation and benefit sharing are crucial and mutually 
linked outcomes determining effective implementation of REDD+. As such, 
using suitable analytical frameworks to analyse how the outcomes are achieved 
in practice and the sources of interplay from the global process could help 
identify implementation deficits.   
3.6.   Conclusion 
This Chapter has examined scientific debates on REDD+ ranging from technical 
to institutional and implementation issues. In these debates, research gaps have 
been highlighted.  The debates show that a key challenge to REDD+ remains 
on how to harmonise global REDD+ institutional process characterised by 
multi- actor interests with national level polices and local socioeconomic 
settings where forests are hosted. This Chapter thereby reveals the need for 
multilevel analysis of REDD+ institutions and their implementation within 
national and local contexts to identify institutional conflicts and synergies in 
REDD+ design and implementation. The Chapter has also discussed the 
suitability of the SLF in guiding the analysis but also highlights that the 
framework is limited in linking local context to broader institutional processes 
as envisaged in this study. To fill the gap, the next Chapter draws on the SLF to 
develop a more comprehensive multilevel and multi-actor institutional 
framework ‘the IDAF’ that is applied in this study.  
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Chapter 4   
Study area, design and methods 
 
4.1.   Introduction 
This Chapter describes and justifies the study area, design framework and 
methodological steps taken in gathering and analysing data to answer the study 
objectives. The Chapter is divided into seven sections. Section two describes 
and justifies Kenya as a suitable case study country for understanding how 
globally designed REDD+ rules are implemented. The section describes the 
trends and status of Kenya’s biophysical, socioeconomic and policy features 
relevant to forests and livelihoods. The third section describes the specific study 
sites including procedures and justifications employed in selecting the sites. The 
overall study design and analytical framework are discussed in the fourth and 
fifth sections respectively. The linkages between study concepts, objectives and 
data collection methods are indicated in the design. Section six, provides an 
overview of methods employed in collecting and analysing data. The section 
draws on relevant methodological literature to justify each method in terms of 
their strengths and relevance to specific study objectives.  The steps taken to 
overcome certain weaknesses of individual methods are outlined as necessary 
and the main study limitations are also acknowledged. It should be noted that 
methodological discussions here are general. Specific methodological details 
are included in each empirical Chapter (Chapters 5-8). The seventh section of 
this Chapter outlines ethics and positionality of the researcher during data 
collection, handling and presentation.   
 
4.2 .   Study Area: Kenya 
Kenya was selected as a suitable case study country for understanding how 
globally designed REDD+ is implemented. This section first discusses the use 
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of a case study approach and then justifies the suitability of Kenya as a case 
country. The key biophysical, socioeconomic and policy settings of Kenya are 
then discussed and linked to forests and climate change policies. The section 
also outlines the procedures employed in selecting specific case project and 
study sites within Kenya.  
 
4.2.1.   Case study approach  
A case study approach involves using a particular setting to describe, test or 
generate theory (Yin, 1984). The approach is supported as a useful way of 
understanding how rules are translated into practice (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Multiple cases can be used as case studies, especially in pursuing multilevel 
analysis (Yin, 1984). The strength of a case study approach lies in the fact that 
it permits detailed interrogation of issues and generates informative lessons that 
can be applied in similar cases (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 1984). The case study 
approach is particularly suitable for analysing REDD+ institutions that are 
globally standardised but are targeted for implementation within diverse 
developing country settings; settings which are practically impossible to be 
covered in a single study. REDD+ studies have therefore commonly applied the 
case study approach for various levels including country cases (Minang et al., 
2014b) and project cases (Pokorny et al., 2013). The case study approach is 
however critiqued on the basis that findings from a single case may not be 
generalised to other settings (Eisenhardt, 1989). To improve the generalisation 
of case study findings, Yin (1984) recommends the use of representative cases 
that reflect other settings and the wider framework of the topic under 
investigation. In this study, Kenya was selected as a representative case country.   
 
4.2.2.   Suitability of Kenya as a case country 
Kenya was selected as a suitable case country for three reasons. Firstly, Kenya 
has committed to international climate actions. The country is a signatory to the 
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UNFCCC (in 1994), the Kyoto Protocol (in 2005), and is currently involved in 
REDD+ negotiations (Republic of Kenya, 2011). As part of national and 
international climate obligations, the Kenyan government has prepared a 
climate change action plan for 2013-2017. In the plan, REDD+ is emphasised 
as one of the low-carbon development pathways in the country’s development 
plan ‘the vision 2030’  (Republic of Kenya, 2012a). The UNFCCC also expects 
other African countries to align their REDD+ plans with development agenda. 
As such, Kenya’s climate institutions and actions provide a national case for 
understanding and informing the multilevel linkages between international and 
national REDD+ activities in the context of sustainable development.  
Secondly, Kenya, alongside 16 African countries, currently participates in the 
REDD+ readiness process under the World Bank’s FCPF and UN-REDD. 
Lessons generated from this study, could be adopted widely by the other African 
countries whose institutional processes draw from similar readiness procedures 
and conditions.  
Thirdly, Kenya is a leading adopter of REDD+ demonstration projects 
compared to most African countries (Cerbu et al., 2011, Diaz et al., 2011). 
Kenya hosts ‘the Kasigau Corridor REDD+ project, the world’s first globally 
linked REDD+ project to sell verified carbon credits in the voluntary carbon 
market (Peters-Stanley et al., 2013). Lessons from such REDD+ interventions 
will be of interest to most project developers implementing or intending to 
implement REDD+ projects in different parts of Africa and elsewhere. 
 
4.2.3.   General background of Kenya 
Kenya is in East Africa at 0.4252° S, 36.7517° E.  The country covers an area 
of 580,728 square kilometres, 2.2% of which is covered by water bodies. Kenya 
is administratively divided into 47 Counties making up  eight provinces 
(Republic of Kenya, 2010c). The country’s population currently stands at 41 
million persons (Republic of Kenya, 2009).  Of the 41 million persons, 67.7% 
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live in rural areas where they mainly practice rain-fed agriculture and other land 
based forms of livelihoods. Eighty percent (80%) of Kenya’s terrestrial land is 
classified as semi-arid to arid (ASALs) and only 20% with humid and semi-
humid conditions.  
Kenya’s economy and livelihoods depend significantly on her natural capital 
including agricultural land and forests. Rain-fed subsistence and commercial 
agriculture are the main sources of local subsistence livelihoods and national 
GDP earnings for Kenya. Agriculture directly contributes about 25% of 
Kenya’s GDP and also supplies numerous non-marketed goods and services 
such as firewood, construction material, fruits and opportunities for informal 
labour to the country’s rural population (Republic of Kenya, 2010a). The role 
of forests in supporting Kenya’s economy and livelihoods is crucial but, as 
outlined in the next subsection, these forests are subjected to both threats and 
conservation efforts.  
 
4.2.4.   Kenyan forests: status, functions, threats and conservation 
Kenya hosts a diversity of forests ranging from indigenous or natural closed 
canopy, plantation, mangrove and open woodlands occurring in humid and 
dryland ecosystems (Republic of Kenya, 2013a). Kenya’s forest cover currently 
lies at 6% of  the country’s land area and this is approximately half of the 
coverage five decades ago (Republic of Kenya, 2013a). On average, Kenya 
losses about 12,000 hectares of closed canopy forests annually (FAO, 2010b). 
The remaining forests constitute about 10% humid forests and close to 85% 
dryland forests comprising woodlands and savannah grasslands (Republic of 
Kenya, 2013a).   
Through ecosystem services such as rainfall, temperature regulation, and 
erosion control across water catchments, Kenyan forests support both 
subsistence and commercial agricultural activities (Campbell et al., 2000, 
Republic of Kenya, 2013a). Some 10% of Kenyans, mainly local communities 
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including indigenous people, live within five kilometres of both dryland and 
humid forests and pursue rain-fed farming within these forests (Geller et al., 
2007). These local communities also use forest provisioning services such as 
livestock fodder, firewood and charcoal for livelihoods and for coping during 
hard times, such as during climatically induced agricultural failures (Thenya 
and Kiama, 2008).   
Kenya’s humid forests are water towers for hydroelectric power generation for 
the country’s industrial activities. They also provide enabling ecosystems for 
the Kenya’s cash crops e.g. tea and coffee. Dryland forests host most of the 
country’s wildlife conservancies such as the Tsavo national park and Maasai 
game reserve. These conservancies are sources of touristic revenue for the 
Kenyan economy. The dryland forests also constitute expansive savannah and 
grassland ecosystems supportive to pastoral and agropastoral  activities  (ole 
Riamit, 2010). 
Both humid and dryland forests are however under threat, mainly from 
anthropogenic activities. Much of the deforestation in Kenya (about 83%) 
occurs within indigenous closed canopy and open woodland forests (Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1: Trends in the spatial cover of various types of Kenyan forests. 
Source: FAO (2010) 
 
 
Category of forest resource (FAO 
definition) 
Area ('000 ha) 
1990 2000 2005 2010 
Change 
between 1990-
2010 ('000 ha) 
Natural closed canopy forests  1240 1190 1165 1140 -5 
Indigenous Mangrove Forest 80 80 80 80 0 
Open woodlands 2150 2100 2075 2050 -5 
Public Plantation Forests  170 134 119 107 -3.15 
Private Plantation Forests  68 78 83 90 +1.1 
Total Forest Change  3708 3582 3522 3467 -12.05 
Bush lands  24800 24635 24570 24510 -14.5 
Farms  with trees  9420 10000 10320 10385 48.25 
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Deforestation results mainly from a nexus of livelihood, development and 
political interests (Mogoi et al., 2012, Wass, 1995). Forest encroachment for 
peasantry agriculture is a direct cause of forest losses in Kenya (Wass, 1995). 
Peasantry driven deforestation evolve from the initial forest management 
approaches such as shifting cultivation in the 1970s and the shamba system in 
the 1980s.  Both shifting cultivation and the shamba system aimed to integrate 
subsistence farmers into forest management  by allowing them to cultivate crops 
in the forests and plant and care for  the trees before moving to other forest 
sections (Republic of Kenya, 1994).  
In the context of a rising population, the post-colonial authorities, especially in 
the lands sector used peasantry agriculture as spaces for politically driven 
allocation of forests lands. The authorities allocated gazetted forests as part of 
settling landless peasants (Ndungu Land Commission, 2004). In the era of 
multi-party democracy in Kenya and associated competitive electoral politics, 
resettlements in forests areas were executed mainly as part of gaining electoral 
advantage. Sections of gazetted natural forests were also allocated to loyal 
political and private sector actors for commercial agriculture such as tea 
plantations (Ndungu Land Commission, 2004).  Additionally, corrupt forestry 
and local government officials administering the resettlement process extended 
official resettlement boundaries allocating, to themselves, extra forest areas.  As 
a result, in the period between 1972 and 1990 Kenya recorded the highest losses 
of natural forests (Wass, 1995). In the context of international concerns on 
environment and development, significant efforts have been made to conserve 
Kenyan forests.   
Efforts towards conserving Kenyan forests build on emerging forest 
decentralisation policies that support participatory forest management in a bid 
to curb peasantry forest encroachment (Republic of Kenya, 2007a). The Kenya 
Forest Act of 2005 particularly legalises community forest associations (CFAs) 
as a mode of governance within which local communities can participate and 
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benefit from integrated forests management initiatives (Republic of Kenya, 
2005). A number of other policies such as Kenya’s new constitution, and in 
agriculture, climate change and REDD+ plans also target enhanced 
management of land resources including forests (Table 4.2).  
 Table 4.2: Forest related policies in Kenya  
 
Conservation efforts through ICDPs have mainly been targeted at humid forests 
that are considered as water towers supportive to industrial and commercial 
agricultural activities. However, Kenya’s dryland forests have received little 
 
Policy Description   
The Constitution of 
Kenya (2010) and 
Vision 2030. 
(Republic of Kenya 
2010c)  
Provides the legal basis for policies in Kenya. The constitution establishes the bill 
of rights that recognises people’s rights to clean and healthy environment. This bill 
of right provides the policy framework climate change mitigation and adaptation 
initiatives in the forestry sector.  
National Climate 
Change Action Plan 
2013-2017 
(NCCAP) (Republic 
of Kenya, 2012a) 
The Plan provides a framework for instituting climate change mitigation and 
adaptation actions in various sectors. The Plan recognises forests as the most cost 
effective way of mitigating climate change. The plan emphasises REDD+ as a way 
of archiving forestry mitigation and adaptation within an international framework. 
REDD+ readiness 
plans  (Republic of 
Kenya, 2010b) 
REDD+ readiness plans aim to technically and institutionally prepare Kenya for 
effectively participating in REDD+. The REDD+ readiness involves 48 other 
developing countries, a third of which are from Africa. The process is supported 
through established multilateral funds under the World Bank and the UN-REDD.  
The Kenya Forestry 
Master Plan 1995-
2020 (Republic of 
Kenya, 1994) 
This is a 25 year plan aimed at informing sustainable management of Kenya’s 
forests and associated resources.  The plan provides the basis for the Kenyan Forest 
Act of 2005 and the Forest Policy of 2007.The Plan recognises the role of forests in 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
Land Act (National 
Land Policy, 2007) 
This policy establishes reforms in the land sector by reinforcing principles of 
equity, productivity and sustainable land use. The Act recognizes various forms of 
land ownerships (e,g. leasehold and freehold and land types (private, public and 
communal). The provisions on land access and ownership influences how different 
types of forest land can be owned, acquired or transferred.   
The Kenya 
Agricultural Sector 
Development 
Strategy (Republic 
of Kenya, 2010d) 
This policy specifies strategies for agricultural development in Kenya. Its objective 
is to promote agricultural development that enhances economic returns and 
alleviate hunger and poverty. It recognises the need for sustainable land 
management in agricultural land use.  
Environmental 
Management and 
Coordination Act 
(Republic of Kenya, 
1999) 
This Act provides a national framework for environmental management including 
environmental coordination and assessment as well as approval of development 
projects in the forestry (and other) sectors. The Act established the National 
Environmental Management Authority which is the Designated National Authority 
(DNA) and Implementing Entity (NIE) for mitigation programmes such as REDD+ 
and CDM and Adaptation Fund respectively. 
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attention even though they too contribute significantly to the country’s 
economy. The dryland forests have long been neglected and are now frontiers 
of deforestation as humid forests become restricted.  The Kenya’s climate 
change action plan recognises both dryland and humid forests but emphasises 
the dryland ones as crucial for REDD+. 
 
4.2.5.   Kenya’s climate change plan and REDD+   
Kenya’s National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) for 2013-2017 
(Republic of Kenya, 2013a) outlines mitigation and adaptation options that are 
in line with the UNFCCC framework and Kenya’s development plans. The plan 
outlines specific climate compatible development actions within key economic 
sectors such as forestry, energy, transport, industry, electricity and wastes. The 
plan argues that selected sectors present the most effective opportunities to 
achieve national mitigation commitments and development needs.  
Agriculture and forestry sectors are particularly targeted for low carbon 
development because they collectively emit the most GHGs (72%) in Kenya 
and also support the country’s economy and livelihoods. For both these sectors, 
forestry activities are emphasised. Agroforestry practices such as on farm 
woodlots and boundary and hedge row plantings are targeted to offset the 
country’s agricultural emissions expected from increasingly mechanised cash 
and food crop production. Net emission reductions are mainly expected from 
forests. The NCCAP reveals that deforestation accounts for 32% of national 
GHGs and if curbed, could significantly contribute to the country’s emissions 
abatement targets.  
The climate plan singles out REDD+ as the main intervention for funding and 
achieving emission targets through forests. Specifically, REDD+ would achieve 
this through incentivising the rehabilitation of degraded lands and protecting 
existing forests especially those in dryland areas. Rehabilitating and protecting 
dryland forests are targeted as cost-effective undertakings because of available 
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land, relatively low populations and yet increasing forest exploitation in these 
areas. Already, a concept paper for restoring dryland forests through REDD+ 
has been prepared (Murphy and McFatridge, 2012). The concept proposes 
incentive driven restoration and rehabilitation of dryland forests. Such 
incentives may include non-charcoal enterprises, capacity building and 
demonstrations based on evidence generated through research and other 
government inventories.   
As mentioned earlier, Kenya is preparing to implement these REDD+ practices 
in line with an internationally agreed framework.  Since 2008, the country has 
been putting in place national REDD+ institutions using technical and financial 
support or ‘readiness support’ from the World Bank’s Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPC) and the UN-REDD. In the context of readiness 
support, Kenya has prepared a readiness plan that includes forest management 
strategies and ways of addressing deforestation, and necessary institutional 
arrangements for implementing monitoring and reporting forest and carbon 
stock changes. The readiness process also allows Kenya to build financial 
networks for her REDD+ activities and exchange REDD+ lessons with the other 
countries involved in the readiness process (FCPF et al., 2010) (see section 4.3.3 
for more details).  
This section reveals that Kenyan forests are a key natural resource for the 
country’s economy and livelihoods. Kenyan policies therefore target REDD+ 
as a new strategy for incentivising forest conservation, meeting her climate 
commitments and attending to development. REDD+ policies are however still 
evolving. At this critical point, there is a need for evidence on how REDD+ can 
work as the country navigates the institutional pathway to full implementation. 
Targeting ongoing implementation of REDD+ demonstrations for research 
analysis can generate crucial empirical evidence on what works or not (Caplow 
et al., 2011).    
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4.3    Case study REDD+ project and field sites 
This section explains the procedures employed in selecting a case study REDD+ 
project within Kenya and how specific sites were chosen from the project area. 
The relevant characteristics of the selected case project and associated sites are 
also described here. 
 
4.3.1.   Selection of case study REDD+ project 
This study analyses the REDD+ design process at the global level and takes 
Kenya as a case study country to understand how resulting rules are 
implemented at national and local levels. While the rules are still being 
instituted (implemented) at the national level in Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 
2013b) and other developing countries, implementation at local levels is 
ongoing through sub-national demonstration projects.  These projects comprise 
a hybrid of forestry and agroforestry initiatives (Brandon and Wells, 2009, 
Peters-Stanley et al., 2013). Primary field data were therefore collected from 
sites where there is ongoing implementation of REDD+ projects (objectives 3, 
4 and 5).  
The selection of a suitable case project for this study was informed by objective 
3 (Chapter 6) which mapped and evaluated REDD+ projects across Kenya’s 
socioeconomic settings. From a total of 15 projects, the Kasigau Corridor 
REDD+ project was selected. The selection process was based on three criteria 
aided by expert consultations: (1) international verification (2) project 
implementation period (3) socio-ecological context.  In the first step, a project 
accredited by an international standard, specifically the VCS, was preferred. 
This is because most buyers of forestry credits prefer the VCS standard and 
perceive it as credible in verifying credits (Peters-Stanley et al., 2013, Kollmuss 
et al., 2008, 2014).  Due to this legitimacy,  the majority of REDD+ 
demonstrations seek the VCS as a way of getting carbon buyers (Peters-Stanley 
and Gonzalez, 2014). The VCS is also recognised in the UNFCCC negotiations 
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as an appropriate expert standard for verifying REDD+ projects (UNFCCC, 
2010). The VCS provisions thus make it possible for a project’s design and 
implementation to be linked to global rules and shared across other projects. 
Out of the 15 projects, ten were registered under the VCS although only three 
had been VCS certified.  
The certified projects were prioritised and assessed against the implementation 
period criteria. A project that had engaged communities for more than five years 
was preferred as a suitable case for enhancing confidence in data collected. 
Confidence in data in this case results from project exposure to dynamic 
socioeconomic and ecological processes for a relatively longer time thus 
providing realistic experiences on the interplay between REDD+ activities and 
local settings (Jagger et al., 2010). From the three projects, the Kasigau Corridor 
REDD+ project and the Kenya Agricultural Carbon Project (KACP) had 
worked with local communities for eight and five years respectively. In the final 
analysis, the Kasigau project was preferred to the KACP mainly due to the 
project’s sociological context. The project specifically operates in part of the 
dryland ecosystem that the Kenya’s climate plan prioritises for REDD+ (see 
subsection 3.1.5). The project is the world’s first REDD+ initiative to sell 
verified carbon credits in the voluntary market (Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez, 
2014). Evidence drawn from the Kasigau project is therefore more useful for 
emerging policy interests in dryland forests in Kenya and other developing 
countries. The project proponent is a United States based private company, 
Wildlife Works. Wildlife Works has operated in the Kasigau area since 1998, 
with specific interests in wildlife conservancies and eco-tourism. The project 
protects 500,000 acres of dryland forest for carbon credits and engages the local 
community in conservation and development activities (see more project 
description in subsection 7.3.3).  
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4.3.2.   Selection and characteristics of field sites 
The Kasigau project is located in Taita-Taveta County in the Coastal Province 
of Kenya (Figure 4.2). Taita-Taveta county occupies an area of 17,084.1 square 
kilometres and is the 12th largest among the 47 Kenyan counties (Kenya 
National Bureau of Statistics, 2007). Most parts of the county extend through 
low-land areas dominated by dryland ecology and receive less than 400 mm of 
rainfall per annum.  However, a small section of the county to the north is 
dominated by mountainous semi-humid ecosystems that receive relatively 
higher rainfall. Sparse open woodlands dominate the low-land areas while the 
mountainous areas have relatively dense close canopy woodlands. The 
dominant open woodlands in the low-land areas are rich in terrestrial wildlife 
resources within which the Tsavo National Park, the biggest wildlife 
conservancy in Kenya, is hosted. Taita-Taveta County is, however, ranked 
among the poorest with a poverty rate of 54% of persons living below the 
poverty line, higher than the national average of 51% (Kenya National Beureau 
of Statistics, 2007).  Rain-fed farming and livestock rearing are the main 
livelihood and economic activities in the area but these are affected by highly 
variable rainfall (Figure 4.1). Maize is the main food crop grown in the county 
while green grams is mainly cultivated for sale. 
The Kasigau project area covers five locations in Taita-Taveta County (Figure 
4.2).  To establish a counterfactual project-livelihood interaction for objective 
3 (Chapter 6), data were collected from sites within and outside the project area 
based on the Matched Control Intervention (MCI) approach (Jagger et al., 
2010). The MCI involves establishing a counterfactual scenario by comparing 
data from the intervention where activities are taking place with control sites 
where there are no project activities. The approach is useful in enhancing data 
validity (Caplow et al., 2011) and has been applied in Jindal (2010) and Brown 
et al. (2004) mainly in researching project impacts on livelihoods.  
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Figure 4.1: Rainfall and maize yield trends in Taita-Taveta county over a period 
of 35 years (1975 – 2010).   
Data sources: Kenya’s Departments of Meteorology and Agriculture  
Sites within the project area were designated as intervention sites while those 
outside were designated as control sites. Marungu and Kasigau locations, both 
occurring in the south of the project area, were purposefully selected as 
intervention sites. The two locations had closely engaged with the REDD+ 
project and so households living and working in these areas would be more 
likely to be able to give an accurate account of the project interactions with the 
local settings.  The sites were selected through a rapid rural appraisal process 
and consultation with community informants and extension staff from the case 
project (Chambers, 1994) (see subsection 4.5.4).  
Mbololo occurs outside the project area towards the north and was selected as a 
control site. The MCI approach requires that the intervention and control sites 
be of similar socioeconomic characteristics in order to establish a factual 
comparative basis. The rapid rural appraisals and community informants helped 
in affirming socioeconomic similarities between the Mbololo and the 
intervention sites. Data obtained from the Kenya national household survey 
(Kenya National Beureau of Statistics, 2007) also assisted in affirming the 
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similarities against other potential control sites (Schreckenberg et al., 2010). 
The Mbololo site is also located relatively far from the project sites, 26 km 
away, to minimise possible spill-over effects from the project activities (Jindal, 
2010).  
 
Figure 4.2: Location of Taita-Taveta county in Kenya and specific study sites 
(Marungu, Kasigau and Mbololo) in the County.  
The communities pursue various livelihoods strategies such as small scale 
agriculture, ranching and charcoal production (Table 4.3). Both the intervention 
and control sites are overlapped by the Tsavo national park and host both 
communal and private forests. Some parts of Mbololo’s forests are however still 
managed by the local government as trust lands.  The diversity of land and forest 
ownership in the sites is crucial for the REDD+ project as the next subsection 
discusses.     
Table 4.3: Main socio-ecological characteristics of study sites.  
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Source: Kenya National Beureau of Statistics (2007) 
 
4.3.3.   Land tenure in the study sites 
The land tenure system in both study sites draws from the national land policies 
that recognise leasehold and freehold ownership of private, public and 
communal land (National Land Alliance, 2007). The area’s land is dominated 
by group ranches with patches of communal and private lands. Group ranches 
are relatively expansive grassland with continuous dry land vegetation (both 
shrubs and trees). The ranches were originally owned by the State but in the 
post-colonial period, (in the 1970s) the government reclassified the land and 
allocated it to community groups formed as private companies such as Rukinga 
and Taita Ranching Co. Ltd, among others (Korchinsky et al., 2008). The groups 
were issued with ranch titles as provided for under the Land (group 
representation) Act of 1968 (Republic of Kenya, 1968).  Each group ranch 
comprises between 20-2500 individuals holding transferrable shares to the 
 
Asset 
category  
Indicator   Maungu and Kasigau 
(Intervention sites) 
Mbololo (control site) 
Natural Geographical location  3° 33' S / 38° 45' E 3° 16' S / 38° 28' E 
 Forest type  Communal forest 
(hills), ranches  
Trust forests, 
communal, ranches  
 Household land size (acres) 5 4 
 Crop yields (mean bags/acre) 1.89 2.0 
 Distance from the project 0.5km 26km 
Financial  Main source of income expenditure  Faming/business  Faming/business 
 Main expenditure  Food  Food  
 Average number of goats (mean) 4 5 
 Poverty rate (% households  under a 
dollar/day) 
54 56 
Human Literacy rate  (% households able to read 
and write) 
72 79 
 Access to primary school at 5 km or less 
(% households)  
53 56 
Social Agro ecological condition Semi-arid Semi-arid 
 Ethnic composition Taitas, Durumas and 
Kambas   
Taitas and Durumas 
 Household size (mean 5 6 
 Forest management  Private, communal, 
trust 
Private, communal, 
trust 
 Causes of crop failure (majority) 
 
Drought Drought 
 Land acquisition Inheritance  Inheritance  
 Land ownership Private/family and 
communal 
Private/family  and 
communal 
 % handholds with land title deeds  4.3 5.2 
Physical  Water access (hours taken to access water  2 2 
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ranches. Given the dryland conditions, most local peasants initially attached 
little value to the ranches and subsequently sold most of their shares to buyers 
who largely hailed from outside the community. As such, most local peasants 
living around the sites have no shares in the ranches.1 
Alongside the private group ranches, there exists communal land that is mainly 
hills which are managed by the community. Individual lands, where households 
have settled, also exist in patches between the communal hills and the group 
ranches. The individual lands were initially part of the communal land that the 
local authority through the Chief had powers to allocate to landless locals and 
immigrants. However, community members claim that the process was 
characterised by corruption with some relatively rich people receiving large 
parcels to which they further acquired title deeds. For most poor immigrants and 
local peasants however, knowledge held by the village elders or the chief 
remains the main authority justifying their ownership and they have hitherto 
passed ownership rights to their sons through inheritance.  In the  project area, 
ranches constitute about 75% of the total land area under the project while the 
communal hills and private lands take up the rest (Wildlife-Works, 2011).  
 
4.3.4.   Landscape history: ethnicity and interventions   
As in most parts of Kenya, social life in the localities of Taita-Taveta County 
revolves around predominantly male-headed households. Male children are 
often conferred the mantle to carry on the family lineage while the female ones 
get married and move to some distant land. Households belonging to a given 
family reside within a homestead either in a single house or separately. A 
number of homesteads that are part of a particular family lineage become part 
of a unit called a clan. A group of these clans forms the village that is headed 
by the village elders who are often appointed on the basis of their age, 
experience and good moral standing in the community. It is from the village set 
                                                          
1 Discussion with village elders during scoping study,  Kasigau, October, 2012 
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up that formal governance units such as sub-locations and locations headed by 
the Chiefs or assistant Chiefs exist as links to the central government.  As such 
the chief and the village elders are key authorities in the study sites. 
A mix of ethnic tribes including Taitas, Durubas, Kambas and Swahilis live in 
the study sites and have, over time, adopted common socio-cultural practices.  
In the 1970s, most villages were dominated by the Taitas who were the original 
occupants. In the late 1970s, the Taitas, who mainly practiced rain-fed 
agriculture, sold off their ranch shares to outsiders and Somali pastoral 
communities then moved in to moist mountainous areas in the north ‘ the Taita 
hills’. In the early 1980s, other immigrants, including the Kambas and Durubas, 
settled in the area as squatters, mainly subsisting through making charcoal from 
the now protected dryland forest. In the 1990s, the charcoal business became a 
booming economic venture thanks to the expanding tourism activities within 
the Tsavo National Park and nearby Mombasa city. The increasing economic 
prospects in these low-land areas triggered a return of some Taitas who resettled 
to pursue charcoal businesses and subsistence agriculture. Today, the project 
area constitutes sparse settlements of Taita, Duruba and Kamba communities 
who have few or no shares in the expansive ranches.  
Given the anthropogenic threats such as charcoal burning and peasantry 
agriculture that threatens the area’s dryland forests and wildlife resources, a 
number of ICDPs have attempted to conserve the forests and wildlife alongside 
providing livelihood support to local communities. The Tsavo national parks 
are one such initiative by the government. The parks span over 24,000 square 
kilometres. The parks were initially established by colonial governments who 
intended to curb anthropogenic wildlife destruction and promote wildlife related 
sports such as hunting.  In the post-independence period (1970s), the Kenyan 
government has used the parks mainly as a source of touristic revenue for 
national GDP (see subsection 8.2.2). World Vision, CARE Kenya alongside 
other NGOs have also  worked in the area since 1999 and has engaged local 
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communities in projects such as food for work; food for conservation and food 
for assets (see subsection 8.2).  
Overall this section reveals the diverse policy and socioeconomic circumstances 
that a globally linked REDD+ project is likely to face during implementation at 
the local level. Generating evidence on this interaction requires an 
interdisciplinary research design and methods as described in the following 
sections. 
  
4.4.   Study design 
This section presents research design indicating various research activities 
undertaken at different timelines. The research design is schematically 
presented in Figure 4.3. The design follows a multilevel approach. It shows key 
activities and timelines for each level of analysis.  
After developing an initial research concept, a scoping study was undertaken in 
Kenya from November 2011 until March 2012. A scoping study is a prior 
exploration of a particular research topic and possible sources of evidence to 
support the given topic  (Mays et al., 2000). Scoping studies are more useful in 
situations where little is known about the dynamics of a particular research 
subject (Arksey and O'Malley, 2005). While REDD+ is reasonably understood 
at the global level, to most local communities and national stakeholders it is a 
new venture not because it seeks to protect forests, but because it revaluates 
forests in terms of carbon as a commodity for sale within globally set rules. 
Therefore it was necessary to undertake a scoping study during the period of 
November 2011 until March 2012 to identify the key research issues to 
investigate.  
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Figure 4.3: Research process indicating the link between different levels of 
analysis, objectives and methods  
 
    
 
82 
 
During the scoping study, a number of REDD+ projects and their activities were 
documented through snowball consultation. Field visits were made to two 
projects (the Kasigau Corridor REDD+ project and the Kenya Agricultural 
Carbon Project -KACP). During the visits, semi-structured discussions and 
interviews were held with a variety of people attached to the projects. A total of 
107 household interviews, 9 group discussions and 12 key informant interviews 
were executed within both projects.   Among other findings, the scoping study 
pointed to a multiplicity of perceptions about carbon initiatives. The findings 
were used to refocus and reformulate the objectives of the thesis.   
Due to presidential elections taking place in Kenya in March, 2013, it was 
necessary to bring forward data collection for global level REDD+ activities 
(objective 2). As a result, a research visit to the UNFCCC was undertaken to 
collect global level data during the elections (objective 1). After the UNFCCC 
visit, the researcher travelled to Kenya in June 2013 to collect primary data 
drawing on the activities of the Kasigau Corridor REDD+ project. Data analysis 
and initial write-ups for each objective were executed alongside data collection. 
The overall methodological framework developed to guide the conceptual focus 
and data collection in this thesis is outlined in the next section.  
4.5.    Methodological framework: the IDAF 
Section 3.7 discussed the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) as a suitable 
basis for framing local settings where REDD+ is implemented. The section, 
however, showed that the SLF does not address the linkage between local assets 
and broader institutional processes at national and global levels. This section 
therefore integrates the SLF with the Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework (IAD) and the Policy Process Analytical Framework (PPA) to 
develop the Institutions and Development Analytical Framework (IDAF) that 
links the global REDD+ design process and implementation at national and 
local levels. Given that the SLF has already been discussed (section 3.6), this 
section briefly reintroduces the SLF then moves to discuss the IAD and the PPA 
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to highlight their strengths and weaknesses, and how they were integrated to 
create the IDAF.    
 
4.5.1.   The Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) 
Having drawn from the literature to show the need for multilevel analysis of 
REDD+ institutions and their implementation, this section discusses the 
sustainable livelihood framework (SLF) (Figure 4.4) as a basis for linking 
REDD+ institutions and implementation. The SLF (DFID, 1999) holistically 
contextualises the socioeconomic settings in terms of five livelihood capitals 
and also highlights the role of institutions in structuring these capitals in the 
context of sustainable development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: The Sustainable Livelihood Framework  
Source DFID (1999: 2.2) 
Other frameworks such as Institutional Analysis and Development (Ostrom et 
al., 1994a) or the Policy Process Analytical Framework (Keeley and Scoones, 
2003) provide an alternative analytical basis but these are limited to institutional 
processes and do not comprehensively contextualise the local settings within 
which such institutions are implemented. These other frameworks were 
however adopted into the SLF to form an integrated institutions and 
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development analytical framework (IDAF) (section 4.4) that usefully links the 
SLF to broader multilevel and multi-actor institutional processes to which this 
thesis begins analysis (Scoones, 2009).  
The SLF draws on the sustainable development concept. SLF evolved as part of 
attempts to operationalise sustainable development within rural settings 
(Chambers and Cowie, 1992). Chamber and Cowie (1992: 6) define a 
sustainable livelihood as ‘a livelihood [that] is sustainable when it can cope with 
and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and 
assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; 
and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global 
levels and in the short and long term”. 
The SLF conceptualises sustainable livelihoods in terms of livelihood assets, 
vulnerability and institutions. Livelihood assets are tangible and intangible 
goods and services owned and used by households or communities for living 
and are sorted into five broad categories: natural capital, financial capital, 
human capital, social capital and physical capital (Scoones, 1998). Emission 
reduction under REDD+ builds directly on the natural assets, such as land, 
forests from which most rural populations draw livelihoods. Financial assets, 
including income, savings and fixed assets (Vincent, 2007), are equally useful 
in the local context, particularly as they allow households or communities to 
pursue various livelihood strategies including farming and business, and in so 
doing may structure the drivers of deforestation under REDD+ (Asquith et al., 
2002). Capabilities, skills, education and employment are human assets (Fry, 
2008, Gupta et al., 2010, Brooks et al., 2005) that aid the successful pursuit of 
different livelihood strategies and even in understanding the contents and 
objectives of REDD+ projects.  
Social assets include household/community networks, social claims, affiliations 
and associations (Vincent, 2007) that help households or communities in 
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coordinating their livelihood strategies (Vincent, 2007) and in their participation 
in REDD+ projects (Maraseni et al., 2014). The mix of these assets at household 
and community level may impede REDD+ or make it successful in terms of 
achieving global mitigation goals and meeting local livelihood needs. For 
instance, weak land tenure at the local level may be a barrier for credible and 
legally defendable emission reductions in REDD+ projects (Chhatre et al., 
2012, Jindal et al., 2008).  
The SLF also includes a vulnerability component which reflects the 
sustainability of households or community livelihoods in the context of shocks 
such as climate change. Livelihoods that are able to cope or adapt to shocks are 
less vulnerable and sustainable while those that unable to cope are vulnerable 
and unsustainable.  Interventions, though not explicit in the framework, are 
highlighted as activities that provide case situations which could offer suitable 
institutional entry points for sustainable livelihoods (Scoones, 1998). Such 
interventions mainly include ICDPs which have been operating in these local 
settings and could offer vital implementation lessons for REDD+.  
Institutions are also considered as part of the SLF. Institutions provide the social 
link which structures access, utility and flow of resources among households 
thereby identifying opportunities and barriers to sustainable livelihoods. 
Examples of such institutions range from tenure regimes, family labour sharing, 
household networks and credit arrangements, local organisations and networks, 
most of which are also part of social capital. Institutions thus mediate access to 
and control of livelihood assets and reveal negotiations and trade-offs involved. 
In the context of REDD+, these institutions are crucial in mediating 
participation, benefit sharing, rights and equity of various groups involved in 
REDD+ at the local level (Maraseni et al., 2014). The SLF however lacks 
provisions for linking livelihood assets to  broader institutional processes such 
as those taking place at the global level (Neylan, 2008, Scoones, 2009). 
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In failing to address broader policy issues, the SLF is limited in addressing 
issues of agency, power and equity in resource access and decision making 
(Toner, 2003, Baumann, 2000, Scoones, 2009). Yet REDD+ is a global regime 
drawing its institutional mandates design from the global UNFCCC 
negotiations. The implementation of REDD+ within national and local settings 
is ideally governed by interactions at the global level where the policies are 
designed.  Multilevel institutional analysis is therefore necessary to generate 
meaningful information on institutional coordination, equity and effectiveness 
of global environmental regimes such as REDD+ (Clement, 2010, Ostrom, 
2008). In order to create clear linkage between REDD+  design at the global 
level and implementation at the national and local levels, the SLF needs to be 
integrated with broader multilevel and multi-actor institutional frameworks.  
 
4.5.2.   The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD)  
The IAD framework is one of the most widely tested frameworks in policy 
analysis  (Rudd, 2004, Gibson et al., 2005) and empirical theoretical 
development research  (Lam, 1998, Clement, 2010). The IAD identifies 
institutional process as an action arena where actors at various governance 
levels interact and inform each other rationally and collectively in making 
policy decisions. The action arena is influenced by existing biophysical and 
socioeconomic factors (e.g. resource abundance, uses, threats and uncertainty) 
as well as rules in use. Ostrom et al. (1994b) define rules in use as existing 
statements about what actions are required, prohibited, or permitted and the 
authorised enforcement actions if the rules are not followed. These rules are 
linked across levels of governance i.e. global, national and local. The resulting 
rules are evaluated based on particular criteria that reflects the original goals 
and expected outcomes of the policy.  A key emphasis in the IAD is that 
resulting rules from the action arena, e.g. global level, can only be effective if 
they are compatible with rules in use. For instance, formal international or 
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national agreements can intersect informal rules at the local level and be 
interpreted with relative freedom and collectively shared within a community. 
As such, the IAD enables multilevel institutional analysis (Clement, 2010) and 
incorporates evaluative criteria for assessing the implementation of rules. This 
is relevant for REDD+ where rules from the global arena are to be implemented 
within existing sectoral polices with sustainable development as an evaluative 
criteria. 
However, the IAD assumes that actors in the action arena collectively negotiate 
rules on an equal footing.  In this, the IAD assumes that every actor equally and 
rationally contributes to the rule making process with no other interests but to 
solve the problem under negotiation.  This contrasts the actual situation in global 
environmental regimes such as REDD+, which are significantly shaped by 
development interests and capabilities among different States and non-State 
actors resulting in some actors exercising more agency while others are 
marginalised (Ribot, 2009). This makes the IAD limited in terms of evaluating 
the institutional interests that could create implementation deficits in global 
regimes such as REDD+ (Imperial, 1999). As such, the multilevel aspect of IAD 
was adopted but components of the PPA were adopted to account for interests 
and agency in the institutional process.   
 
4.5.3.   The Policy Process Analysis Framework (PPA) 
The PPA (Keeley and Scoones, 2003) involves analysis of narratives, actors and 
interests in a policy process. The framework has been widely applied in 
analysing policy processes related to climate change adaptation programmes in 
Africa (CCAA), with specific focus on Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania (IDS, 
2009, Naess et al., 2011). The framework usefully presents the process of 
making rules through actor interactions, revealing their influence in the process. 
Actors have been defined in section 2.4.3 and a similar definition is offered in 
this framework, i.e. individuals, groups or organisations with decision making 
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rights in a policy process. Actors often come together to form actor networks 
and use their expertise, knowledge and resources to push for particular 
narratives in a policy process. The PPA states that the strength of a particular 
policy option is determined by the strength of the actors who uphold the option 
and if key actors withdraw their support, the particular option becomes weak 
and may not find its way into a final policy decision. In analysing actor 
interactions, the framework considers interest and politics as part of actor 
agency in the process. The interests can be analysed through actors’ statements, 
documents and actions.  For instance, the various actor constellations within 
REDD+ such as private sector, consultants and scientific bodies have 
organisational documents and submissions to the UNFCCC that could be 
reviewed to reveal their interests and influence in REDD+.  
For this thesis, PPA’s focus on actors, their interactions and influence in a policy 
process was applied to analyse the agency of actors in designing REDD+ at the 
global level. The actor approach in the PPA however fails to consider the 
various levels of governance (Clement, 2010) but this was accounted for by use 
of the IAD. The various components of IAD and PPA were embedded in the 
SLF to form the integrated framework (IDAF) described in the next subsection. 
 
4.5.4.  The Institutions and Development Analytical Framework 
(IDAF)  
The IDAF (Figure 4.5.), developed for the requirements of this study, consists 
of three parts: existing policy environment (part 1), interactions in designing 
and implementing new policies (part 2) and implementation outcomes in the 
context of sustainable development (part 3). Part 1 of the framewrok constitutes 
the existing policy environment including relevant laws e.g. national and 
international conventions and national legislations that are linked to forests in 
one way or another.  In a policy process, these existing policies define the mode 
of governance of actors/stakeholder so as to influence the preferences and 
positions of those involved in negotiating a new policy (Dellas et al., 2011) (see 
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section 3.4.2, 3.4.3 & 3.4.4). For instance multilevel environmental regimes 
involving negotiations such as REDD+, States and non-State actors often push 
for policy options that align with these mode of governance and so some actors 
would prefer for instance that REDD+ consider poverty alleviation in the 
financial mechanism because these are central in their policies. On the other 
hand, private sector actors may push for market mechanisms for REDD+ 
because profit generation and capital investment is core to their policies. 
Ultimately, these different preferences shape the interactions in the 
negotiations.    
Part 2 of the IDAF conceptualises the REDD+ policy process and 
implementation of resulting rules. The policy process is analysed in terms of 
interactions between various actor preferences (e.g. expertise, interests and 
representation) in the negotiations. The actors exercise varying agency in the 
resulting rules (Keeley and Scoones, 2003, Schroeder, 2010) (also see section 
3.4.3 and 3.4.4). Agency here reflects how much of actors’ preferences become 
part of the final rules. Looking at the agency in a policy process allows for 
insights into the compatibility of resulting rules with existing settings where 
policies are implemented (Biermann et al., 2009, Paavola, 2003) (section 3.4.2). 
Drawing on literature on REDD+ implementation (see section 3.5), the IDAF 
analyses implementation based on the interaction of resulting rules with existing 
policy and socioeconomic settings. At the national level, rules of a global 
regime such as REDD+ will have to traverse existing national sectoral policies, 
development strategies, visions, climate plans among others. At the local level, 
where forests are hosted, practical on-the-ground implementation involves 
interaction of the resulting rules with local settings coneptualised in terms of 
livelihood capitals; natural, financial, human, social and physical. The 
framework additionally recognises conservation and development initiatives as 
part of the local setting and could shape the way people view, judge of perceive 
new policies e.g. REDD+. The implementation results in outcomes that 
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contribute to the overall goal of REDD+ as a policy. These outcomes are 
outlined in the UNFCCC safeguards (appendix 1/COP 16) (also see section 
3.5.2) and are coneptualised into the IDAF as the evaluative criteria.  
The evaluative criteria constitutes part 3 of the framework. In this, the 
framework recognises that every policy is expected to achieve particular goals 
and these goals define the performance of the given policy (Jordan, 1999). For 
climate change policies such as REDD+, sustainable development is the main 
expected outcome (UNFCCC, 1992). The framework operationalizes 
sustainable development in terms of policy convergences between global rules 
and existing national policies, stabilization of naturel resource base, poverty 
alleviation, and participation. These variables are outlined in the REDD+ 
safeguards as key implementation outcomes (see section 3.5.3).  
Overal, the IDAF draws on theoretical literature and frameworks to synthesise 
and link key concepts about REDD+ policy process and implementation and in 
so doing, holistically identifies sources of policy implementation deficits. Lack 
of holistic and interdisciplinary approaches to multilevel REDD+ analysis has 
been cited as one of the key impediments to identifying multilevel sources of 
REDD+ implementation deficits (Jagger et al., 2014, Viseren-Hamakers et al., 
2012).  As such by clearly indicating the key analytical variables to focus on at 
each level of governance, the framework provides one of the first simplified 
step-by-step guidelines for pursuing multilevel policy analysis. This is a novel 
contribution to the current literature on REDD+ governance that has sustained 
calls for multilevel analysis, yet a systematic framework for doing so lacks 
(Viseren-Hamakers et al., 2012). The applicability of IDAF including specific 
methodological steps (see section 4.6) has been demonstrated in this thesis in a 
manner replicable in other studies and contexts. The experience and outcomes 
of IDAF’s application indicate that the framework has the potential to generate 
rich, insightful and interdisciplinary empirical evidence for policy and academic 
debates. 
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Figure 4.5: Integrated Analytical Framework, combining institutional analysis 
and livelihoods 
 
4.5.5.   Data types and approaches for the IDAF 
Both quantitative and qualitative data gathered from various sources, using 
participatory approaches, were crucial. A mix of quantitative and qualitative 
data is particularly useful in establishing a strong evidence base on the linkages 
between multilevel policy formulation and implementation (Scoones, 2009, 
Jick, 1979).  
Quantitative and qualitative data were triangulated (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
2010) and sequenced (Caracelli and Greene, 1993) in this study.  Sub-national 
quantitative data on socioeconomic development and a REDD+ projects 
inventory (objective 3) were triangulated with global and national level 
qualitative policy data on actor roles in designing REDD+ rules (objective 1 & 
2). The role of local behaviours and social networks in influencing local 
people’s choices, perceptions and expectations from REDD+ may not be 
revealed from the quantitative information (Ellis, 2000). The quantitative 
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information however informed the selection of a suitable case study project and 
livelihood assets upon which project implementation at the local level were 
assessed (objectives 4 and 5) using a range of participatory methods.  
Scholars view participatory methods to be crucial in generating valid and 
informative evidence for linking policy and practice (Chambers, 2008, Yin, 
1984). These scholars argue that participatory approaches generate 
representative evidence from local contexts comprising various social groups 
e.g. the poor, the rich and immigrants among others (Chambers, 1997, 
Chambers, 2008). Such differentiated evidence reveals interests and 
circumstances of various affected actors, especially local communities targeted 
for implementing most environmental policies (Chambers, 2008, Chambers and 
Conway, 1992, Chambers, 1994, Tolman and Brydon-Miller, 2001, Schensul et 
al., 2014, Martin and Sherington, 1997, Dougill et al., 2006).  In this study, 
participatory methods such as participant observations, semi-structured 
interviews and discussions (Chambers, 1997) allowed  for the collection of data 
on REDD+ design process at the UNFCCC and implementation at national 
level. At the local level, methods such as wealth ranking transect walks, 
informal discussions, non-structured and semi-structured interviews made it 
possible to collect evidence from different groups of people on the interactions 
of their livelihood conditions with REDD+ as well the role of ICDP experiences 
in the REDD+ project implementation. Retrieving this data was crucial given 
the heated debates on equity and rights in REDD+ especially with regards to 
local communities.  
Participatory methods may however generate biased information steered by 
seasons or skewed by the views of influential people participating in the 
research (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, Chambers, 1997). Certain commonly 
employed participatory methods such as household surveys  have also been 
associated with research fatigue among local households (Clark, 2008). These 
weaknesses were mainly overcome through triangulating the various methods 
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and drawing mixed sampling techniques. Combining probability sampling 
techniques (stratified and random sampling) and non-probability techniques 
(purposive and snowball sampling) enabled the selection of relevant research 
subjects thus reduced the risk of overburdening particular people with 
questioning (Shively, 2011). The next section provides an overview of 
individual methods and associated sampling techniques. 
4.6.    Overview of data collection methods 
This section provides an overview of data collection methods (Table 4.4) 
highlighting their strengths and weaknesses and indicating the objectives to 
which they were applied. Detailed methodological steps take for each objective 
is provided under the respective empirical Chapters (Chapters 5-8).  
Table 4.4: Data collection methods employed for study objectives at various 
research levels.  
 
Method  Global 
design and 
national 
level 
implementa
tion 
(objective 1 
and 2) 
Subnational 
level 
implementat
ion within 
socioeconom
ic factors 
(objective 3) 
Local  level 
implementation 
within 
livelihood assets 
and ICDPs 
(objective 4 & 
5) 
1. Document analysis X  X  
2. Expert interviews (n=12) X X  
3. Stakeholder interviews  (n=25) X X X 
4. Rapid Rural Appraisal and Transect 
walks 
  X 
5. Wealth ranking   X  
6. Household questionnaires (n=150)   X 
7. Focus Groups and group meetings 
(n=10) 
  X 
8. (Non)participant observations   X X X 
9. Seminar discussions (n=1) X    
10. Stakeholder roundtable discussion 
(n=1) 
X   
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4.6.1.   Document/Policy analysis  
Qualitative and quantitative data were extracted from a range of policy 
documents and inventories retrieved from the UNFCCC archives, government 
departments and projects archives (Table 4.5).  
Table 4.5: Categories of policy and evaluation documents analysed for data 
 
 
Document  name  and year  Documents source  Type of data  
Global level documents 
COP Reports 
(2008,2009,2010,2011,2012,2013) 
UNFCCC archives  
http://unfccc.int/method
s/lulucf/items/6917.php 
Qualitative data on global REDD+ 
design process (objective 1)  
SBSTA reports  UNFCCC archives  
 
Qualitative data on global REDD+ 
design process  (objective 1) 
Parties and observer submissions UNFCCC archives  
 
Qualitative data on global REDD+ 
design process  (objective 1) 
World Bank and UN-REDD readiness 
reports (2008,2010, 2012) 
World Bank and UN-
REDD  archives 
Qualitative data on global REDD+ 
design process   
CIFOR reports CIFOR archives 
http://www.forestclimatec
hange.org/redd-map  
Quantitative and qualitative  data 
on REDD+ projects (objective 2) 
National level documents 
Revised REDD Readiness Preparation 
Proposal for Kenya (2010). 
Ministry of Environment  Qualitative data on national 
REDD+ design process (objective 
2 and 3) 
National Climate Change Action Plan 
(2012) 
National Climate Change 
Secretariat 
Qualitative data on Kenya’s 
climate change policies (objective 
2and 3) 
Forest Act 2005  Ministry of Environment  Qualitative data on Kenya’s forest 
policies (objective 2and 3) 
National Land Policy 2007 Kenya National Land 
Alliance  
Qualitative data on Kenya’s land 
policies (objective 2 and 3) 
Agricultural Sector Development 
Strategy (2010-2020) 
Ministry of Agriculture  Qualitative data on agro-forestry 
policies (objective 2 and 3) 
National Population and Household 
Population Census (2009) 
National Bureau of 
Statistics 
Quantitative data on population 
(objective 3) 
Economic Review of Agriculture 
(2012) 
Ministry of Agriculture  Quantitative data on agricultural 
productivity (objective 3) 
District Agricultural Development 
Reports (1970-2010) 
Ministry of Agriculture  Quantitative data on agricultural 
productivity (objective 3) 
National Climatic Records (2012) Kenya Meteorological 
department  
Quantitative climate data 
(temperature and rainfall) 
Kenya Integrated Household Budget 
Survey 2005/2006 (2007) 
National Bureau of 
Statistics  
Quantitative sub(national) 
socioeconomic data (objective 3, 4 
& 5) 
Project/Local  level documents 
Kasigau Project Design Document 
Phase I 
Kasigau Project  Qualitative data on project linkage 
to global design and national 
policies (objective 4 & 5) 
Kasigau Project Design Document 
Phase II 
Kasigau Project  Qualitative data on project linkage 
to global design and national 
policies (objective 4 & 5) 
Kasigau Project progress document  Kasigau Project Qualitative data on project 
procedures (objective 4 & 5) 
Kasigau Project Standard Operating 
Document  (2012) 
Kasigau Project  Qualitative data on project 
operational procedures (objective 
4& 5) 
Constitution document of the local 
CBO: Marungu Hills Conservancy 
Marungu Hills CBO Qualitative data on community 
groups  (objective 4 & 5) 
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The documents were analysed through a combination of exploratory analysis 
(Thai et al., 2008) and iterative content analysis (Marsh and White, 2006, 
Kohlbacher, 2006). Exploratory analysis involves a broad and quick overview 
of documents to identify specific issues of concern e.g. actors in a policy process 
(Thai et al., 2008) while iterative content analysis involves in-depth analysis to 
establish a particular information sequence (Marsh and White, 2006). A 
combination of exploratory and iterative document analysis provides a 
systematic way of retrieving useful information from documents (Kohlbacher, 
2006).  
The document analysis gathered information on REDD+ design at the global 
level and implementation at the national and project (local) levels. Global level 
documents, drawn from the UNFCCC archives were analysed to identify actors 
and their contribution to the REDD+ design process and to partially achieve 
objective 1 ‘analysis of global REDD+ design’ (see subsection 5.2.1).  
National level policy documents were analysed to achieve objective 2 ‘national 
level REDD+ implementation’ (subsection 5.2.2). National agroecological 
inventories from agricultural, statistics and meteorology departments among 
others were surveyed for quantitative socioeconomic and agroecological data. 
The agroecological data retrieved included historical rainfall, temperature and 
maize yield data while socioeconomic data included livelihood assets for each 
of the 47 Kenyan counties. The data were quantitatively analysed to generate 
vulnerability indices against which sub-national projects’ design and 
distribution were analysed to achieve objective 3 ‘interaction between REDD+ 
design and Kenya’s socioeconomic conditions’ (see details in subsections 6.2.2 
and 6.2.3). Project design documents were an important source of information 
on REDD+ implementation at the local level to partly answer objective 4 
‘REDD+ interaction with local assets’ (subsections 7.2.1) and objective 5 
‘ICDP lessons for REDD+ implementation’ (subsections 8.3.2). Information 
retrieved from global, national and project level documents was triangulated 
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with expert interviews, stakeholder interviews, household surveys, focus groups 
and key informants at various levels.  
 
4.6.2.   Expert interviews   
Experts are individuals with professional knowledge and insights into a 
particular policy or research field (Fitzpatrick et al., 2009). Expert interviews 
provide insights into specific policy issues and their connections with the real 
world (Dorussen et al., 2005). Expert interviews in this study generated insights 
into REDD+ design process (objective 1). Combining expert interview and 
document analysis is a recommended approach to understanding how policies 
are made and the potential outcomes of their implementation (Urwin and 
Jordan, 2008). As such, the experts usefully triangulated information retrieved 
from documents and also revealed insights into new sources of information on 
REDD+ design and implementation.  
The experts (n=12) interviewed were mainly drawn from the UNFCCC. The 
UNFCCC Secretariat is the legitimate custodian of most information from State 
and non-State actors involved in the REDD+ design process. Experts based at 
the Secretariat had insights about the negotiation procedures, and the 
contribution/submissions of actors to REDD+ design components such as 
methodology, finances and safeguards.  The experts were identified through a 
combination of purposive and snowball sampling techniques. Combining 
purposive and snowball sampling provides a useful way of obtaining 
information from interdependent sources that are sometimes difficult to access 
(Biermann, 2002, Reed et al., 2009). The interviews focused on the roles of 
various actors, especially African States, where REDD+ is targeted for 
implementation, in designing REDD+ and the linkage with national and sub-
national REDD+ activities (subsections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3). The interviews were 
carried out on a face to face basis and took the form of  guided discussions (Hay, 
2000). Executing the interviews in form of guided discussions enabled insights 
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and key issues about REDD+ design to coherently emerge and in a manner 
useful for generating particular narratives from the information (Babbie and 
Mouton, 2001).  Interview notes were written down on a note book and backed 
up with a digital voice recorder. The expert interviews revealed a number of 
linkages between global REDD+ design and national implementation and these 
linkages were further detailed through national level stakeholder interviews.  
 
4.6.3.   Stakeholder interviews  
A stakeholder is an individual or group with a level of influence on decisions or 
who is influenced by decisions (Reed et al., 2009). Stakeholders were mainly 
interviewed on how global REDD+ rules are implemented at the national and 
local (project) levels. Stakeholders interviewed were purposively selected 
mainly drawing on a stakeholder analysis process that involved review of 
government policies linked to forests and enquiries from local informants. A 
total of 27 stakeholders were interviewed for the national and local level 
implementation processes. At the national level, stakeholder interviews (n=13) 
aimed to partially achieve objective 2 ‘implementing REDD+ rules at the 
national level’. The national interviews targeted government staff drawn from 
various forest related sectors e.g. lands, agriculture and forestry. Government 
staff and institutions were targeted because they are the ones expected by the 
UNFCCC to create national policy options and oversee the implementation of 
globally negotiated REDD+ rules (McDermott et al. 2012). The government 
staff revealed useful information on how REDD+ is implemented at the national 
level and how the national process links to global and sub-national project 
designs (subsections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3).  
At the local level, stakeholders interviewed (n=14) included persons linked to 
local institutions such as CBOs, local administration, local development 
committees and staff of case REDD+ and ICDP projects. These stakeholders 
play key roles in defining and reinforcing rules on resource access and use at 
    
 
98 
 
the local level and in doing so, make decisions which influence activities of a 
REDD+ project being imeplemented in these localities. The local and project 
stakeholders were mainly interviewed to obtain information on project 
implementation at the local level. The stakeholders additionally provided 
insights into the project’s linkage with national instituions and ICDPs. 
Interviews were executed in English except in certain local circumstances where 
some stakeholders were comfortable with the local languages (Kitaita or 
Kiswahili). The interview followed an open discussion with interview notes 
captured both digitally and on paper (see subsection 4.6.2).  Detailed data on 
REDD+ implementation at the local level were further obtained through 
fieldwork targeted at specific ongoing REDD+ and ICDP projects’ activities.  
 
4.6.4.   Rapid rural appraisal and key informants  
Rapid rural appraisal (RRA) was undertaken through transect walks together 
with community informants. RRA involves a quick and cost-effective visual 
appraisal of rural conditions and was aimed at identifying and characterising the 
study sites and subjects.  RRA is more informative when undertaken with key 
informants who can explain relationships and trends of observed features in a 
manner informative to sampling sites and subjects (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999, 
Chambers, 1997). Key informants comprising of village elders (n=3) and 
community resource persons (n=2) were identified from within the study 
communities to guide the RRA process. The informants were chosen based on 
their deeper understanding of the socioeconomic status, history, norms, 
demography and traditions of the study sites as they demonstrated during initial 
meetings (Shively, 2011).  
During the RRA process, the informants were asked about the key livelihood 
activities in various sites.  The village elders orally narrated the history of the 
landscape and the changing resource abundance, use, traditions and ethnicity in 
the area and past interventions. In doing so, the RRA process aided the 
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identification and comparison of intervention and control sites for data 
collection (see subsection 7.2.2) and in revealing the nature of local level 
stakeholders and households to be interviewed (see subsection 7.2.2).  Village 
elders are respected opinion leaders in the study area and their presence during 
the RRA made it easier for the researcher to be accepted by the local people 
prior to interviews and discussions. Key informants may however sometimes 
give skewed information biased towards the interests of their social groups 
(Shively, 2011, Warrick, 2009). To minimise such biases, information from an 
informant was triangulated with views of other informants. After identifying 
sites through RRA and informants, households in the identified sites were 
grouped into wealth categories for the purposes of drawing samples for 
household questionnaire surveys. 
 
4.6.5.   Wealth ranking 
Local communities are heterogeneous and are made up of diverse social groups 
with varying perceptions and entitlements to resource access and use (Scoones, 
1998). Various social groups utilise forests in different ways with the poorer 
segment of local communities reportedly more dependent on forest provisioning 
services than the richer segment (Kalaba et al., 2013a). Because REDD+ aims 
to protect forests, socially differentiated households potentially posit varying 
implications on a project’s ability to protect forests.  Capturing views of various 
social groups is also critical for REDD+ research, especially in the context of 
debates on rights and equity with regards to local communities. In order to 
capture views of various social groups, a wealth ranking procedure was 
developed and used to group households in the study sites into various wealth 
categories (subsections 7.2.2 and 8.2.2).  
Wealth ranking can be drawn from secondary income data or local people’s 
knowledge of their assets and conditions (Scoones, 1995). The people based 
approach reportedly generates more contextually accurate wealth rankings due 
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to people’s close understanding of local processes such as livelihood seasonality 
and trends (Scoones, 1995). The approach has been widely applied in many 
empirical studies on natural resource management in Africa (Oino and Mugure, 
2013, Reed et al., 2007, Scoones, 1995). The people approach was adopted in 
this study and implemented with the help of village elders. These elders, 
compared to other local people, had a deeper understanding of important assets 
due to their many years of living in the study areas and also through their role 
in mediating resource conflicts between households and groups (Chambers, 
1994). 
Wealth status in sub-Sahara Africa is mainly based on natural capital (Scoones, 
1995) and key capabilities to diversify assets into livelihood strategies 
(Chambers and Conway, 1992). Through consultation with village elders, the 
size of land owned, crop yields, number of sheep owned and educational 
capabilities were the key assets used in wealth ranking (Table 4.6). The wealth 
ranking guided sampling of households interviewed using the household 
questionnaire. 
Table 4.6: Wealth ranking criteria  
 
4.6.6.   Household questionnaires  
A total of 150 households were interviewed using semi-structured 
questionnaires to further achieve objective 4 and 5.  The households were 
sampled from each wealth category and across the study sites. Household 
questionnaires enabled micro-level insights into the social, demographic and 
economic interactions, perceptions and expectations about REDD+ (Jagger et 
 Land size 
(acres) 
Livestock numbers 
(sheep) 
Crop yields 
(maize bags/acre) 
Educational 
capabilities (level)  
Low 1-1.5 or none 1-2 sheep or none <1.5 or  none Primary level or none 
Middle Household meeting any 2 of the asset criteria for the high category   
High >6 >10 >3 Tertiary level  
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al., 2010).  A household was defined based on the Kenyan Ministry of Planning 
and Development’s definition that a household is a production, consumption, 
social and demographic unit (Republic of Kenya, 2003). Specifically, this study 
defined a household as people (normally family members) living together under 
the same roof, and whose production and consumption activities are organised 
into a social unit.   
The questionnaire design followed the HAI+ (Household characteristics, assets 
owned, income of the household + special research questions relevant to the 
objectives) framework (Lund et al., 2011). The questionnaire comprised of 
seven parts including introduction, household demographic and livelihood 
profile, household engagement in REDD+ project, interaction of household 
assets with the project activities, community expectations and suggestions, and 
interaction of the case REDD+ project with ICDPs (see details in subsection 
7.2.2, 8.2.2 and appendix 1). The questionnaires were administered through 
face-to-face interviews that enabled rural households with little access to digital 
communication facilities (e.g. internet, telephone etc.) to effectively participate 
in and validate data for the research (Figure 4.6). 
 
Figure 4.5: Interview of a male household head in Marungu village, August 
2013.  
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The questionnaires were administered to household heads with the help of two 
research assistants. The research assistants, selected from the study area, were 
conversant with the local language and had a reasonable understanding of 
climate change and carbon issues (Jagger et al., 2010). The assistants were 
thoroughly trained on the research aim and questions contained in the 
questionnaire and their understanding   evaluated through a questionnaire pilot 
with 15 households. 
The pilot also helped in assessing the feasibility of the questionnaire within the 
target respondents (Angelsen and Lund, 2011). This was crucial given that 
carbon issues are still new for most households in these local settings (Jagger et 
al., 2010). The pilot revealed that households needed more explanation to 
understand certain questions related to carbon. One possible way to address this 
was to document the more general information which respondents could easily 
provide then triangulate these with group discussions. However, in the quest for 
insights beyond the exploratory evaluations commonly deployed in studying 
carbon projects (see subsection3.5.5), the interview schedule was adjusted to 
incorporate more time and flexibility in the questioning sessions. This was done 
by reducing the number of interviews targeted for a day from eight to five and 
allowing more than one questioning session. Reducing the number of 
questionnaires enabled adequate time for explaining, reframing and discussing 
questions with respondents.  
While the questionnaire targeted the household heads as the observation unit, 
other members of a household were allowed to join in the interview and provide 
additional explanations. Flexible interview sessions also helped to minimise 
interview fatigue (Lund et al., 2011).  In the end, the household questionnaire 
adopted a more discussion based approach than was planned, lasting for  2.5- 3 
hours and longer than the earlier stipulated time of 2 hours. Each questionnaire 
was assigned a special identification code incorporating the first letters of the 
village name, enumerator’s name and the household number (e.g.KA001). The 
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coding was necessary for follow-up on arising issues or future investigations 
but was kept confidential in line with ethical provisions outlined in section 4.8. 
 
4.6.7.   Focus group discussions and community meetings 
A focus group discussion (FGD) is a one off meeting of selected individuals 
aimed at discussing a particular research or policy topic based on a guiding list 
of inquiries into the topic (Bedford and Burgess, 2001). FGDs enabled 
collective discussion of REDD+ and livelihood issues in a manner that usefully 
overcame the relatively low understanding of carbon issues among individual 
households.  The FGDs were carried out based on the procedures recommended 
in  Cundill et al. (2011). A total of ten (10) FGDs were undertaken with a 
diversity of local people including women, men, youth, village elders, land 
owners (both communal and ranches) and representatives of community 
groups(Figure 4.6). The participants had varying asset ownership and social 
entitlements that are influential to REDD+ project implementation and 
informative the aim of this study.    
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Focus group discussion in Marungu location of Taita-Taveta county, 
September, 2013.  
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Six of the FGDs were undertaken for objective 4 ‘project interaction with 
livelihood assets’. The six FGDs mainly focused on triangulating the household 
data through livelihood calendars and ranking assets in terms of their 
significance in implementing REDD+ (see subsection7.2.3). The other four 
FGDs were undertaken for objective 5 ‘project interactions with ICDPs’. These 
four focused on the areas’ intervention history and also triangulated household 
data on lessons the REDD+ project draws from ICDPs in the area (see 
subsection 8.2.3).   
The FGDs were organised and conducted with the help of village elders and 
community informants. The discussions were undertaken at convenient sites 
such as chief’s camps, schools and sometime farmers’ homesteads. A topic 
guide (appendix 3) was used to guide all the discussions. Contentious issues in 
the discussions were subjected to voting to achieve consensus (Cundill et al., 
2011). FGDs have however been critiqued on account of constraining women 
from speaking especially in male dominated societies (Darlington and Scott, 
2003). Even though the FGDs included a number of women holding group 
leadership positions e.g. women group leaders and were able to speak openly 
without any intimidation from their male counterparts, some women 
participants, especially those with no leadership positions, were sometimes a bit 
intimidated to speak.  To improve representation of women in the FGDs, 
participants included equal number of women as men to enable equal voting 
strength on issues. Women were also allocated special sessions to give their 
views during the discussions. To capture views of women with little confidence 
to speak in the FGDs, a number of meetings and discussions were specifically 
held with women groups especially during their group activities such as farming 
(Figure 4.9).  
In addition to the FGDs, two general community meetings were organised with 
the help of the chief to discuss general issues of livelihoods, climate change and 
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the REDD+ project work. The general meetings were aimed at gathering views 
from community members who were not part of the FGDs. The meetings were 
also used as learning forums where the researcher explained to the community 
about climate change causes, impacts, mitigation and adaptation.  Each FGD 
and general community meeting lasted 2-3 hours compared to the planned time 
of one and a half hours. This was because participants could sometime engage 
in prolonged debates on issues and such debates unveiled certain information 
relevant to the study.  
 
4.6.8.   Participant and non-participant observation  
Participant observation provides practical evidence of reported behaviours 
(Holland and Campbell, 2005). Participant observation was mainly applied at 
the local level to achieve objective 4 (implementing REDD+ within local assets) 
and 5 (implementing REDD+ in the context of ICDPs).  In pursuit of participant 
observation, the researcher engaged in various communal activities such as 
women group meetings and farming sessions (Figure 4.8).  
 
 
Figure 4.8:  Researcher participating in a women group’s farming activities in 
Marungu village, August 2013.  
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During these times, the researcher listened and asked probing questions about 
livelihoods and implications for REDD+ project (subsection 7.2.3).  
Non-participant observation involves observing activities without contributing 
to the activity in under observation  (Holland and Campbell, 2005). The non-
participant observation was mainly applied at the global level to achieve 
objective 1 (Global REDD+ design) and partly at the local level. At the global 
level, the observations were made during various UNFCCC workshops and 
seminars which provided insights on the process of preparing, organising and 
administering meetings and negotiations on REDD+ (subsection 5.2.1).  At the 
local level, non-participants observation was applied in two community 
meetings, one where the community was making decisions on how to invest a 
share of carbon money from the communal hills and another one during a 
meeting of ranchers and trustees of communal carbon money.  These enabled 
the researcher to listen to how people link their livelihood priorities with 
benefits from the REDD+ project.  
4.6.9.   Seminar and roundtable discussions  
A seminar discussion to explore the implications of REDD+ design on the 
national process was held on 11 April, 2013 at the UN University conference 
hall. The seminar audience included staff from the UNFCCC, UN University 
and PhD and masters students from Bonn University. The researcher presented 
preliminary findings on REDD+ design issues, followed by a structured 
discussion on the implications of the findings on REDD+ implementation. In 
Nairobi, a policy roundtable discussion bringing together 15 stakeholders drawn 
from across government sectors, research, development partners, private sector 
and farmers was undertaken on the 16th April, 2014. The discussions took place 
at Kenya’s Ministry of Agriculture. The researcher presented national and local 
level findings and through structured discussions in small groups, participants 
provided useful information on the on-going development of climate policies in 
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Kenya and associated challenges. These discussions usefully informed 
objective 2 (national level REDD+ implementation) and 6 (synthesis and policy 
recommendations).  
 
4.6.10.   Data analysis 
For objective 1 (designing REDD+ at global level), a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative analysis was applied. Quantitative analysis involved social network 
analysis (SNA) to generate centrality measures for various actors involved in 
designing REDD+(Wasserman, 1994) (see subsection 5.2.1). The SNA 
measures were mainly used to understand information diffusion among actors 
and structure the analysis of actor roles. Qualitative analysis involved an 
iterative process of retrieving and coding statements from documents and 
interviews (Marsh and White, 2006, Kohlbacher, 2006) on the roles of actors 
involved in designing REDD+ (see subsection 5.2.2).   
For objective 2, (national level implementation of REDD+), data were analysed 
qualitatively through coding where statements were categorised into themes 
related to actor involvement in the national process. For objective 3 (REDD+ 
interaction with sub-national socioeconomic settings, quantitative analysis was 
applied to agro-ecological and socioeconomic data from the 47 counties of 
Kenya to calculate vulnerability indices. GIS (ArcGIS), and statistical 
correlation tests (Bolboaca and Jäntschi, 2006) were used to compare the design 
and numbers of REDD+ projects with the vulnerability indices and a range of 
sub-national socioeconomic indicators (see details in subsections 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 
6.2.3). 
For objectives 4 and 5 (local level implementation of REDD+), qualitative and 
quantitative analysis were employed. Qualitative data drawn from FGDs, key 
informants and stakeholder interviews were coded to draw out themes and 
illustrative quotes (Hopkins, 2007). Household questionnaire data were 
analysed using SPSS to generate descriptive statistics. Household questionnaire 
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data on asset-project interactions were analysed using non-parametric statistical 
tests were applied in analysing the household data (Green and Salkind, 2010). 
Specifically, Chi-squared and spearman rank correlation coefficient were used 
to test for differences between wealth categories and between sites (see details 
in subsections7.2.6 and 8.2.4).  
The finer details of these methods are included in the respective empirical 
Chapters to which they were applied. Nonetheless, their application had a 
number of limitations that are discussed in the next section.  
 
4.7.   Methodological limitations  
In analysing REDD+ design at the global level, sample UNFCCC experts 
provided views about other organisations involved in the process. This may 
generate biased information about other actors. However, analysis of a broad 
range of documents including those associated with actors outside the 
UNFCCCC process usefully triangulated the interview data. Additionally, 
information gathered from specific experts was confirmed with other experts in 
a manner that usefully triangulated information about the other actors.  
In analysing REDD+ implementation at the local level, the MCI design was 
applied to compare data between intervention and control sites. However, 
information from the control site could only be used to compare project impacts 
on assets but could not be applied in comparing asset impacts on the project 
design. This was because households in the control site had not had an 
experience with a REDD+ project and could not provide a factual account of 
the influence their assets could have on the project. This partial use of the MCI 
however does not have significant implications on the aim of this study since 
qualitative information from the control sites revealed some evidence that were 
comparable with the intervention site.   
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4.8.   Ethics and positionality 
Ethical considerations were crucial in this study because it involved gathering 
data from diverse sources and cultures. Prior to the fieldwork, ethical approval 
was obtained from the University Faculty Research Ethics Committee (AREA 
11-219). The University ethical provisions guided the fieldwork ethics but 
certain adjustments had to be made in light of emerging field conditions (Ergun 
and Erdemir, 2010). By observing certain key ethical issues, the researcher 
positioned himself strategically within various organisations and the local 
community in a manner that enabled collection of useful data from various 
sources. The main ethical issues observed during fieldwork include (1) ensuring 
voluntary participation and informed consent of the participants (2) protecting 
personal privileges and anonymity of participants and (3) appreciating the 
cultural and socio- political contexts of organisations, communities and 
households from whom data were drawn.   
Informed consent was ensured by first discussing the study objectives with 
every category of research participant. The research objectives and expectations 
were outlined in the first page of all data collection tools i.e. household 
questionnaires and interview guides. Interviewees were given time to read and 
understand the objectives and expectation.  In situations where households 
could not easily read and understand especially in household questionnaire 
interview, the objectives and expectations were reinforced through verbal 
explanations using local language at the beginning of each interview session. 
Participants, were given time to decide whether they were comfortable to 
participate without any form of inducement. Voluntary participation in the 
research enabled participants to open up and provide useful information for the 
research (Ergun and Erdemir, 2010). 
Data collected from individual households and community informants were 
coded using pseudonyms to ensure anonymity of these respondents. For the 
experts and stakeholders interviewed, consent was obtained as to whether their 
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name/position or organisations could be used. In cases where participants did 
not consent to any of these options, general identities e.g. ‘expert A’ or ‘national 
stakeholder B’ were used.  
The norms and culture of various organisations and communities from where 
data were collected were observed. At the UNFCCC, high professionalism was 
ensured and all interviews were secured by email appointments. Upon securing 
appointments, the experts were interviewed at their convenient locations, 
mostly in their offices. Their time schedule was respected and for any uncovered 
issues, a request for email correspondence was made. Observing these standards 
helped in gaining the trust of the experts and so it was possible to pursue 
continuous communication and meetings to discuss emerging research issues 
even after the interviews. Similar organisational procedures were also observed 
in gathering data from national departments and stakeholders in Kenya. The 
Kenyan environment was less structured because the researcher is Kenyan and 
had worked in the agriculture sector before and thus could easily access most 
stakeholders and their locations. Further, affiliations with intergovernmental 
organisations such as NEPAD in Kenya, and the World Agroforestry Centre in 
Nairobi provided the necessary institutional support that made it possible to 
access stakeholders.  
The local socio-political hierarchy was also well understood and respected 
(Ergun and Erdemir, 2010).  Before beginning the fieldwork, a formal request 
and arrangements were first finalised with the Kasigau project administrators. 
As already highlighted in section 4.2.4, the chief and the village elders were the 
main authorities in the study sites. Therefore at the beginning of fieldwork, the 
local chief was met first to discuss the intended research. Through community 
meetings organised as Chief’s Barazas (Fleming, 1966), the researcher was 
introduced to the local community. Chiefs’ barazas are a decentralized local 
administrative forum where governance issues affecting local people are 
discussed and new development initiatives from the government and NGOs are 
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announced. They were established by colonial officers as fora for local political 
bureaucracies who could thus exercise external authority over their clientele 
(Fleming, 1966). In the Barazas, the Chief introduced the researcher to the 
public and also to village elders. The village elders helped the researcher in 
gaining access to and acceptance by various community groups for interviews 
and discussions.  
During interviews and discussion, expectations were sometimes high, especially 
after being introduced as a student studying in Europe or sometimes ‘London’. 
However, at every point research participants were informed that there would 
be no payment for participating and that the research was aimed at achieving an 
academic degree. The researcher also participated in a number of community 
activities such as land ploughing and local football games. These helped in 
gaining acceptance and additional insights into the community.   
 
4.9.   Conclusion 
This Chapter has outlined and discussed the study area and the methods 
employed. The Chapter has justified the selection Kenya as a case study country 
for understanding the implementation of global REDD+ rules within national 
policies and local socioeconomic settings.  The Chapter has presented a new 
multilevel analytical framework (IDAF) within which mixed methods have 
been applied to acquire and analyse data on designing and implementing 
REDD+ rules. The Chapter has also provided an overview of data collection 
methods, citing their relevance, strengths and weaknesses. These methods are 
discussed in detail under each of the empirical Chapter that follows. The next 
Chapter presents the first empirical findings for objectives 1 and 2 focusing on 
REDD+ design at the global level and its implementation at the national level.  
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Chapter 5   
REDD+ global design and   implementation 
at the national level2 
 
Abstract 
This Chapter examines the process of designing REDD+ at the global level and 
how resulting rules are implemented at the national level. The Chapter gives 
attention to the agency of Africa in the global process and draws evidence from 
Kenya to link the global process to national level implementation. Analysis of 
policy documents and interviews with UNFCCC experts and government 
stakeholders were the main methods applied. Results show that multiple State and 
non-Sate actors are involved in the global process. However, the agency of Africa 
(African States) is weak partly due economic constrains that impede the continent’s 
technical and institutional input into the global design process. The case of Kenya 
reveals technical and financial gaps in the national process. The country relies on 
resource endowed multilateral intermediaries for technical expertise and funds. The 
support to Kenya mainly emphasises institutional arrangements for carbon delivery 
                                                          
2This Chapter is developed from published working papers  and a contribution to a book 
Chapter: 
a. Atela JO, Quinn CH and Arhin A. (2015): Where is Africa in the REDD+ debate? Actor 
typology and representation of Africa in the global REDD+ architecture. Under Review in 
International Environmental Agreements, Politics, Law and Economics.  Manuscript 
Number:  INEA-D-15-00013 
b. Atela JO, Quinn CH  and Minang PA. (2015): Implementing REDD+ at the national level:  
stakeholder engagement and policy coherences between REDD+ rules and Kenya's sectoral 
policies. Forest Policy and Economics FORPOL2049. Accepted subject to revision. 
c. Atela JO. & Quinn, CH.  (2014). Exploring the agency of Africa in designing REDD+ and 
the associated implications for national level institutions. Centre for Climate Change 
Economics and Policy Working Paper No.198.  
d. Arhin A. and Atela JO. (2014). Carbon Policies in Africa. In Carbon conflicts and forest 
landscapes in Africa. Ian Scoones and Melissa Leach (Eds), Routledge, pg 43-57. 
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but reinforces national institutional gaps such as path dependencies  where 
dercisions are monopolised within particular sectors. REDD+ activities are 
mainstreamed within Kenya’s forestry sector with little integration to other key 
sectors, e.g. lands and agriculture and local communities, because these 
stakeholders could ‘complicate’ the delivery of carbon funds. Such stakeholder 
exclusion creates multiple implementation deficits that are presented and analysed 
here.   
 
5.1.   Introduction 
Multiple actors with varying interests are involved in designing REDD+ at the 
global level (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011). Despite multi-actor interests, effective 
implementation of the resulting design rules will depend on how much the policy 
and socioeconomic circumstances of targeted countries are accounted for in the 
design rules (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011, Schroeder, 2010, Brown and Bird, 
2008) (subsection 3.4.4). This is mainly because when a target policy from a 
particular source e.g. global negotiations is not coherent with the existing policy 
setting e.g. national policies, the effectiveness of the target policy is negatively 
affected (vertical interplay) (Young, 2002, Ostrom et al., 1994b) (section 3.54.). As 
such, the agency of developing countries in designing REDD+ is crucial in shaping 
effective implementation of the programme within these countries (Brown and 
Bird, 2008, Brockhaus et al., 2013). Agency in this case refers to the ability of 
actors to participate and prescribe REDD+ design rules (Biermann et al., 2009, 
Paavola, 2003) (subsections 3.4.2, 3.4.3 & 3.4.4).  
This Chapter explores the process of designing global REDD+ rules and how the 
resulting rules are implemented at the national level drawing on evidence from 
Kenya. The specific objectives of the Chapter are: (1) to explore actors and their 
roles in designing REDD+ rules at the global level (2) to explore the representation 
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of Africa (African States) in the global REDD+ design process (3) to analyse the 
participation of sectors and stakeholders related to deforestation in implementing 
global REDD+ rules at the national level and (4) to analyse the interplay between 
global REDD+ rules and national sectoral policies on forests, land and agriculture. 
Document analysis and interviews within the UNFCCC and government 
departments were the main methods applied. The Chapter is divided into five 
sections. The next section explains the methods applied in gathering data. Results, 
discussions and concluding remarks then follow in the subsequent sections.    
5.2.   Methods  
Data were collected during a three month research visit to the UNFCCC in Bonn, 
Germany (February to May 2013) and during fieldwork in Kenya (June to August 
2013). Document analysis, semi-structured interviews and policy analysis were the 
main data collection methods.   
 
5.2.1.   Review of UNFCCC documents     
An exploratory review (Thai et al., 2008) of  a range of documents (Table 5.1) was 
first undertaken to identify actors involved in designing the three main REDD+ 
components: methodology, finances and safeguards (Angelsen, 2008c). Actors 
included States and non-State organisations and groups (Keeley and Scoones, 
2003) who have either made submissions to the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) or have been conferred particular responsibility 
through SBSTA or COP recommendations. Actors outside SBSTA and COP 
institutional settings were excluded because the study focused on an ongoing 
REDD+ design process. SBSTA is a permanent subsidiary body to the UNFCCC 
and provides scientific and technological advice to the COP. SBSTA meetings play 
‘a gate keeper’ role for the COP by bringing together actors to decide which actors, 
approaches and/or data sources are relevant for REDD+ design. 
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Table 5.1: List of documents reviewed 
 
In-depth content analysis of documents was then undertaken through an iterative 
content analysis to explore actor roles in designing REDD+ rules at the global level. 
Iterative content analysis involves retrieving homogeneous and heterogeneous 
relationships between sentences and words (Marsh and White, 2006, Kohlbacher, 
2006). The approach has been applied in a wide range of policy studies e.g. Kalaba 
et al. (2014); Wallbott (2014); Stringer et al. (2009). In this case, it involved 
retrieving and categorising statements on the roles of identified actors within the 
various REDD+ components.  
Document  name  and year  Documents source  Type of data 
Global level documents 
UNFCCC Conference of Parties 
reports from  2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013 
UNFCCC archives  
http://unfccc.int/methods/lulucf/items/
6917.php 
Information on global 
REDD+ design process 
SBSTA reports and recommendations  UNFCCC archives  
http://unfccc.int/methods/lulucf/items/
6917.php 
Information on global 
REDD+ design process 
Submissions from Parties and 
observer organisations  
UNFCCC archives  
http://unfccc.int/methods/lulucf/items/
6917.php 
Information on global 
REDD+ design process  
IPCCC reports 2001, 2007, 2013 IPCC archives  Information on global 
REDD+ design process 
World Bank and UN-REDD 
readiness reports (2008,2010, 2012) 
 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
(FCPF) archives 
https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.o
rg/  
 
Information on global 
REDD+ readiness process   
National level documents 
Revised REDD Readiness 
Preparation Proposal for Kenya 
(2010) 
Kenya’s Ministry of Environment / 
FCPF archives 
 
https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.o
rg/kenya-0   
Information on national 
REDD+ design process  
National Climate Change Action Plan 
2013-2017 
National Climate Change Secretariat Information on Kenya’s 
climate change policies  
Forest Act 2005  Ministry of Environment  Information on Kenya’s 
forest policies  
National Land Policy 2007 Kenya National Land Alliance  Qualitative data on 
Kenya’s land policies  
Agricultural Sector Development 
Strategy (2010-2020) 
Ministry of Agriculture  Qualitative data on agro-
forestry policies  
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From the in-depth analysis, three main categories of actor roles emerged; 
information designers (IDs), information receivers (IRs) and information 
implementers (IIs). IDs are actors who generate, package ideas e.g. specific MVR 
methodologies for verifying REDD+ projects and use these evidence to inform 
design rules. IRs are actors who receive or are informed about packaged ideas from 
other actors and have to be helped in understanding these ideas because they did 
not generate the ideas themselves. IIs are actors who, through on-ground actions, 
implement/demonstrate the design options generated by themselves or by other 
actors.  
5.2.2.   Expert interviews and non-participant observations  
In-depth, semi-structured interviews (Hay, 2000) were undertaken with 12 
UNFCCC experts. The interviews triangulated information retrieved from the 
documents regarding actor roles and networks. The experts were identified through 
a snowball sampling process (Reed et al., 2009). The snowball process begun with 
initial purposive sampling of specific experts aligned to the REDD+ design 
components. Through the initial interviews, additional experts were identified and 
interviewed. The experts were interviewed on three topics (1) actor typology and 
connections (2) actor roles and (3) negotiation procedures at the UNFCCC.  
In terms of actor typology, experts were asked to indicate the menu of actors 
involved in each of the REDD+ design components and how the actors are linked 
to each other. For example, an expert dealing in methodological issues was asked 
to provide a list of organisations working on REDD+ methodology and other 
components (where possible). The expert would also confirm the list of actors 
generated from the document analysis. Within the menu of actors, an expert was 
then asked about how each actor/organisation links to others and the kind of 
information exchanged among the actors/organisations.  
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Actors and their connections retrieved from document analysis and expert 
interviews were coded into a matrix of actors and their connections. An exploratory 
social network pattern (SNA) (De Nooy et al., 2011) was then generated using 
UCINET.  The SNA network was used to guide and indicate which actors should 
be targeted for qualitative analysis of actor roles. Centrality measures derived from 
the network analysis were considered adequate for guiding the qualitative analysis. 
Other analytical measures such as network homophily (actor similarity) and density 
(uniformity of connections) mainly depict speed of information diffusion among 
actors but were not pursued because focus was given to the level of information 
flow among actors (Crona and Bodin, 2006, Bodin and Crona, 2009, Hannan, 
2005). From the network patterns, degree and betweeness centrality scores for each 
actor was generated (Wasserman, 1994). Degree centrality depicts the number of 
connections (to other actors) a particular actor has while betweeness depicts an 
actor’s position as a link between other actors (Wasserman, 1994). Actors with high 
degree centrality scores potentially possess higher capacity to mobilise other actors 
than those with low degree centrality scores. Actors with high betweeness centrality 
potentially broker ideas between disconnected actors who they link together 
(Wasserman, 1994).  
Centrality scores were interpreted to mean the level to which information diffuses 
to or from particular actors. These scores were however not indicative of how 
influential an actor is (Bäckstrand, 2006). Evidence shows that highly central actors 
are sometimes characterised by weak ties and decreasing influence over others 
(Prell et al., 2009). Therefore, to characterise how various actor connections posit 
influence on the REDD+ design, the experts were asked about actor roles and their 
representation in the REDD+ design process. Specific attention was given to 
African States where REDD+ is targeted for implementation and as the region to 
which the case study country ‘Kenya’ belongs.  Interview questions and discussions 
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focussed on matching the centrality scores (both degree and betweeness) against 
actor roles either as IDS, IFS and IRS.  
Actor roles i.e. whether they design (ID), receive (IR) or implement (II) information 
on REDD+ design rules were used to define agency categories based on earth 
system governance framework (Dellas et al., 2011) and consultations with the 
UNFCCC experts.  The governance framework mainly defines sources of agency 
in terms of an actor’s ability to generate knowledge and transmit to the design 
platforms (Dellas et al., 2011) (subsection 3.4.3). Actors were classified as either 
having weak, moderate or strong agency (Figure 5.1). Actors who do not play a key 
role in designing REDD+ components but only receive (IR) and implement (II) 
design options suggested by other actors were categorised as having weak agency 
(Schroder, 2010). Such actors mostly lack capacity or resources to generate and 
package information on design options e.g. methodological procedures for 
accounting carbon thus are limited in exercising agency through expertise (Dellas 
et al., 2011, Archer, 2003, Gupta and van der Zaag, 2009) (also see subsections 
3.4.3 and 3.4.4). By contrast, actors who are able to generate knowledge, design, 
and implement particular REDD+ options have strong agency. Such actors have the 
capacity to steer design decisions by generating ideas and testing their 
‘implementality’ in a manner that provide  stronger empirical evidence/experience 
to support their positions in the global process (Pattberg, 2005, Gupta and van der 
Zaag, 2009). Actors who are able to design options but are limited in terms of 
implementing the options were classified as having a moderate agency.  
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Figure 5.1: Conceptual framing of actor agency based on their roles in REDD+ 
design process.  
The agency measures for African States (developing countries) were further 
triangulated with interviews focusing on Africa’s representation in the UNFCCC 
negotiations. Experts were asked to explain the negotiation procedures such as rules 
on numerical and technical representation of actors and how these structure the 
participation and actors’ influence in designing REDD+. Specific focus was given 
to the representation in the SBSTA meetings and IPCC documentations where 
REDD+ design decisions are filtered. The level to which existing negotiation 
coalitions e.g. the Coalition for Rainforest Alliance and the Africa Group of 
Negotiators (AGN) improve Africa’s representation in the global REDD+ design 
was discussed. Non-participant observation within UNFCCC workshops and 
seminars provided insights on the process of preparing, organising and 
administering negotiations on REDD+.   
 
5.2.3.   Analysis of national level policies  
REDD+ design rule emanating from the global process were analysed against 
existing national policies. The analysis followed the policy interaction framework 
outlined by Young (2002) (see subsection 3.5.1). Both vertical and horizontal 
interactions between REDD+ rules and national policies were analysed.  Vertical 
interaction focused on how the global rules are instituted at the national level.  This 
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involved retrieving and coding texts and statements that link national REDD+ 
policies e.g. readiness proposals, strategies, assessment documents and plans 
(Table 5.1) to the global process. The coding was supported with illustrative quotes 
underpinning key national policy views (Krippendorff, 2004).  
Analysis of horizontal interaction focused on how globally/nationally established 
REDD+ rules interact with national sectoral policies. The sectoral policies analysed 
include the National Forest Act of 2005, the National Agriculture Sector 
Development Strategy for 2010-2020 and the National Land Policy. Lands and 
agricultural sectors were particularly targeted for the analysis due to their  role in 
driving deforestation in Kenya  (Ndungu Land Commission, 2004). Through the 
iterative content analysis, specific policy measures emphasised in the policy 
documents were retrieved and analysed against each of the REDD+ design rules 
i.e. additionality, leakage avoidance, permanence, equity and rights. Interactions 
where specific sectoral measures were supportive of REDD+ rules were classified 
as positive (+). A negative (-) classification was assigned wherever measures 
conflicted specific REDD+ design rules.    
5.2.4.   Interviews with national government stakeholders 
Interviews with government stakeholders (n=13) triangulated the analysis of policy 
documents.  The stakeholders were drawn from various State departments 
including the Kenya Forest Service where the REDD+ National Coordination 
Office is hosted (n=5), the National REDD+ taskforce (n=3), the Lands Ministry 
(n=1) and the Agriculture Ministry (n=4). The stakeholders were asked to clarify 
how global REDD+ design rules are implemented (instituted) at the national level 
(see subsection 4.6.3 for discussions about stakeholder interviews). The 
stakeholders also clarified the roles and representation of relevant national sectors 
and local communities in formulating and implementing REDD+ policies at the 
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national level. REDD+ Secretariat staff clarified the stages of implementing 
REDD+ and linkage with the global process. The staff were also asked to indicate 
how and why other sectors and stakeholders are represented or not represented in 
the national process.   
5.3.   Results  
Results are presented in four parts corresponding to the chapter objectives.  
 
5.3.1.   Typology of actors and their roles in the global REDD+ design 
Figure 5.2 shows an exploratory network diagram depicting a typology of actors 
and their connectedness across the various REDD+ design components: 
methodology, finance and safeguards. The connections depict that all actors are 
linked to each other in one way or another.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Network diagram indicating actor connections across REDD+ design 
components.   
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A total of 16 broadly categorised actors were identified. The actors were listed 
based on their areas of specialisations and roles  even though the network diagram 
indicate that that certain actors contribute to more than one component. 
Nonetheless, the institutional diversity of the actors is indicative of the global nature 
of REDD+. Actors from various regions and levels of governance e.g. global, 
regional, national and local are part of the process. They include States who are 
Parties to the UNFCCC, global level UN agencies such as the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO). There are also intergovernmental scientific 
bodies such as Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), World 
Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) as well as international nongovernmental 
organisations such as the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) mainly contributing 
science to the programme’s methodological design. International consulting firms, 
for example German Climate Action, Winrock International Ltd, Climate Care also 
support methodological design options. The financial component is dominated by 
international organisations including multilateral intermediaries such as the World 
Bank; UN-REDD and multilateral private companies interested in carbon business. 
A range of civil society groups and forest people organisations also exist to 
represent the interests of local communities in the process.  
Figure 5.3 shows respective centrality scores and agency measures of actors based 
on whether they design (IDs), receive (IRs) or implement (II) REDD+. In terms of 
centrality scores, there was a positive correlation between degree and betweeness 
centrality scores of actors (p<0.05). This implies that actors with more connections 
e.g. developing countries (D=14) also acted as links between other actors (B=10.6). 
However, there was no significant difference in actors’ degree centralities (p>0.1) 
even though the betweeness scores were significantly different among actors 
(p<0.1). This implies that all actors are relatively well linked to each other in 
designing REDD+ but vary in terms of mediating between actors.  
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The highly central actors in the network included developing countries (D=14; 
B=10.6) consultants (D=14; B=3.3), multilateral private companies (D=11; B=3.1), 
multilateral intermediaries (D=10; B=3) and specialised UN agencies (FAO) 
(D=10; B=8.7). These actors are key sources or targets of REDD+ information and 
could have relatively more input in the REDD+ design. On average, financial actors 
had the highest average centrality scores at 6.56 followed by safeguard and 
methodological actors at 6.22 and 6.15 respectively. All financial actors have 
degree and betweeness scores of greater than 10 and 2 respectively. This contrasts 
the safeguard and methodological actors where degree centrality and betweeness 
scores were mostly less than 10 and 2 respectively. This could mean that the 
REDD+ financiers have more input into the REDD+ design than methodological 
and safeguard actors. 
As already highlighted, the centrality scores are only indicative of which actors 
could have more input into the REDD+ design but do not depict the actual actor 
influence. Qualitative analysis of actor roles in the connections usefully helped to 
understand the actual influence/agency of actors.   
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Figure 5.3: REDD+ actors and their agency based on their role in REDD+ design. 
Developing countries in this case refer to the low income segment of developing 
countries to which most African countries participating in REDD+ belong. 
In terms of agency scores, majority (4 of 6) of methodological actors have moderate 
agency in REDD+. These actors mainly specialise in research activities to generate 
knowledge, design models for measuring and monitoring land use changes and 
carbon stocks among others. They package scientific knowledge on carbon 
accounting, monitoring, ways of avoiding leakage and emission reversals among 
other methodological provisions (Table 5.2). The actors transmit the 
methodological options to the global process through presentations within SBSTA 
expert sessions designed to address specific methodological issues such as forest 
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reference levels. 3 They also organise separate side events and sessions to share new 
research findings and approaches on MVR, including on-going collaborative work 
with other actors. For example during 18th COP, CIFOR and Global Observation 
of Forest and Land Cover Dynamics (GOFC-GOLD) organised a side event on 
REDD+ national forest monitoring and setting reference levels for the MVR.4  
Despite being able to design methodological options, these actors have moderate 
agency because they do not legally engage in the implementation of these design 
options.   
Consultants and the VCS board are the methodological actors with strong agency. 
Consultants are hired by various actors across the design components to develop 
REDD+ methodologies (IDs) and oversee the implementation (II) of demonstration 
projects within Africa and other developing countries. In this, they have garnered 
knowledge upon which most developing countries rely on for the global REDD+ 
negotiations and on-ground demonstrations. International consulting firms e.g. the 
German Climatic Action, Winrock consulting Ltd, Climate Care and Climate Focus 
currently support developing countries e.g. Kenya with national REDD+ 
implementation, greenhouse gas inventory and global negotiation procedures. 
Africa and other developing countries often submit methodological suggestions to 
SBSTA but their submissions mostly outline administrative structures for 
coordinating the externally designed technical information. The VCS board has 
strong agency because it is comprised of private sector actors that are currently 
designing and certifying VCS methodologies. The VCS is the main carbon standard 
upon which more than half of global REDD+ credits are currently verified. Most 
private multilaterals aligned to the VCS board are also implementing more than 
80% of the REDD+ projects globally.       
                                                          
3 FCCC/SBSTA/2011/INF 
4 https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLZ1FEAFDHOWfkp4eaNRXkoUN4DEJOSF3o  
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Two out of five financial actors including regional economic bodies and developed 
countries have moderate agency. These actors design the financial mechanisms 
(IDs) but disburse the funds. The intermediaries redefine (IDs) the funding 
conditions and execute the implementation process (II). For example, a host of 
developed countries e.g. Norway, Australia, UK now channel REDD+ funds to 
developing countries through the World Bank’s FCPF and the United Nations 
Collaborative programme on REDD (UN-REDD). The intermediaries have strong 
agency as both IDs and IIs.  The World Bank’s FCPF and the UN-REDD provide 
expertise and financial support for national level REDD+ implementation in 48 
developing countries (16 from Africa). The intermediaries have hired teams of 
methodological experts and consultants (e.g. Unique consultants consulting for the 
World Bank) who draw from the UNFCCC guidelines to design technical details 
and help in instituting them in developing countries. The intermediaries have 
established various carbon funds e.g. REDD+ carbon fund and the Biocarbon fund 
to implement on-ground REDD+ activities. The intermediaries, then present to the 
global negotiations, experiences from the national and local level implementation 
as empirical evidence. This takes place either through presentation in expert 
sessions or through lobbying delegations of actors and countries which they fund. 
According to a UNFCCC expert, multilateral intermediaries are currently the main 
sources of empirical evidence for the global REDD+ design process.  
Private sector businesses e.g. Althelia, Macquarie-International Finance 
Corporation, Ned Bank group, Wildlife Works and Terra Global Capital mong 
others also finance REDD+. They do so either through multilateral intermediaries 
or directly. In direct funding, these companies develop (IDs) and implement (II) 
REDD+ methodologies and sub-national demonstration projects in developing 
countries. For instance, the first REDD+ project ‘the Kenya’s Kasigau project’ to 
sell credits in the voluntary carbon market is a private initiative ‘the Wildlife-Works 
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Co Ltd. The project has been showcased as an example in the global platforms. The 
private multilateral companies currently implement over 80% of REDD+ projects 
globally. These private companies are also the main buyers of carbon credits and 
are able to control and influence carbon prices for the whole REDD+ portfolio. 
Ultimately, multilateral companies have strong agency in the REDD+ design 
process.  
           ‘Without money, you can do nothing’ [UNFCCC expert, Bonn, April 2013]   
In terms of safeguards, most actors including the civil society and forest people 
organisations have moderate agency. These actors designed, submitted and 
advocated for most of the safeguard provisions included in the UNFCCC text 
(Table 5.2).5  These civil society organisations do not have strong agency because 
their advocacy is mainly limited to the negotiation process. They have limited 
mechanisms (resources and legitimacy) to enforce these provisions at the national 
level implementation like the multilateral intermediaries.  A key finding here is that 
Africa and other developing countries are players in the safeguard component. 
These countries are expected to implement REDD+ in the context of sustainable 
development i.e. ensuring community participation and poverty alleviation. The 
agency of these countries in the global process remains weak. They mainly receive 
(IRs) and implement (IIs) safeguards designed and advocated for by international 
civil society bodies. Submissions by African countries on safeguards mainly 
explain policy structures being put in place and financial support required to 
address the UNFCCC safeguards.6  
                                                          
5http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/smsn/ngo/469.pdf 
6 For example the joint submissions made through the Republic of Chad in response to the 
thirty-eighth SBSTA session  
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Table 5.2: REDD+ design rules based on COP decisions  
 
 
In comparing actor agency measures and respective centrality scores, no significant 
correlation was observed (p>0.1) for both degree and betweeness scores. This is 
because some actors with high centrality scores e.g. developing countries are 
mainly recipients of technical and financial support from a variety of actors. 
Africa’s agency measure in the design process was triangulated by examining the 
continent’s representation in joint negotiations platforms.    
Design 
feature  
Description  COP decision 
Activities  (1) Avoiding deforestation by for example keeping existing forest intact 
and addressing key drivers of deforestation   
(2) Avoiding forest degradation by for example  avoiding the conversion 
of natural forest to plantation forest  
(3) Conservation of forest carbon stocks by   
(4) Sustainable forest management by avoinding extraction of premnature 
trees below 30 years of age   
(5) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks through increasing idnigenous 
high cabon value tree spoecies and cover. 
Decision 1/CP. 16 
Decision 2/CP. 13 
 
Scale  (1) National and subnational forests defined based on national 
circumstance e.g. 10% canopy cover for Kenya 
(2) Subnational projects expected to be nested into national systems. 
(3) Subnational activities to be verified using expert standards. 
Decision 2/CP. 13 
UNFCCC (2009), 
Republic of Kenya 
2010 
MVR (1) Credible, result based nationally implemented MVR 
(2) The Monitoring process to apply scientific techniques of remote 
sensing  e.g. FAO approaches within the IPCC’s LULUCF guide  
(3) International verification through internationally accepted standards 
such as the VCS or team of experts 
(4) Avoiding leakage- avoiding shifting drivers of deforestation to other 
areas. National MVR to help avoid leakage 
(5) Additionality- requires that REDD activities increase carbon storage 
above the level at which of would occur without the activity.  
(6) Permanence- measures to ensure that emissions avoided are not 
reversed through future deforestation 
 
Decision 4/CP.15 
Decision 1/CP.16 
Decision 12/CP.17 
Decision 10/CP.19 
Decision 11/CP.19 
Decision 13/CP.19 
Decision 14/CP.19 
Decision 15/CP.19 
UNFCCC (2009) 
 
Finace (1) Result based funding   
(2) Both market and public sources: can be in form of grants, loans, 
budgetary support among others.  
(3) Funds should be managed Principles for REDD+ finances including 
transparency, accountability, predictability  
 
Decision 4/CP.15 
Decision 2/CP. 17 
Decision 9/CP. 19 
(UNFCCC, 2009). 
(UNFCCC, 2012) 
 
Safeguards  (1) Community consultation on land and carbon rights. 
(2) Community consent in line with the UNFCCC safeguards  
(3) Sustainable development and poverty alleviation 
(4) Equitable benefit sharing and conflict resolution mechanism 
(5) Biodiversity conservation  
Decision 4/CP15 
Decision 1/CP.16 
Decision12/CP.17 
Decision 12/CP19 
FCPF (2012b) 
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5.3.2.   Representation of Africa in REDD+ design platforms 
Representation in established joint climate platforms such as SBSTA, COP and the 
IPCC allows African States to participate and mould information designed by 
others to suit their circumstances. This subsection explores Africa’s representation 
in SBSTA sessions and in the IPCC work upon which REDD+ methodology is 
based.   
The SBSTA process involves annual meetings of government experts and observer 
groups including specialised UN agencies such as FAO and the World Bank, 
international scientific committees and implementing NGOs. The general agenda 
of a SBSTA meeting is set by the COP which often asks SBSTA for technical 
advice on specific REDD+ design components. SBSTA experts collect and 
synthesise written views from States and observer organisations then presents these 
for discussion and consensus building at its meetings. The meetings often follow 
multiple agendas. For example in SBSTA’s 30th Session (FCCC/SBSTA/2009/3) 
there were ten agendas including REDD+ and other climate change issues. 
Representation in SBSTA negotiations is recognised both in terms of specific 
country delegates and negotiation coalitions bringing together delegations of 
several countries.   
In terms of delegations, SBSTA has no clear rules on the delegation size 
representing particular governments or observer organisations. Analysis shows that 
African countries often have fewer delegates compared to other regions. It is argued 
that African States lack the economic ability to sponsor as many delegates to 
SBSTA meetings compared to other States.7 For instance, in the 30th SBSTA 
                                                          
7Interview UNFCCC, Bonn March 2013 
    
 
130 
 
meeting that included REDD+ as part of the agenda8, Brazil and Germany were 
represented by 20 and 71 delegates respectively, while Kenya and DRC had only 
two and three delegates respectively participating in the meeting 
(FCCC/SB/2009/MISC.1). Overall, most African States had less than four 
delegates and in total, Africa represented less than 2% (about 60 out 4216) of the 
total SBSTA delegation.9 The few African delegates present are often unable to 
participate in all the parallel negotiation sessions. As such, they may be unable to 
learn and internalise design options packaged by other actors due to physical 
absence from certain sessions. They may also not interact and lobby in informal 
side events where useful information e.g. new tested technologies or funds for 
REDD+ are often showcased.  According to UNFCCC staff, because of their low 
numbers, African delegates have to make trade-offs between attending REDD+ 
sessions or other sessions on issues such as addressing adaptation and vulnerability 
that they often consider more important for their contexts. As such, it is no surprise 
that sometimes these delegates do not even participate in REDD+ sessions.  
African representatives also participate in specialised SBSTA expert sessions on 
specific issues e.g. setting for reference levels for REDD+.10 However these 
sessions are brief, spanning only two days, within which several participants have 
to showcase their experiences on the issues in question.11 For example, in the 35th 
expert session, out of 60 experts with none from Africa. In this session, certain 
decisions made overlooked the specific contextual conditions in Africa. For 
instance, a decision made in this 35th session that ‘... technical issues, including 
                                                          
8FCCC/SB/2009/MISC.1 Provisional list of participants to the 30th SBSTA Session 
held in Bonn, June 2009. UNFCCC, available online: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/sb/eng/misc01.pdf. 
9 Also see: http://cdkn.org/2014/01/opinion-former-agn-chair-reflects-on-representing-a-strong-
african-voice-in-climate-negotiations/?loclang=en_gb 
10FCCC/SBSTA/2011/INF 
11FCCC/SBSTA/2011/INF 
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technical adjustments to forest reference emission levels and forest reference levels, 
should be separated from the policy issues and socioeconomic and development 
considerations of a country’12  does not fully resonate with the situation in Africa. 
Ideally forests serve socioeconomic roles supporting national economy and local 
livelihoods, thereby influencing reference levels.   
In terms of coalitions, results show that the ability of African delegates to bargain 
for their preferences through negotiation coalitions is complicated by diverse 
interests within coalitions. The African Union established the Africa Group of 
Negotiators (AGN) during the 1992 Earth Summit. The AGN aims to pull together 
African delegates in common negotiation positions. Interviews and documents 
reveal that the AGN mainly adhere to a common position on issues of financing 
adaptation but is often in disagreement on issues of REDD+ due to varying regional 
economic interests. Africa’s rainforest countries e.g. in the Congo basin, are 
committed to REDD+ but those in the Sahel see little economic value in REDD+.  
The AGN often negotiates with the G77+China which brings together developing 
nations in climate negotiations. This group is a critical voting block but members 
often have competing interests informed by their national contexts. Some countries 
are more interested in agricultural mechanisation and large scale energy mitigation, 
e.g. China, and this limits commitments to REDD+, especially if REDD+ does not 
promise adequate economic returns for economic growth. The opinions of smaller 
African delegations within the group are often overshadowed by the positions of 
larger economies of Asia (e.g. India, China) and Latin America (e.g. Brazil). 
African delegations also get disfranchised by several coalitions pursuing different 
interests. For instance, Kenya, Congo and South Africa are all members of the 
Coalition for Rainforest Alliance, which is committed to forest mitigation but they 
                                                          
12 (FCCC/SBSTA/2011/INF: paragraph 33).   
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also belong to the G77 whose general position has been that developed countries 
need to take mitigation responsibility and pay for climate damage.  South Africa is 
also part of the emerging economies including Brazil, India and China (BASIC) 
whose interests in industrialisation sometimes overshadow the REDD+ agenda.  In 
the mix of interests and multiple negotiation issues, REDD+ as an agenda itself gets 
overshadowed and is often picked up by non-State actors in side events.  The 
position of the small number of African delegations gets further weakened through 
the layers of interests and coalitions: 
‘Sometimes negotiating Experts from Africa ask me what the SBSTA outcome 
will be but I normally tell them…it is [for] you to decide’  
[UNFCCC Methodology expert, Bonn May 2013] 
In their submissions however, Africa and their developing country counterparts 
have pursued a common position on the need for developed countries to honour 
their financial pledges for REDD+ and other climate actions in line with the 
common and differentiated responsibility outlined in the UNFCCC text. Through 
the Coalition for Rainforest Alliance, arguments for funds to cover vulnerability, 
institutional capacity needs have been advanced.13 
In terms of inclusion in the authorship of technical guidelines, results show that 
African experts are underrepresented in the IPCC’s land use and land use change 
forestry (LULUCF) publications upon which REDD+ methodology is based.  An 
analysis of the contribution to the IPCC guidelines14 reveals that out of the 84 
authors to the guidelines, only four (less than 5%) were from Africa and these were 
                                                          
13FCCC/TP/2012/3 Financing options for the full implementation of resultsbased actions 
relating to the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, including related 
modalities and procedures. UNFCCC. 
 
14IPCC (2000,2006) 
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mainly drawn from governmental institutions. Fifty six (56) authors were from 
USA, Europe, Canada and Australia and the rest from Latin America and Asia. Of 
the experts drawn from the USA and Europe, the majority (75%) were affiliated to 
national government departments, 5% were affiliated to international research 
organisations and the rest to Universities. Asked to comment on the reasons behind 
such geographical and institutional imbalances in climate change technical 
processes, a member of UNFCCC staff stated:    
‘The technical contribution of most developing countries to REDD+ is 
weak as there is little documentation of their circumstances. We got a lot 
of complaints from developing country Parties to the effect that ‘our 
conditions are not reflected in the IPCC’ and my answer was ‘your 
expertise is not reflected in journals’ 
 [UNFCCC staff, Bonn, March 2013] 
Overall, the foregoing examples reveal that the agency of Africa in terms of its role 
and representation in the joint design platforms is weak.  The finding about weak 
agency of Africa is however limited to the global level. It should be noted that 
African and other developing countries are the ultimate implementers of the 
REDD+ rules within their jurisdictions and as to whether these countries adhere to 
the global rules or choose to exercise agency at implementations may add some 
twist to the agency debates.  The next subsection shows how the global REDD+ 
process plays out at national level implementation based on the Kenyan experience. 
 
5.3.3.   From global to national: the FCPF readiness process  
Kenya alongside 16 other African countries implements the global REDD+ rules 
through a readiness programme designed by the World Bank’s Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF). The FCPF is an intermediary fund through which 
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bilateral and multilateral REDD+ funds are channelled to support REDD+ 
implementation in developing countries. The fund draws its legitimacy from the 
13th and 15th Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC. These meetings 
requested developed countries and financial bodies to support REDD+ in 
developing countries. The FCPF uses its panel of experts and consultants to design 
UNFCCC guidelines and help developing countries in instituting them into their 
national systems. The process follows three interlinked steps supported by a grant 
of US$3.6 million.  A country first submits a readiness idea note (R-PIN) which is 
an initial intent to participate in the FCPF process subject to the World Bank’s 
standard conditions. Upon acceptance, a country then prepares a Readiness 
Proposal (R-P) outlining strategies for executing the global REDD+ design 
nationally. The R-P is backstopped and evaluated by FCPF experts and consultants’ 
after which a country qualifies to execute results-based REDD+ actions through the 
FCPF Carbon Fund (FCF). Each step is approved by the World Bank as the fund’s 
delivery partner, subject to standard criteria aimed at establishing results based 
MVR systems for delivering credible carbon credits.  
The MVR system encompasses technical design provisions including usage of 
remote sensing to acquire and interpret, monitor and report carbon information at 
national scale and in the context of IPCC guidelines. Carbon is particularly crucial 
for the funders of the readiness process who include profit seeking private sector 
investors targeting a post-Kyoto compliance market as well as developed countries 
expecting to meet their mitigation commitments. The fund’s documents therefore 
state that ‘…the aim of the FCPF Carbon Fund is to pay for Emission Reductions 
(ERs) from REDD+ programs and deliver them to the Carbon Fund (Tranche) 
Participants’15 and that ‘...there would be no systematic evaluation of non -carbon 
                                                          
15 FCPF (2013: 3) 
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values under the Carbon Fund’.16 In terms of social aspects of REDD+, the 
readiness conditions follow on from the World Bank’s safeguards ‘Strategic 
Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA)’. As discussed in the next 
subsection, the readiness process interplays with national processes and influences 
stakeholder engagement (vertical interplay). 
 
5.3.4.   Implementing REDD+ at the national level (Kenya) through the
          FCPF readiness process 
The FCPF process supports REDD+ implemntation at the national level. Experts 
representing Kenya in the international REDD+ talks emphasised that national 
institutions are not fully conversant with global REDD+ requirements such as MVR 
systems and do not have funds  to create such systems. As such the FCPF fills the 
gap by providing expertise and funding for moving ahead with REDD+. However, 
the process has to adhere to the terms and conditions of FCPF process that 
emphasise efficient systems for delivering of carbon:  
“One major problem with REDD+ implementation in Kenya is lack of 
enough capacity in the forestry sector because most of our people are not 
fully engaged in the framing of REDD+ at the global level. We also do not 
have budgetary allocations for developing carbon systems. We therefore 
have to depend on the technical and financial support from the World 
Bank. We also benefit from their trainings on negotiations and how to 
advocate for our views at the UNFCCC”  
[Government staff, Department of Forestry Nairobi, August 2013]  
                                                          
16 FCPF (2012a:13) 
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To meet the carbon requirement, the forestry sector with the help of consultants  leads 
the prerapration of the R-P document. In the document, it is explained that the forestry 
sector has the legal mandate and experience in formulating forest strategies for Kenya 
over the years and this experience is crucial for developing efficieit MVR system for 
delivery of carbon as required by the donors.  Interviews confirmed this view, adding 
that the forestry sector represents the country in REDD+ processes and understands 
the requirements. The sector can deliver MVR strategies within the stipulated 
timelines. This would effectively minimise institutional complexities for delivering 
carbon funds, they argue.  
“This work of carbon requires good coordination. Donors expect good 
systems that can produce carbon. It is about delivery of carbon because 
that is what will attract funds so to avoid competition and conflicts that 
can affect the carbon work, the Kenya Forest Service is steering the 
process. Other sectors will be involved in the implementation where 
necessary”  
[Government staff, Department of Forestry Nairobi, July 2013]  
While the experience of the forestry sector is critical in developing anational MVR 
system for delivering carbon, the justification that this could minimise institutional 
complexities could be intpreted to mean than including other sectors could make 
institutions too complex for the delivery of carbon. As such other sectors such as 
agriculture lands that are significantly linked to deforestation were underepreseted 
in the taskforce charged with developing and operationalizing the country’s R-P. 
The  Kenya Forest Serrvice (KFS) and international consultants led the 
establishment of the taskforce. The taskforce had 40 members assigned to various 
technical working goups (TWGs) on policy, methodology and consultation.  Out of 
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the 40 taskforce members, more than half were from the forestry sector (13) and 
consulting companies (eight). These forestry actors and consultants dominated trhe 
technical working group (TWG) on policy which was tasked with overall 
management, coordination, and formulation of national REDD+ strategies (Table 
5.3).  The agriculture sector was represented by only one person while the there 
was no representation from the lands sector (Table 5.3).  
Table 5.3: Role of various stakeholders involved in the Kenya’s REDD+ process. 
Source: modified from the Revised R-P for Kenya (2010).   
 
Key: P = Policy/ strategy formulation, C=Consultation, M=Developing methodological 
elements e.g. ways of developing reference levels and capacity needs for such, NC=Not 
Clear. 
 
The taskforce members were separated into three technical working groups (TWG) 
each handling roles on policy, consultation and methodology. The input of the one 
representative from agriculture is minimal and restricted to the less influential 
 
Sector/Stakeholder No of 
Rep. 
Main role in 
the readiness 
process 
Main role in operationalizing the REDD+ 
policies/strategies 
Ministry of Forestry  (State 
Department of Forestry) 
13 P, C, M - Overall coordination, 
- implementation, 
- monitoring and 
- Financial management  
Ministry of Environment and 
Mineral Resources (State 
Department of Environment) 
2 C  - Conflict resolution through National 
Environment Management Authority 
Ministry of Agriculture (State 
Department of Agriculture)  
1 C - NC 
Ministry of dryland areas  1 C - NC 
Ministry of Finance  1 C - National conduit for international 
REDD+ finance  
Ministry of water and 
irrigation  
1 P - NC 
Ministry of Energy  1 C - NC 
Bilateral Partners  2 C - NC 
International NGOs  7 P,C,M - Implement subnational projects 
National NGOs 1 C - Implement subnational projects 
National Universities  1 M  - Generate remote sensing tools  
Consultants:  8 P,C,M - Backstop technical processes  
Intergovernmental 
organizations (IPAC, FAO, 
UNDP) 
3 P - Funding  
Private sector  0 None (only 
Consulted)  
- Implementing subnational projects  
Local communities   None (only 
Consulted) 
- NC 
    
 
138 
 
consultation group. The consultation group only collects views from other 
stakeholders such as local communities, through workshops and reports these to the 
policy group for final write-ups and actions.  
In the R-P however, it is acknowledged that despite the experience of the forestry 
sector, there is lack of capacity within the sector to implement MVR systems for 
REDD+. Interviews revealed that most of the forestry staff are not conversant with 
particular remote sensing techniques expected to be applied in monitoring carbon, 
especially how associated data can be acquired and scaled up from local to national 
level. It is expected that the readiness process through consultants and FCPF experts 
will continuously help build the capacity of forestry staff to implement the 
country’s MVR system. Enquiries about expertise from other sectors such as the 
lands which has been applying remote sensing tools in land mapping reveal that 
these sectors have little understanding of REDD+ requirements because they are 
often not part of Kenyan delegations to international REDD+ meetings both at the 
UNFCCC and FCPF. This implies that the fewer delegation sizes at the global level 
contains inclusion of other sectoral experts into REDD+ talks and in so doing 
creates poor legitimacy of REDD+ in other sectors and also limits opportunities to 
harness cross-sectoral expertise for effective REDD+ implementation.  
Other non-State stakeholders such as local communities and the private sector are 
unrepresented in the national taskforce. However, they were consulted through 
regional workshops. For local communities, the extent to which such workshops 
meaningfully gather their views may be of concern. The targeted regions (8 
provinces) are geographically expansive and are inhabited by close to 5 million 
persons with diverse concerns and linkages to forests and these may not be captured 
by a one off regional workshop. Stakeholders working in the national REDD+ 
office appreciate the need to fully engage the local communities in the national 
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process but acknowledge that difficulties exist in harmonising REDD+ technical 
requirements and local community knowledge:    
“The community is an important stakeholder in the REDD+ process. They are 
consulted through regional workshops. They provide important information but 
this information has to be re-worked by professionals to meet the results-based 
requirements for the national REDD+ policies”  
[Member of Consultation Working Group, August, 2013]  
Whilst not represented in the national taskforce, the private sector is expected to 
play a key role in operationalising on-the-ground actions through sub-national 
projects. The R-P also states that the operationalization of actions will draw 
expertise from all relevant sectors. The operationalization scheme presented in 
(Figure 1) does not however clarify how this will happen given that most 
coordination and technical functions, including recruiting technical taskforces, are 
vested in the National Coordination Office (NCO) within forestry sector. The 
operationalization plan is also unclear about the role of the local communities even 
though Kenya’s Forest Act legally recognises Community Forest Associations 
(CFA) as the devolved unit through which local communities could structurally 
engage in forest management initiatives such as REDD+. Whilst the plan 
establishes local conservancy officers under the NCO, it is unclear how these 
conservancies would work with the CFAs.    
The plan does however include a National Steering Committee (NSC) comprised 
of Permanent Secretaries from various ministries. The NSC is expected to 
coordinate sectoral interests and stakeholder engagement. This committee is headed 
by the forestry Permanent Secretary and again completely excludes representation 
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from lands and agriculture sectors.17 Further, the committee’s role is largely 
ceremonial e.g. approving plans and looking for donors. It does not make any 
influential inter-sectorial decisions because details, key plans and activities are all 
prepared by the forestry sector (Figure 5.4).   
 
Figure 5.4: National REDD+ implementation framework proposed in the Kenya’s 
R-P.  
 
Given the lack of adequate sectoral and stakeholder engagement in the formulation 
and operationalization of REDD+ in Kenya, the vertical interplay between the 
FCPF processes is mainly negative. This is more so because the process involves 
measures that emphasise strict carbon delivery and this plays into national 
institutional gaps. Such negative interplays may also be exacerbated when the 
REDD+ rules interact with policies/socioeconomic circumstances of the 
underrepresented sectors/stakeholders.    
 
                                                          
17See Republic of Kenya (2010b) for the list of sectors included in the implementation plan 
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5.3.5.   Interplay between REDD+ rules with national sectoral policies 
This section first provides a brief description of sectorial policies on forests, 
agriculture and land followed by analysis of how REDD+ interplays with these 
policies (Table 5.4).   
5.3.5.1.    The National Forest Act (FA) 
The Forest Act of 2005 was enacted as a means to encourage participatory forest 
management in Kenya. The Act legalises diverse forest management options 
including leasehold, public, and commercial forest management. The Act 
entrenches community participation in forest management options. Part IV, 
sections 45–48, of the Act specifically legalises the establishment of Community 
Forest Associations (CFA). These associations are constituted by groups of local 
people with clear interests and plans to manage forests in their areas. However, this 
Act does not include a legal basis for how external programmes such as REDD+ 
should engage local communities. It lays emphasis on how the local communities 
could manage or protect forests but not how they can benefit from, partner with or 
be protected from external programmes. Experts in the Forestry department argue 
that the Act was enacted when the country had not begun active engagement in the 
REDD+ process. However, it can be argued that prior externally funded 
reforestation programmes that existed before REDD+ could have informed the 
legislation.  Moreover, the Act does not elaborate how the state will logistically and 
technically support CFAs. Kenya’s REDD readiness plan heavily draws from the 
Forest Act. 
Out of the 10 measures identified in the Act, most eight (80%) were mutually 
supportive to REDD+ rules especially MVR and financial rules (Table 5.4). The 
positive measures mainly emphasise reforestation/afforestation and avoidance of 
forest degradation and these are mutually supportive of carbon additionality by 
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increasing carbon capture and sink capacity as required by REDD+. The diverse 
forest management measures (e.g. commercial and leasehold regimes) are 
supportive to REDD+ projects initiated by the private sector as part of capital 
investments (Table 4). A key measure in the Act is the legalisation of CFAs as a 
means through community members can engage in forest management initiatives 
such as REDD+. This is crucial for REDD+ safeguards which emphasise 
community consultations, consent and rights in REDD+. However, the lack of clear 
guidelines on how these CFAs should engage in REDD+ could expose these 
communities to exploitation by non-State actors expected to implement REDD+ in 
various localities. The Act also envisages enhancement of indigenous forests which 
could be useful in addressing concerns about biodiversity protection as required by 
the REDD+ safeguards. Measures on reforestation and expansion of area under 
forest could support carbon requirements such as additionality. A major drawback 
in the Act, which potentially creates negative interplay, is that it lacks explicit 
provisions for cross-sectoral consultations that could help curb underlying drivers 
of deforestation outside the forestry sector e.g. resettlement and agricultural 
mechanisation in the agriculture and lands sectors respectively.   
5.3.5.2.   The National Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (NASDS) 
Kenya’s Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) for 2010 – 2020 
focuses on enhancing economic development via agriculture. It draws lessons from 
earlier strategies such as the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) and the Strategy 
for Revitalizing Agriculture (SRA). The ASDS brings together 20 ministerial 
portfolios relevant to agriculture and these are expected to support the 
implementation of the ASDS. The ASDS aligns its thematic focus with Kenya’s 
vision 2030 ‘the country’s industrialization blueprint’ and the Comprehensive 
Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).  CAADP is a compact, 
established by the AU member states in 2003, and is aimed at spurring agricultural 
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productivity by about 6% by the year 2015 through annual 10% budgetary 
allocation to agriculture. Such investments in CAADP are expected to achieve 
economic returns alongside food security subject to successful implementation. To 
achieve its goals, the strategy aims to support agricultural mechanisation as a way 
of enhancing agricultural productivity for economic development and alleviation 
of hunger. Mechanisation measures proposed include fertilizer use, input subsidies 
and machinery deployments.   
Out of 12 measures identified, half (50%) are supportive to REDD+ rules while the 
other half negatively interplay the rules. The mutually supportive measures are 
those related to sustainable land management, agroforestry and conservation 
agriculture which are mainly crucial in storing carbon thus enhancing additionality. 
However, the overarching measure in the strategy i.e. agricultural mechanisation to 
achieve a 6% increase in agricultural productivity negatively interplays with 
REDD+ rules. Mechanisation activities such as fertilizer use and deployment of 
machinery are agents of GHGs emissions18 thus could create leakage and threaten 
additionality.  Kenya’s national climate change action plan indicates that 
agricultural mechanisation contributes 40% Kenya’s GHGs, the most if compared 
to other sectors.  Agricultural mechanisation for commercial purposes is also 
singled out as one of the underlying drivers of deforestation especially through 
agricultural extensification into forested land.19  Such practices could trigger 
rampant deforestation and reverse any emissions reduced through REDD+ thus 
compromising the permanence requirement under RED+. Even though the ASDS 
has provisions for inter-ministerial consultations, these consultations are targeted 
at supporting commercialization and mechanisation agendas that could achieve the 
ASDS’s central goals.    
                                                          
18 IPCC, (2007) 
19Ndungu Land Commission (2004) 
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5.3.5.3.   The National Land Policy (NLP) 
The National Land Policy encompasses the land reforms that were enshrined in 
Chapter Five of Kenya’s constitution (Republic of Kenya 2010). The reforms 
emphasise the principles of equity, productivity and sustainability in land deals. To 
achieve these principles, institutional provisions in land governance have been 
proposed. At the national level, an independent arm of the State ‘the National Land 
Commission’ exercises powers that were initially vested in the Ministry of Lands. 
The commission has powers to allocate (development control) and acquire land 
(compulsory acquisition) in the interests of the public. The commission is arguably 
independent from State institutions that reportedly misused powers and 
mismanaged the country’s land tenure system leading to the loss of public land and 
forests.  However, there have been efforts from the mainstream Land’s Ministry to 
retain power to allocate public land.20   
The tussle between the lands authorities shows that centralisation regimes could 
compromise the gains these reforms could provide to REDD+. Out of the eight 
measures identified in the NLP, one half (four) (62%) negatively interplay REDD+ 
design rules (Table 5.4).  Key policies in the NLP such as resettlement, centralised 
decisions on land and lack of cross-sectoral consultations are key drivers of 
deforestation. Resettlement in gazetted forests land is a major direct threat to 
Kenya’s forests and this thrives in instances where land allocation decisions are 
vested in the Minister with little provision for cross-sectoral consultations. Discrete 
decisions such as resettlement were the key drivers of forest losses in Kenya and 
their persistence in the current policy regimes posit greater risks for reversing 
emission under REDD+ and a threat to permanence especially when such decisions 
                                                          
20National Press: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nd8aJWgM7zU). 
    
 
145 
 
are made for political convenience.   Overall, the foregoing policy interplay could have 
varied implications for on-the-ground implementation of a REDD+ project.   
Table 5.4: Interplay between Kenya’s national policies and REDD+ design rules as 
well as drivers of deforestation  
 
Key: NFA=National Forest Act, NLP= National Land Policy, NASDS= National 
Agricultural Sector Development Strategy DD=Drivers of Deforestation AF= Allocation 
of gazetted Forests land, AE= Agricultural Extensification (+) = Positive interplay, (-) = 
Negative interplay (0) = Not clear. 
Policy 
 
Specific activities proposed in the policy and  
relevant to forests and REDD+  
Interplay with REDD+ rules  Interplay 
with DD 
  AF AE 
NFA  Intensified afforestation Additionality (+) 0 + 
 Agroforestry Leakage avoidance (+)  0 + 
Alternative energy sources Leakage avoidance (+) 0 + 
Public and commercial forest management  Finance (+) 0 0 
 Sustainable forest management  Additionality/Safeguards (+) -/+ 0 
 Decentralized community entity  Safeguards (+) 0 + 
 Increase in indigenous forest  Safeguards (+) -/+ -/+ 
 Payment for ecosystem services   Finance (+) 0 0 
 Minister as the overall decision making authority Permanence (-) 0 + 
 No mechanism for cross-sectorial consultations Permanence (-) - - 
 
NASDS  
    
Agroforestry Additionality/reduced leakage (+) 0 + 
Agricultural intensification  Additionality (+) 0 + 
Conservation agriculture  Leakage avoidance (-) 0 + 
Value addition to agricultural products Additionality (-/+) 0 + 
Sustainable land management  Safeguards (+) 0 + 
 Enhancing extension services  Leakage avoidance (+) 0 + 
 Efficient irrigation and water harvesting Safeguard (+) 0 + 
 Climate change information to farmers  Additionality  (-) 0 + 
 Agricultural mechanization  Permanence (-) - - 
 Minister as the overall decision making authority Permanence (-) - - 
 No mechanism for cross-sectorial consultations Permanence (-)  - - 
 No legally decentralized community entity   Safeguards (-) - - 
     
NLP  Conservation of land based natural resources  Safeguards/ Additionality (+) 0 + 
 
Strengthening land rights Safeguards (+) 0 + 
Public, private and communal land rights Safeguards (-/+) 0 + 
 Transfer rights  e.g. freehold and leasehold  Permanence  (-) -/+ -/+ 
 Compensation through resettlement  Permanence (-) - - 
 Minister as the overall decision making authority Permanence (-)  - - 
 Existence of decentralized community entity  Safeguards (+)  0 0 
 No mechanism for cross-sectorial consultations Permanence (-) - - - 
 
    
 
146 
 
5.4.   Discussion 
5.4.1.   Agency of Africa in global REDD+ 
Various actors play varying roles in designing REDD+. Results here show that 
although African countries are targeted for REDD+ their agency in designing 
various REDD+ components is weak. These countries receive ideas from many 
actors intending to support, collaborate or test technologies with them. This could 
explain why these countries have the highest centrality scores yet their agency is 
weak. Quantitative network measures were mainly useful in visualising the quantity 
of information diffused to and from actors involved in designing REDD+ but 
qualitative aspects of the networks in the policy process provided insights on actor 
influence over decisions. (Crona and Bodin, 2006). 
The weak agency of African countries partly results from their inability to generate 
and transmit scientific information needed for technical decisions. This could be 
explained by a number of factors. Africa’s economic constraints limits 
governments’ investments in research that could help develop inbuilt technical 
capacity to inform REDD+. Priority in resource allocation is given to development 
and pressing livelihood matters while investment in research is marginal e.g. only 
0.6% share of world gross expenditure on research and development (GERD) 
comes from Africa, compared to Asia’s and Europe’s 30.5% and 27.2% 
respectively (Teng-Zeng, 2009). Other studies also report this weak technical 
agency of Africa in climate regimes (Najam et al., 2003, Nhamo, 2011, Makina, 
2013). These studies recommend technology transfer as part of the solution.  
Technology transfer is acknowledged in the UNFCCC text (UNFCCC, 1992). This 
can partly take place through globally established negotiation forums and joint 
scientific platforms where actors showcase and learn new approaches (Makina, 
2013). However, this Chapter reveals that Africa does not make any meaningful 
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contribution to knowledge exchange in these forums because they are represented 
by fewer delegates (in the negotiations) and authors (in the IPCC land use reports) 
compared to other regions. Larger delegations from other regions often get their 
preferences into decisions due to more voting power and diverse expertise able to 
interpret and critique information and lobby across multiple sessions and side 
events during negotiations (Makina, 2013, Minang, 2009, UNfairplay, 2011). 
Conversely, the smaller delegations from Africa compromise the continent’s ability 
to bargain for appropriate interventions that suit their circumstances or question 
others’ suggestions to enhance their own understanding. While various REDD+ 
technologies are not alien to Africa’s circumstances because they have been 
developed and tested in Africa either through international scientific bodies or other 
non-African experts, inbuilt capacity within governments is necessary to effectively 
and sustainably implement such techniques.   
Even though economic constraints are commonly blamed to be responsible for 
Africa’s lack of expertise and subsequent underrepresentation in the climate 
regimes, this Chapter further finds that interest in REDD+ and other climate funds 
also contribute to the weak agency. The belief that climate change results from 
developed countries, as championed by negotiation coalitions and embedded in the 
wider political economy, casts Africa as ‘a victim’ eligible for help rather than as a 
source of technological solutions. Funding for sustainable development is the main 
issue Africa has pursued collectively both in REDD+ and in other climate debates 
(Najam et al., 2003, Nhamo, 2011, Frost, 2001). This Chapter has not investigated 
the role political economy plays in REDD+ design in a detailed manner but the 
possibility that Africa’s financial interests in climate regimes could undermine its 
own technical interests in REDD+, needs further research attention.    
The story about Africa’s weak agency in climate regimes may not be new. In the 
context of REDD+ though, it is a key concern because the programme is 
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specifically expected to be implemented and coordinated by African governments. 
Weak agency has implications for REDD+ implementation at the national and local 
levels.   
5.4.2.   Implications for national level implementation  
The national REDD+ process in Kenya receives technical and financial support 
from the World Bank’s FCPF. This support is crucial because it mobilises funds for 
REDD+ without which interest in REDD+ could wane, especially in the context of 
alternative land uses (Clements, 2010, Rosendal and Andresen, 2011). Findings 
however reveal that theweak agency and underperesentation this support plays into 
national institutional gaps to create a negative vertical interplay in instituting 
REDD+ rules into the national system.    
Key stakeholders linked to deforestation (both national sectors, local communities 
and the private sector) are not adequately engaged in the national REDD+ process. 
Poor stakeholder engagements have been reported in REDD+ readiness processes 
in other developing countries e.g.  Cameroon, Indonesia, Peru (Minang et al., 
2014b) and Brazil (Brockhaus et al., 2013). This Chapter adds to these debates by 
revealing not only the causes but also the implementation deficits that poor 
stakeholder engagement could create for REDD+.  
In terms of the causes, this  study reveals that implemntataion deficits results both 
from the weak agency/underrepresentation at the global level as well as existing 
national institutuional gaps. Weak agency at the global level creates dependence on 
donor expertise and funds. While the fiunsds usefully supports the implemntataion 
process, efforts to meet associated donor conditions- especially delivery of carbon- 
results in poor stakeholder engagement due to a perception that many stakeholders 
could make institutions too complex to deliver carbon.  In this, the preparation of 
Kenya’s R-P mainly depended on convenient path of engaging the experience of 
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the forestry sector  while the other stakeholders were mainly consulted through 
workshops rather than in-dpeth engagaments and feasibility analysis that could 
have unpacked the underlying role of other stakeholders in driving deforestation. 
This impeded the setting  institutional settings for effective implementation. This 
fidning corroborates with ern has been raised in studies that dependence on external 
support to implement REDD+ causes a mad rush for REDD+ funds that could 
compromise institutional arrangements necessary for credible emission reduction 
through REDD+ (Dkamela, 2010, Brown and Bird, 2008).  Evidence in this study 
reveals negative interplay between REDD+ rules and sectoral policy measures 
responsible for Kenya’s deforestation as discussed in section 5.4.3.  
The weak agency also creates implementation deficits through limiting spaces for 
harnessing expertise for national implemntataion. Smaller delegations to REDD+ 
talks limits participations of experts from other sectors in intrernational REDD+ 
talks whwther at the UNFCCC or at the FCPF meetings. As such, delegations to 
international REDD+ talks are dominated by the forestry exerts. This limits the 
legitmacy and understanding of REDD+  within sectors outside the forestry sector 
and subsequently limits the possibility of drawing expertise from other sectors and 
attending to drivers of deforestation that lie outside the forestry sector. For instance, 
the fact that Kenya’s land sector has been excluded from implementing national 
REDD+ limits the sector’s ability to contribute its expertise on land mapping 
techniques to the national MVR system. The MVR system instead relies on 
international consultants.  
While the weak agency at the global level partly contribute to implemntataion 
deficits, other cauases sare inherent within the institutional gaps of African 
countries. In the case of Kenya, the claim that the forestry sector is best suited to 
handle REDD+ is a manifestation of path dependency whereby sectors have, 
overtime, monopolised specific resource decisions linked to their respective 
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mandates (Shannon, 2003, Phelps et al., 2010). Path dependency can be a good 
thing if it can bring about  positive experiences for REDD+  (Shelby and Morgan, 
1996). However, failure by sector-driven ICDPs to address deforestation (Blom et 
al., 2010, Brown and Bird, 2008, Minang and van Noordwijk, 2013) casts doubts 
on whether such experiences could effectively handle REDD+ in isolation. In the 
context of limited funding from the national budget, path dependency has also 
created competition for climate mitigation and adaptation funds among Kenya’s 
sectors (Maina et al., 2013). The monopoly of REDD+ by the forestry sector could 
as well be interpreted as an attempt to guard REDD+ funds from other sectors.  
5.4.3.    Coherences between REDD+ rules and sectoral pollicies  
Findings reveal that most forest policies are coherent with REDD+ rules but this 
coherence is affected by lack implementation of the forest policies. Lack of policy 
implementation is one of the greatest challenges in natural resource governance 
(Leventon and Antypas, 2012). While Kenya’s Forest Act legalises decentralised 
forest management to CFAs, the operation of these CFAs is not supported by 
national institutional settings. Mogoi et al. (2012) have raised a similar concern by 
claiming that Kenya’s CFAs may not make meaningful engagement in forest 
management because access to decision-making, revenue streams, and overall 
resource control rights are vested in the central government via the Kenya Forestry 
Service. Therefore, for decentralisation to support REDD+, ensuring that local 
communities are supported to form CFAs and given rights to revenue and decision 
making are prerequisites.   
Findings additionally reveal negative interplay between REDD+ rules and 
agricultural policies targeting mechanisation for economic development. Such 
negative interplay has been reported in Zambia (Kalaba et al., 2014) and other 
African countries and this affects effectiveness of the REDD+ policies (Young, 
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2002, Gehring and Oberthür, 2009). In Kenya, mechanisation practices are agents 
of GHGs emissions contributing 40% of Kenya’s GHGs (Republic of Kenya, 
2013). Mechanisation practices are also synonymous with agricultural 
extensification into forest land (Ndungu Land Commission, 2004). Agriculture is 
the main source of Kenya’s economic development contributing 25% to Kenya’s 
GDP and almost entirely supports livelihoods in rural areas. This justifies the need 
for such agricultural mechanisation. In the context of this need however, it is 
necessary recognise trade-offs and invest in mutually supportive links between 
forest protection/emission reduction, food security and economic development. 
Findings reveal that agroforestry offers this option. Agroforestry practices, if 
supported by REDD+, could replenish land productivity and supply households 
with forest goods such as firewood and poles and these would minimise leakage in 
situations where forest access is restricted for REDD+ (Minang et al., 2014a). In 
recent times, agroforestry alongside other measures such as drought tolerate crops, 
zero tillage has been integrated as part of climate smart agriculture aimed at 
achieving triple wins ‘mitigation, adaptation and food security (Mbow et al., 2014). 
Supporting such climate smart agricultural technologies is an entry point towards 
mutually enhancing coherence between REDD+ and agricultural policies.   
Findings also reveal that certain policies in the land sector e.g. resettlement are 
linked to underlying drivers of deforestation thus negatively interplay with 
REDD+. In Kenya, the lands sector has the authority to allocate land for 
development or public use. The Kenyan experience however reveals that lands 
authorities have  utilised this provision to allocate gazetted forests (sometimes 
irregularly) to private developers or electoral populations resulting in  massive 
forest losses (Ndungu Land Commission, 2004). Such allocations have also 
degraded Kenyan forests as indigenous forest areas allocated to private developers  
are converted to fast growing plantation forests or crops (e.g. tea)  to meet the 
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timber and economic demands. This ultimately is not coherent with REDD+ 
safeguard that inhibit forest conversions because such result in loss of biodiversity 
(appendix 1/CP.1 6).  
5.4.3.   Implications for local communities  
Findings show that the local community is underrepresented in national REDD. 
The communities are underrepresented because they are simply consulted through 
one off workshops and are not clearly integrated into the implementation plan. This 
represents a negative interplay in the process manifested in terms of disrespect of 
community participation rights. Underrepresentation of local communities in 
national REDD+ processes has been attributed to poorly decentralised forest 
management and continued monopoly of forests by the  government (Brown et al., 
2011, Chhatre et al., 2012, Minang et al., 2014b, Cerbu et al., 2011). The Kenyan 
case however reveals that despite decentralising forest management to CFAs 
through the Forest Act of 2005 (Republic of Kenya, 2005), the local community is 
still not involved, apparently because they lack skills needed for the formulation of 
carbon requirements. This is a manifestation of path dependency where centralised 
regimes monopolise resource management decisions. As such, path dependencies 
may scuttle any gains in resource decentralisation and challenges the notion that 
decentralisation automatically translates into effective community participation in 
environmental decision making (Mathur et al., 2013, Martin and Lemon, 2001). In 
the context of REDD+, exclusion of local communities could negate States’ 
commitments to safeguarding participation rights of local communities even 
though the REDD+ safeguards (appendix 1/COP. 16) and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP, 2008) expects States to 
do so. 
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Poor participation of local communities is a recipe for elite capture of REDD+ 
benefits (Schroeder, 2010). On one hand, credible carbon generation is crucial for 
climate mitigation and is a source of the much needed REDD+ funding (Bernard et 
al., 2014). The carbon agenda in the Kenyan case and elsewhere however does not 
clarify benefit sharing with regard to local forest-based livelihoods. In the absence 
clear benefit sharing, local livelihoods may be restricted by the commoditisation of 
carbon for funds to the benefit of the government (Ghazoul et al., 2010, Phelps et 
al., 2010b, Barnsley, 2009). The FCPF social safeguards (SESA) are not clear on 
benefit sharing yet the UNFCCC safeguards expect benefit sharing to be clarified. 
This exposes weaknesses in the UNFCCC systems especially the framework’s lack 
of enforcement mechanism for safeguards that are crucial for climatically 
vulnerable poor.    
 
5.5.   Conclusion 
This Chapter has analysed the process of designing REDD+ at the global level and 
how this process interplays with national REDD+ implementation.  The global 
analysis shows that Africa’s agency in designing REDD+ is weak and this creates 
technical and funding capacity for the national process. Even though the World 
Bank’s FCPF usefully supports the national process, this support emphasises 
delivery of carbon in a manner that reinforces national institutional gaps such as 
path dependencies and sectoral competition for climate funds to create multiple 
implementation deficits and policy conflicts.  These policy deficits may affect the 
implementation of REDD+, especially in the context of the diverse socioeconomic 
circumstances of Kenya. The next Chapter investigates how the REDD+ design 
analysed in the present Chapter interact with Kenya’s socioeconomic settings.  
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Chapter 6  
REDD+ design interaction with sub-national 
socioeconomic settings 21 
 
Abstract 
This Chapter examines the designs and spatial targeting of REDD+ projects in 
Kenya in the context of varying socioeconomic settings.   A vulnerability index 
map for Kenya was first developed from long-term socioeconomic (crop yields, 
literacy rates and poverty rates) and climate (rainfall) data drawn from the 47 
counties of Kenya. The distribution and designs of REDD+ projects were mapped 
on the vulnerability map. Correlation tests were performed and experts consulted 
to clarify the linkage between project design and socioeconomic developments. 
Results show that most projects are designed and managed by international private 
and consulting companies. The State held a less than 5% stake in the demonstration 
projects. The projects are however designed with strict carbon standards that are 
mainly feasible within relatively richer and less vulnerable communities. The 
socioeconomic settings of poorer communities especially where dryland forests are 
                                                          
21 This Chapter is developed from a published journal article, two working papers and two book 
Chapters: 
a. Atela JO., Quinn CH. & Minang PA. (2014). Are REDD+ projects pro-poor in their spatial 
targeting? Evidence from Kenya. Applied Geography 52: 14–24  
b. Atela, JO. (2012). The Politics of Agricultural Carbon Finance: The Case of the Kenya Agricultural 
Carbon Project, STEPS Working Paper 49, Brighton: STEPS Centre  
c. Wambugu S., Chomba S. and Atela J. (2014). Institutional arrangements for climate smart 
landscapes. In climate-smart landscapes: multifunctionality in practice, Minang, P van Noordwijk, 
M., Freeman, O. E., Mbow, C., de Leeuw, J., & Catacutan, D. (Eds.) Nairobi, Kenya: World 
Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), pg  257-273. 
d. Atela, JO. (2014). Carbon in Africa’s agricultural landscapes: A Kenyan case;  In carbon conflicts 
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hosted, are considered unfavourable to the delivery of carbon funds. This Chapter 
provides a basis for understanding how a global REDD+ design practically interacts 
with local settings.   
 
6.1.   Introduction 
The previous Chapter has shown that some REDD+ requirements negatively 
interact with national policy settings. However, some studies (subsection 3.5.3, 
3.5.4 & 3.5.5) argue that REDD+ could positively interact with existing 
socioeconomic settings because it is pro-poor by targeting developing countries and 
also that resulting carbon funds could support livelihoods and development (section 
3.5.5). The simplified standards and diversified funds within which REDD+ 
operates, potentially enable project investments within poor communities when 
compared to the CDM (Bond et al., 2009, Diaz et al., 2011) (subsection 3.5.3). 
However, there is little evidence on how REDD+ design interacts with 
socioeconomic settings within developing countries.  
This Chapter draws evidence from Kenya to analyse how globally designed 
REDD+ projects interact with sub-national socioeconomic circumstances. The 
specific objectives of the Chapter are (1) to develop a sub-national climatic 
vulnerability index map for Kenya (2) to evaluate the design of REDD+ projects 
and their spatial locations across the vulnerability map (3) to assess the linkages 
between REDD+ projects design and sub-national socioeconomic development (4) 
to analyse how the linkages between REDD+ projects and socioeconomic 
development relate to global and national processes.  
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6.2.   Methods 
6.2.1.   Developing a vulnerability index map for Kenya  
This Chapter first created a quantitative vulnerability index in order to map relative 
sub-national socioeconomic settings of Kenya. Sub-national vulnerability studies 
across Africa; Kenya (Eriksen  & O’Brien, 2007), Ghana, (Antwi-Agyei et al., 
2012) Malawi (Malcomb et al., 2014), show that the relative vulnerability of 
communities within a country is a measure of their relative socioeconomic 
circumstances, incorporating both ecological and social aspects of 
development/livelihoods. Similarly, the SLF part of the IDAF contextualises 
vulnerability as an indicator of sustainable livelihoods/development in the context 
of shocks (section 3.6).  
Various approaches to vulnerability indexing have been documented in literature. 
The key ones include the variable assessment and indicator approach (Gbetibouo 
et al., 2010, Füssel and Klein, 2006). The variable assessment applies generic and 
rather holistic simulations to point out areas of greater vulnerability (Ericksen et 
al., 2011). The variable approach is however broad-scaled and excludes specific 
contextual factors that usefully influence vulnerability at lower scales e.g. local 
levels  (Luers, 2005).  
The indicator approach applies a set of proxy quantitative indicators to describe 
vulnerability  index of a particular household, community or region  (Eriksen and 
Kelly, 2007, Luers et al., 2003). Given that this Chapter aimed to compare relative 
sub-national vulnerability indices against REDD+ design, the indicator approach 
was preferred because it is applicable at various scales. The multi-scale 
applicability of the indicator approach also makes it informative to policies because 
of its potential to unpack contextual factors influencing vulnerability (Leichenko 
and O’Brien, 2002). The approach has been applied  in many countries in sub-
    
 
157 
 
Sahara Africa including Ghana (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2012), South Africa 
(Gbetibouo et al., 2010) and in these studies, the approach has proved to be feasible 
in the context of limited detailed data within sub-Sahara Africa. Based on the 
indicator approach,  the IPCC (2001a) conceptualisation of vulnerability as a 
function of  exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity was applied to derive 
vulnerability indices for each of the 47 counties of Kenya.  Proxy socioeconomic 
indicators (literacy and poverty), an agricultural yield indicator (maize yields) and 
climate indicators (rainfall/temperature) were used to calculate and aggregate the 
various components of vulnerability into a composite index of vulnerability for 
each of the 47 counties. The steps followed were as follows:  
Exposure index: the Chapter refers to Füssel and Klein (2006) to define exposure 
as the degree to which agricultural productivity is exposed to climatic changes. 
Exposure indices were first calculated for both rainfall and temperature data. I 
obtained 41 year (1970 - 2010) monthly rainfall and temperature data for the 47 
counties from the Kenya Meteorological Department in Nairobi (Kenya 
Meteorological Department, 2012).  From the data, a 30-year (1971-2000) average 
rainfall for the maize growing period was assigned as a standard reference against 
which yearly rainfall variations were compared (Simelton et al., 2009). The 
standard 30-year was calculated for the maize growing period in Kenya occurring 
between March – November each year and this was inclusive of both short and long 
rainy seasons. The actual amount of rainfall observed during the growing periods 
for each year was divided by the 30-year standard average to calculate the exposure 
index (see equation (1). A temperature based exposure index was also calculated 
using the same procedure (see equation (2) as illustrated in Hawkins et al. (2013).  
 
 
 
Exposure index_prep = sum of the critical growing period/mean of the standard 
30 year rainfall for the critical period……..(1) 
Exposure index_temp = sum of the critical growing period/mean of the standard 
30 year temperature for the critical period……..(2) 
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Correlation tests were performed to compare the significance of temperature and 
rainfall exposure indices to changes in crop yields. The most significant indicator 
was used in the vulnerability index. 
Sensitivity index: the Chapter referred to Eriksen et al. (2005) to define sensitivity 
as the degree to which agricultural productivity (maize yield) is affected either 
adversely or beneficially by rainfall or temperature variability (exposure). Changes 
in maize yields were used to represent agricultural sensitivity to rainfall 
perturbations. Maize is the staple food grown in all 47 counties of Kenya and is 
also a source of income and employment for most Kenyans involved in rain-fed 
farming (Nkako. M et al., 2005, Atela et al., 2012, Kenya National Beureau of 
statistics, 2011). The focus on maize also allowed for the calculation of sensitivity 
indices for all 47 counties and this would not be possible with other crops that are 
only cultivated in specific counties. 
Yearly maize yield data (in tons/ha) for a period of 36 years (1975- 2010) was 
obtained from the Kenya’s State Department of Agriculture, Project Monitoring 
Unit. An extensive review of yearly agricultural reports for each of the Kenyan 
counties was undertaken to validate the data and fill in missing yield values. The 
yields were first detrended to remove any changes attributable to non-climatic 
factors such as technological development (Lobell et al., 2007). Detrending was 
achieved through simple calculation of linear trends in the yields (Easterling et al., 
1996). Linear trends provide better balance between yield prediction and simplicity 
(Chatfield, 1996). In this detrending, the observed yield was plotted against the 
respective years in a time series. A linear trend was fitted on the plot, and the 
equation of this linear trend was used to calculate the expected yields. Resulting 
differences in the observed and expected yields were interpreted as residuals 
attributable to technology. The ratio of expected to observed yields represented the 
sensitivity index (Simelton et al., 2009; equation (3).  
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 Sensitivity index = expected yield (tons/ha)/actual yield (tons/ha) ………(3) 
Adaptive capacity: this Chapter refers to Adger (2003) to define adaptive capacity 
as the ability of a community/ a system to moderate the effects of 
rainfall/temperature perturbations (exposure index) on crop yields (sensitivity 
index). Adaptive capacity is determined by the five categories of livelihood assets 
(natural, financial, human, social and physical assets) making up the sustainable 
livelihood framework (Gbetibouo et al., 2010). Using indicators from all the five 
livelihood asset categories to create an adaptive capacity index makes a study more 
comprehensive (Challinor et al., 2007). However, fewer indicators can usefully 
reduce complexity and large errors associated with parameterizations (Challinor et 
al., 2007).  
Due to a lack of long term socioeconomic data for the 47 counties of Kenya, the 
adaptive capacity index was calculated from poverty and literacy rates. Poverty and 
literacy rates are recommended as adequate indicators for adaptive capacity in 
situations where data is limited (Simelton et al., 2009). County poverty and literacy 
data were available for two years; 2005/2006 Kenya National Household Budget 
Survey (Kenya National Beureau of Statistics, 2007) and the 2009 national 
population and household census (Republic of Kenya, 2009). The population 
census is a regular ten-year exercise and often gathers population income and 
literacy data while the household budget surveys assesses all household assets but 
mainly when funds are available making it difficult to have consistent temporal 
socioeconomic data. Additional socioeconomic data were available from the 
2005/2006 household budget survey but could not be included in the index because 
the data was mainly for a single year (2006). Such point data could compromise the 
temporal perspective of adaptive capacity.   
.......(4)rate)/100)poverty  -(100 + rate/100)(Literacy  =indexcapacity  Adaptive  
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Overall vulnerability for each of the 47 counties of Kenya was calculated using 
equation (5). Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to perform 
hierarchical clustering of the counties into ‘low’ ‘medium’ and ‘high’ vulnerability. 
Hierarchical clustering allows data to be classified without pre-determining the 
number of clusters. Discriminate analysis was performed to validate and correct the 
clusters accordingly. Using ArcGIS, the vulnerability clusters were overlaid on the 
Kenya-county map to generate a vulnerability map for Kenya. 
Overall vulnerability = Exposure index + Sensitivity index – Adaptive Capacity 
index … (5) 
 
6.2.2.   REDD+ project inventory and locations on the vulnerability map 
An inventory of REDD+ projects in Kenya was undertaken (Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1: Project attributes considered in the REDD-project inventory and 
corresponding data sources.
 
Projects operating under various standards including the VCS, Climate Community 
and Biodiversity Standard (CCBS), Plan vivo, and the Chicago Climate Exchange 
Project attribute Data source  
a. Project type and existence - Global databases: CIFOR’s global REDD map 
(http://www.forestclimatechange.org/redd-map/)  
- REDD inventory report: Ecosystem market place 
state of forestry carbon report 2013.    
- Field visits to selected project sites in Kenya 
b. Project geographical location - Project design document  
- Online google earth application  
 
c. Forest type  - Project design documents  
- Vegetation map of Kenya 
d. Project validation standards  - Project design document 
e. Project design objectives  - Project design document  
f. Project stakeholders  - Project design document  
- Interview with project staff 
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were considered in the inventory. As clarified in the methods (section 4.2.1), both 
forestry and agro-forestry projects were included in the inventory with the 
understanding that all these projects posit lessons for national REDD+. Existing 
and upcoming (pipeline) projects were considered in the inventory and were 
usefully indicative of the spatial flow of carbon investments currently and in the 
future. The projects’ spatial location and types were overlaid on the vulnerability 
map.  
 
6.2.3.   Linking REDD+ to socioeconomic development factors     
Given the insignificant number of projects in each county, it was not possible to 
directly compare the county-socioeconomic characteristics with project numbers. 
Therefore, a causal relationship was assumed. The assumption here was that 
socioeconomic indicators that showed significance to vulnerability indices were 
interpreted as factors influencing the spatial attractiveness or unattractiveness to 
REDD+ projects. This causal assumption was assessed validated through expert 
consultations. Pearson correlation was performed between 16 socioeconomic 
indicators, whose selection was informed by the scoping study (section 4.4). 
Data on the indicators were obtained from the 2005/2006 National Household 
Budget Survey of (Kenya National Beureau of Statistics, 2007). The indicator 
values were  standardised into percentage (0-100) to achieve normalised weights 
(Gbetibouo et al., 2010). A research visit to the UNFCCC in Bonn Germany 
(section 5.2) allowed for interviews with UNFCCC experts, particularly to clarify 
the observed spatial distribution of REDD+ projects and the relationship between 
certain socioeconomic indicators and project locations. National REDD+ staff 
(n=2) and staff of the Kasigau Corridor REDD+ project and the Kenya Agricultural 
Carbon project (n=8) were also consulted to verify how the socioeconomic 
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indicators link to project design and national policies.  The next section presents 
results.  
6.3.   Results 
6.3.1.   Vulnerability index map for Kenya 
The vulnerability indices were calculated from long-term precipitation (exposure), 
crop yield (sensitivity) and socioeconomic data (adaptive capacity). Correlation 
coefficients showed that precipitation changes within the maize growing period 
accounted for 54.8% (p<0.05) of changes in maize yields (sensitivity indices), 
higher than the temperature coefficient of 43.2% (p<0.05). Counties with 
vulnerability indices in the range of 0.500 – 1.130 (µ = 0.766), were classified as 
low-vulnerability. Those in the range of 1.130 – 2.141 (µ =1.615) and 2.141 – 2.782 
(µ =2.429) were classified as medium and high-vulnerability respectively (Figure 
6.1).  
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Figure 6.1: Vulnerability clusters for the 47 counties of Kenya. Two counties, Meru 
(46) and Nairobi (47) were outliers. 
The significance of precipitation to yield sensitivity nonetheless varied across the 
high (69.8%), medium (52.1%) and low (48.4%) vulnerability clusters. The 
variation in precipitation (exposure index) was not significantly different between 
the clusters (p=0.06) even though the cluster sensitivities were significantly 
different (p<0.05). County adaptive capacity indices were highly significant to 
changes in maize sensitivity at 0.768; p<0.01, and to the vulnerability indices at -
0.887; p<0.001. 
The vulnerability indices show that 8 of the 47 counties (17.02%) were clustered as 
high, 11 counties (23.41%) as medium and 28 counties (59.57%) as low 
vulnerability (Figure 6.2). North Eastern region had the highest proportion (100%) 
of counties in the high-vulnerability category while Central, Nairobi and Nyanza 
regions had no county in the high-vulnerability cluster. Two counties (Marsabit and 
Isiolo) constituting 25% of the counties in the Eastern region were clustered under 
high-vulnerability while Samburu and Turukana counties constituting 14.3% of the 
counties in Rift valley were clustered under high-vulnerability. One county in the 
Coast province (Tana River) was clustered under high-vulnerability.  
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Figure 6.2:  Vulnerability index map for Kenya 
 
6.3.2.   Locating REDD+ projects on the vulnerability and poverty map for
         Kenya 
A total of 15 projects were inventoried, 10 (66.7%) REDD+ agroforestry and 5 
(33.3%) REDD+_ pure forestry projects. The majority of the projects (86.7%) were 
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located in counties with low-vulnerability indices while the rest were found in 
medium-vulnerability counties (Figure 6.3). No projects were found in high-
vulnerability counties.  All the REDD+ _agroforestry projects were located in low-
vulnerability counties while 3 (60%) and 2 (40%) of the REDD+ pure forestry 
projects were located in the low and medium vulnerabilities respectively.  
 
Figure 6.3: Spatial locations of REDD projects within the vulnerability index map 
for Kenya 
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When the REDD projects are overlaid on the Kenya’s poverty map constructed 
based on percent households living below US$1.25, similar spatial trend is 
replicated (Figure 6.4). Most projects are located in areas of low poverty i.e 0-35% 
of households living below 1.25 per day while most areas of high poverty rates had 
no projects.   
 
Figure 6.4: Spatial localtion of REDD+ projects across poverty indices of the 47 
Kenyan countries. The low poverty poverty are tcounties with 0-35% of households 
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living below 1.25US$ per day, medium 36-60% of households living below 
1.25US$ per day while high are those counties with >60% households under 
1.25US$ per day. 
Most of the low-vulnerability and low-poverty areas such as the mountainous areas 
and the rift valley parts of Kenya has higher carbon biomass compared to poorer 
and high-vulnerability areas. Most projects are hosted in these high carbon areas 
(Figure 6.5).  However, some of these high-vulnerability/high poverty areas in the 
North and coastal areas have patches of high carbon stocks equivalent to those in 
the low-vulnerability/poverty areas.   
  
Figure 6.5: Distribution of carbon biomass across various parts of Kenya  
Source:  UNEP and WCMC (2010) 
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6.3.3.   Evaluation of project design and actors   
In terms of project design standard, the majority of the projects (66.7%) operate 
under the VCS standard even though only 3 (30%) of the VCS projects had received 
VCS approval. There was also no significant difference in project standards in 
relation to project type. Reforestation, emission reduction and sustainable 
livelihoods were cited in all the projects’ documents as the main project objectives 
(Figure 6.6). A Wilcoxon matched pairs signed test subjecting counts of projects’ 
objectives against project type revealed that the objectives of both REDD+_ pure 
forestry and REDD+_ agroforestry were statistically similar on emission reduction 
(p<0.23), sustainable livelihoods (p<0.23) and reforestation (p<0.23). However, 
improved agricultural productivity was explicit for REDD+_ agroforestry projects 
(p<0.05) while biodiversity protection was explicit for REDD+ _ pure forestry 
projects (p<0.05).   
 
Figure 6.6: Objectives of the various types of REDD projects in Kenya as stated in 
the projects respective design documents. 
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In terms of the forest/ tree types being conserved for carbon, the majority of projects 
(73.3%) aim to protect or conserve humid forests/trees, all of which occur in the 
low-vulnerability cluster. Only one project (6.3%) aims to conserve dryland forest 
and this occurs in the medium-vulnerability cluster. Two projects, the Kenya 
smallholder coffee project (low-vulnerability area) and tree flights (medium-
vulnerability) have established/protect perennial cash crops of coffee and cashew 
nuts plantations respectively (Figure 6.7).  The number of projects targeting humid 
forests was significantly higher than those targeting other forest types (p<0.01). 
 
Figure 6.7: Forest/tree type protected/conserved by the REDD projects in Kenya 
In terms of project stakeholders the international community, including 
international NGOs/consulting companies, international private companies and 
multilateral funding agencies, are the proponents/funders for over 75% of the 
projects (Figure 6.8). Local communities, national governments and national NGOs 
Perennial 
cash crops 
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are proponents or funders of less than 20% of either REDD+ _agroforestry or 
REDD+_ pure forestry projects.  
 
Figure 6.8:  Stakeholders involved in the various types of REDD projects in Kenya 
 
6.3.4.  Linking projects to relative sub-national socioeconomic           
development  
Forest cover, land ownership, water access and market access had the greatest 
significant influence on vulnerability and project locations (Table 6.2). Low-
vulnerability counties, with more projects, had a greater proportion of their lands 
under forest cover. Most households in low-vulnerability counties also had land 
title deeds (p<0.01). Employment and literacy rates were the main human assets 
that had significant implications for vulnerability and projects’ location. 
Infrastructure/physical capital and particularly access to water, access to market, 
access to roads and access to post offices had a significant (p<0.01) influence on 
vulnerability and project locations. 
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Table 6.2: Correlation co-efficient between socioeconomic indicators against 
vulnerability indices and the corresponding causal relation to the number of REDD 
projects. In the final column of the table, any socioeconomic indicator which 
reduces vulnerability is interpreted as favourable to REDD projects and this is 
based on observed predominance of the projects in low-vulnerability areas.    
Asset 
base 
 Indicator (%) Coefficient  
Significance to 
REDD projects   
Natural  Agricultural land holding  (acres) .181 .181 
 Proportion of area under forest  -.728** .728** 
Financial  
Proportion of household with non-farm 
income sources  
-0.226 .226 
Human  Proportion of households with 
employment  
-.346* .346* 
 Unemployment index  -.014 .014 
Physical  Proportion of household accessing 
public primary school at >5km (bad)  
.199* -.199* 
 
Proportion of households taking >1hr 
to access water (bad)   
.475** -.475** 
 
Proportion of household accessing 
health facility at >5km (bad) 
.367* -.367* 
 
Proportion of household with access to 
daily market at >5km  
.476** -.476** 
 
Proportion of household accessing 
tarmac/asphalt road at >5km  
.354* .-354* 
Proportion of household with access to 
a post office at > 5km  
.403** -.403** 
 Proportion of household with land 
titles  
-.552** .552** 
Social  Proportion of household totally 
affected by shocks  
.436** -.436** 
 Population density  -.369* .369* 
 
Percent contribution to national 
poverty  
.243 -.243 
Proportion of household feeling unsafe  .063 -.063 
Pearson correlation test *significant at .05 **signiﬁcant at .01 
Interviews at the UNFCCC experts revealed that even though REDD+ policy 
identifies poverty alleviation and emission reductions as key criteria for allocating 
REDD+ funds, additional factors such as donor and proponent interests often take 
precedence in locating resulting projects. Most demonstration projects are currently 
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being implemented and funded by private for-profit and consulting companies and 
so delivering carbon to secure funds is crucial for these companies. UNFCCC staff 
argue that some socioeconomic features such as secure land tenure may reduce 
transaction costs for most profit seeking project proponents. Accordingly, the 
interests of the private sector in locating REDD+ funds remain superior currently 
due to their de-facto financial power. The UNFCCC has directed a variety of 
REDD+ support funds to developing countries in a bid to promote regional equality 
in REDD+ investments. However, it is the responsibility of respective States to put 
in place measures to ensure equity in the flow of REDD+ funds/projects at sub-
national level, argued a UNFCCC staff.  
 
6.3.5.   Projects’ linkage to national institutions  
Interviews further revealed that the State has little involvement in the projects 
because REDD+ rules are still under preparation at the national level (see Chapter 
5). Therefore, on-going activities mostly get approved by global standards that are 
beyond the government’s influence and this, according to national REDD+ staff, 
limits governments’ engagement in the demonstration projects or their ability to 
assess the projects in a detailed manner. It is, however, hoped that on-going support 
from FCPF and associated consultants would enable the government to engage in 
actual project implementation. Interviews further indicate that the FCPF processes 
through which Kenya implements REDD+ policies have some provisions for local 
safeguards and community participation but have no provision for sub-national 
equity in the distribution of REDD+ investments. As such, Kenya’s REDD+ plan 
mainly emphasise the significance of REDD+ funds in protecting areas endowed 
with patches of humid forests and most of these are in low-vulnerability counties. 
A recently prepared climate plan (see Chapter 4) however attempts to re-focus 
REDD+ activities in dryland areas inhabited mostly by poor communities. 
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Nonetheless, specific projects revealed that supportive local socioeconomic factors 
can allow projects to operate in a cost-effective manner but can also reshuffle the 
opportunity costs for projects.  As such, most of the current REDD+ project 
developers prefer suitable and favourable institutional and market conditions that 
can safeguard their investments and help them adhere to global performance 
standards for delivering carbon.  
 
6.4.   Discussion 
6.4.1.   Contextualizing the vulnerability index map 
This Chapter links the design and distribution of REDD+ projects to Kenya’s 
socioeconomic settings. The vulnerability indices are calculated to reflect the 
relative socioeconomic status of various communities in the context of climate 
change.  The vulnerability index map for Kenya was developed based on the IPCC 
conceptualisation of vulnerability as a function of exposure, sensitivity and 
adaptive capacity. Exposure and sensitivity indices were calculated from 
reasonably long term precipitation, and maize yield data respectively. However, in 
calculating the adaptive capacity index, only two socioeconomic indicators were 
applied due to data limitations. The resulting adaptive capacity index was 
nonetheless significantly correlated to changes in maize yields implying the 
indicators considered have significant influence over sensitivity of crop yields to 
rainfall perturbations.  
Vulnerability here has thus reflects relative poverty of counties from both 
socioeconomic and ecological (climate) prospective and should be interpreted in 
relative rather than absolute terms. Ideally, about 80% of the vulnerability indices 
can be explained by adaptive capacity indices constructed based on poverty rates. 
As such, vulnerability indices were synonymous with the poverty situations of 
various counties (see section 6.2.1).  The poverty map indicate that the high 
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vulnerable areas are associated with high poverty rates with over 60% of the 
households living below US$ 1.25 a day. Due to these data limitations, the resulting 
vulnerability index map should be interpreted in relative rather than absolute terms 
and has been used here to understand the socioeconomic choices of globally 
designed REDD+ projects.  
6.4.2.   Linking projects actors to socioeconomic development 
This study reveals that private sector actors dominating the current REDD+ 
demonstrations, prefer initiating projects in low-vulnerability counties perceived to 
be favourable for better carbon returns and investment security. While the global 
process expects REDD+ activities to be implemented through the government, over 
75% of projects are currently funded and managed through international private 
and consulting companies that aim to make profits out of the projects. Globally, 
private (for-profit) companies reportedly dominate forestry offsets, producing 
about 84% of offsets annually (Stanley-Peters et al., 2013). These private sector 
actors draw legitimacy from decision 1/COP. 16 (UNFCCC, 2010) which considers 
a variety of funding possibilities for REDD+ including public, private and market 
based funds. Experts and literature (Thompson et al., 2011, Vatn and Vedeld, 2013) 
confirm that private investors are often keen on delivering carbon funding and 
reducing financial risks and performance failures associated with relatively high-
vulnerability areas. Even though this business interest was not explicit in the project 
design documents reviewed, it is arguably crucial in locating REDD+ 
demonstration. A number socioeconomic indicators discussed below could explain 
why the REDD+ proponents prefer to locate REDD+ projects in low-vulnerability 
areas. 
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6.4.3.   Linking project activities to socioeconomic development 
Humid forest cover (natural capital), access to water (physical capital) and 
ownership of individual title deeds (social capital) all significantly determine 
vulnerability and associated implementation of REDD+ projects.  Forest cover 
directly relates to carbon stock density and the quantities of carbon credit 
deliverable for payment. This is also reflected in the Kenya’s carbon map which 
indicates that low-vulnerable and rcher areas with humid forests are generally 
endowed with higher carbon stocks. Most projects proponents may therefore prefer 
to generate higher revenues by locating activities in areas with higher forest cover. 
Studies on the spatial targeting of REDD+ in Tanzania (2010) and East Kalimantan 
Indonesia (Asner, 2009), revealed that forest carbon stock is a priority criteria in 
allocating REDD+ projects. It is also argued that higher forest carbon stocks 
potentially increases efficiency in REDD+ because such areas can enhance other 
ecosystem services that support local livelihoods (Engel et al., 2009). Forest carbon 
stock is also dependent on forest types. Forests in Kenya range from tropical humid 
forests to dryland savannah forests and are all recognized under REDD+ (Gibbs et 
al., 2007).  
However, more than three-quarters of the inventoried projects in this Chapter seek 
to protect patches of tropical humid forests/trees occurring in low-vulnerability 
areas of Mt Kenya, Rift valley and western highlands with little focus on the wider 
dryland ecosystems that constitute over 75% of Kenya’s vegetation cover. Only 
one project, ‘the Kasigau Corridor REDD+ project’, targeted a dryland ecosystem 
in the Taita-Taveta County (medium-vulnerability). Dryland ecosystems/forests 
reportedly store low amounts of carbon stocks (0.05–0.7 t//ha/year) compared to 
the tropical humid forests that sequester 5.9 t C/ha/year (Gibbz, et al., 2007). 
Therefore, investing in dryland ecosystems may not generate the revenues 
demanded by project proponents. Hwowever the Kenyan carbon map revel that 
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some of the areas i.e. towards notrth also contain equivalent amount of carbon 
biomass as in the hyumid areas but do not have any project. This perhaps indicate 
that poor areas with mitigation potential, may be locked out of REDD+ 
investments.  
Land tenure in REDD+ has attracted mixed academic and political opinions about 
what tenure system may work well for the programme. In this Chapter, areas where 
more households own land titles also hosted more REDD+ projects. It has been 
argued that informal rights to land, as found in high-vulnerability areas, may not 
enable legally enforceable and credible commitments to delivering carbon offsets 
(Gutman, 2003). Informal land rights are perceived to be unfavourable in projects 
where community members themselves are the service providers, argues Gutman 
(2003). The debate about land tenure, however, remains elusive in light of 
contextual suitability and existing local systems. For instance, while secure land 
tenure has largely been interpreted to mean private/individualised ownership 
(Chhatre et al., 2012), the Kasigau project (REDD+_ pure forestry) has shown 
apparent success through communal land tenure systems which provide  a 
framework for community participation, simplified negotiations and more inclusive 
benefit sharing (Atela, 2013) (also see chapters 7 and 8). Another example is the 
Kenya Agricultural Carbon Project (REDD+ _agroforestry) in western Kenya, 
which generates carbon from individual household fields where communal use of 
this land is common practice (Atela, 2012). This raises conflicts over whether 
farmers should allow free grazing of land during the dry season or instead conserve 
residues for carbon sequestration and individual benefit. Such a mix of land and 
resource tenure arrangements may be overlooked as the commoditisation of carbon 
creates incentives to privatise and individualise land, potentially locking out 
landless, tenant farmers and even women and youth (with no traditional land 
inheritance rights) from access and ownership of land resources.  The debate on 
    
 
177 
 
land tenure in REDD+ should thus not be confined to individualised titles but 
should be broadened to reflect the contextual suitability of different tenure systems.   
Access to water is also crucial for the implementation of REDD+ projects. Areas 
with good access to water resources hosted more projects. Areas experiencing 
water/rainfall scarcity may not be able support projects’ objective of reforestation 
for carbon (Zomer et al., 2006). Water scarcity can be a challenge to REDD+ 
projects both in terms of generating carbon credits and participation time in carbon 
activities. For example, the Kenya Agricultural Carbon Project works with groups 
of farmers comprising mainly women, and during dry periods the women have to 
spend more time searching for water instead of implementing sustainable land 
management practices for carbon. In the Kasigau case where water scarcity is 
severe, the project has allocated part of the carbon revenues to communal water 
projects. This has created a favourable perception of the project mainly because the 
local people perceive it to be more sensitive to local vulnerabilities compared to 
unrewarding State initiatives such as national Parks (see details in Chapter 8). The 
Kasigau situation shows that if projects are located in vulnerable areas, with 
mitigation potential, impacts may be more explicit for local people compared to 
high potential areas with better economic alternatives relative to REDD+.  This 
means that pro-poor targeting for REDD+ could spur greater synergies between 
mitigation and adaptation.  
In terms of market access, low-vulnerability counties seem to have closer proximity 
to Kenya’s economic hubs such as Nairobi, Nakuru, Kisumu, Eldoret and 
Kakamega and are able to access better markets for their agricultural produce at 
better prices. This effectively translates into better income, reduced poverty and 
reduced overexploitation of natural resources including forests and soil nutrients.  
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6.5.   Conclusion 
This Chapter assessed the interaction between globally designed REDD+ projects 
and the socioeconomic settings of Kenya. The Chapter reveals that the majority of 
projects target developed areas where socioeconomic conditions are favourable for 
delivering carbon funding. Yet the UNFCCC debates on REDD+ have, over time, 
coined a generic notion that REDD+ is pro-poor simply because it targets 
developing countries. The Kenyan case shows that beyond the ‘developing country’ 
tag, interest in carbon funds ensues. This interest conflicts the pro-poor notion of a 
‘global REDD+’ potentially denying poor communities, with mitigation potential, 
a chance to participate and benefit from REDD+. The Chapter has discussed various 
ways in which socioeconomic factors may impede or promote REDD+ activities. 
The next chapter investigates how a globally linked REDD+ project practically 
interact with socioeconomic factors, represented as ‘livelihood assets’, at the local 
level.  
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Chapter 7   
Implementing REDD+ at the local level22 
 
Abstract 
This Chapter examines the implementation of REDD+ at the local level. It focuses 
on the interaction between REDD+ design and local livelihood assets and national 
institutions.  Evidence is drawn from the first internationally accredited REDD+ 
demonstration project in Africa, the Kasigau Corridor project. Interviews and focus 
group discussions were the main methods applied. Results show that while the 
project is globally standardised to deliver carbon, the local livelihood setting pushes 
the project to consider livelihood issues beyond carbon. Assets, especially those 
identified by the poor, had more impact on the project’s ability to protect forests 
compared to the middle and high-wealth groups. Pro-poor strategies that re-
distribute carbon revenues between project proponents and the landless poor can 
reduce pressure on the forests, enable inclusive participation and simultaneous 
achievement of conservation and development goals. The project’s effort to be pro-
                                                          
22This Chapter is based on one journal article revised and resubmitted, one published book 
Chapter (in press) and two published working papers: 
a. Atela JO, Quinn, CH., Minang PA., Duguma LA 2014 Implementing REDD+ at the local level: 
assessing the key enablers for credible mitigation and sustainable livelihood outcomes. Journal of 
Environmental Management: Paper accepted subject to revisions [Revisions submitted; JEMA-D-
14-0920R1] 
b. Atela JO (2014). Implementing REDD+: evidence from Kenya;  In Carbon conflicts and forest 
landscapes in Africa. Ian Scoones and Melissa Leach (Eds)  Routledge, pg 108-123 [Online link] 
c. Atela JO, Quinn, CH., Minang PA., Duguma LA. (2014) Assessing the key enablers for REDD+ 
to achieve credible mitigation and sustainable livelihood outcomes at the local level: evidence from 
Kenya. SRI Working paper No 72 [Online link] 
d. Atela, JO. (2013). Governing REDD+: global framings versus practical evidence from the Kasigau 
Corridor REDD+ Project, Kenya, STEPS Working Paper 55, Brighton: STEPS Centre. [Online 
link]  
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poor is impeded by national institutional gaps, strict carbon standards that limit 
trade-offs between carbon and livelihoods and fluctuating carbon prices that 
constrain funds required for project operations and local livelihoods. Supporting 
pro-poor assets is necessary but these require enabling national and global 
institutional conditions.  
 
7.1.   Introduction 
The previous Chapter has shown how various socioeconomic factors could 
influence REDD+ implementation. The practical interaction between REDD+ and 
the socioeconomic factors however takes place during on-the-ground 
implementation at the local level where forests are hosted. Implementing policies 
such as REDD+ remains a key challenge in environmental governance (subsection 
3.5.2). Debates on implementing REDD+ (subsections 3.5.3, 3.5.4, 3.5.5) 
acknowledge that REDD+ design rules, when put to practice, are likely to face new 
challenges that test their feasibility in the local context. The local setting constitutes 
a host of livelihood activities and assets linked to forests, intervention histories, 
vulnerabilities and perceptions as well as State or non-State resource management 
regimes. These settings can contribute to fostering support and/or creating barriers 
to local-level implementation of global REDD+ (Mbow et al., 2014, Mustalahti et 
al., 2012, Sills et al., 2009). Projects may reshuffle assets (project-impact) in a 
manner that either benefits or harms local communities (Peskett and Brockhaus, 
2008). It is therefore important to understand how global designs are adapted into 
the local context.  
This Chapter investigates how a globally linked REDD+ project ‘Kasigau Corridor 
Project’ in Kenya interacts with its local setting. The Chapter examines how local 
communities and their assets are engaged in implementing the project and how this 
engagement shapes forest protection and livelihood benefits.  The specific 
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objectives of the Chapter are (1) to evaluate how a globally linked REDD+ project 
engages the local community in its activities (2) to identify the livelihood assets 
that significantly influence the project’s ability to protect forests (3) to analyse 
project impacts on livelihood assets and forest conservation (4) to assess ways in 
which the local community can contribute to REDD+ design and implementation 
(5) to analyse the role of national policies in the project’s implementation.  
 
7.2.    Description of the Kasigau project 
Section 4.3 provided a general description of the project context including a map 
indicating the project areas (Figure 4.2). Here, specific details about the project 
features (e.g. scale, participants, and carbon sales etc.) are presented. The Kasigau 
project is a  subnational REDD+ initiative aimed at avoiding emissions by 
conserving a dryland forest constituting private ranches (50–2500 members per 
ranch) and community land that spans 500,000 acres and is part of a corridor linking 
Tsavo East and Tsavo West National Parks, the two largest wildlife protection areas 
in Kenya. The project developer is a United States based private-multilateral-for 
profit company, Wildlife Works. The project has worked with the local community 
since 2006 to conserve the dryland forests alongside other eco-tourism initiatives.  
The project directly works with approximately 1500 households from five villages 
of Taita-Taveta county. The five villages cover 10,015 sq. km representing about 
59% of the total area covered by the Taita-Taveta county-the 12th largest county of 
the 47 counties of Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2009). The spatial extent of the 
dryland forest of 2023 sq. km is about 25% of the five villages and 11.9% of the 
county.  Protection of the forests for carbon and community engagement in the 
conservation activities and benefit sharing are the key project activities. By the time 
of this research (2013), the project had sold 1.6 million tones on CO2 generated 
until 2011. Out of this, about 1373 tons were from communal hills and the rest from 
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group ranches. The credits were sold to a host of private sector compnies including 
athelia, Barcalys Bank, Nedbank, PUMA Ltd among others in the voluntary market 
at an average of US $ 6 per tonne.23   
 
7.3.   Methods  
A range of participatory data collection methods were applied in the context of a 
Matched Control Intervention research design. The MCI involved data collection 
from communities in the project area and those outside project area (control) 
(Jagger et al., 2010)  (subsection 4.3.2).  
 
7.3.1.   Analysis of project design documents  
Analysis of project documents and general consultation with project staff were first 
undertaken to evaluate the project’s activities in terms of forest protection for 
carbon, community participation and benefit sharing. The documents were 
analysed through a combination of exploratory analysis and iterative content 
analysis (see discussions on document review in subsection 4.6.1). The exploratory 
analysis aimed to understand the general project activities and background. The 
iterative approach was useful in retrieving and categorising specific project design 
aspects relevant to the study objectives. Statements on project standards, linkage to 
global, national and local organisations, as well as community engagement 
modalities were retrieved and their links to the global design established.  
 
7.3.2.   Household questionnaire 
A household questionnaire (appendix 2) was used to interview 100 households. The 
household interviews were targeted to assess how local livelihood assets influence 
                                                          
23 Project documents and interviews with project’s liason staff , September 2013 
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project activities (asset-impact) and the corresponding impact of the project on 
these local assets (project-impact). Stratified random samples of households were 
drawn equally from the intervention and control sites. To obtain a realistic account 
of project-asset interactions, intervention households were randomly selected from 
a list of members belonging to a community based organisation (CBO), the 
Marungu Hills Conservancy, through which the REDD+ project engages 
community members and disseminates benefits (see subsection 7.3.1). Control 
households were randomly sampled from Mraru and Tausa ranch groups, which 
work closely with conservation projects in the area. The intervention and control 
samples represented 20.1 % (50 of 280 registered households) and 19.4 % (50 of 
285 registered households) of the sampling frame respectively.  
The sample size was considered adequate in light of low understanding of carbon 
issues among individual households thus more time was needed to explain 
questions and retrieve quality information from the households. The sample was 
also complemented with several discussions (see 7.2.3) and open interviews 
(n=107) undertaken for the scoping study (see section 4.4). Village elders in each 
location assisted in categorising all households in the target groups (CBO and ranch 
groups) into low, middle and high wealth status, given their deeper understanding 
of individual household’s assets (Bolin and Tassa, 2012). Household land holdings, 
crop yields, livestock numbers and educational capabilities were used to define the 
wealth categories (see details on wealth ranking in subsection 4.6.5). Of the 50 
households in each location, 24 low-wealth, 16 middle-wealth and 10 high-wealth 
households were interviewed. 
Households were interviewed using questionnaires composed of open and closed 
questions. Questions for the intervention and control households were matched. 
The first part of the questionnaire involved a general introduction to the research 
objectives and expectations. In this introduction, the respondent was also assured 
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of confidentiality of the information he/she gave (Gray, 2009). The second part 
inquired about the households’ demography. The third part of the questionnaire 
utilised qualitative and quantitative techniques to detail respondents’ livelihood 
assets and how they access and use these in different seasons. The fourth part 
inquired about project’s interaction with household livelihood assets.  Twelve (12) 
indicators were used to represent each of the five livelihood assets (Table 7.1). The 
indicators were selected from the scoping study (Atela, 2013) and analysis of 
project-socioeconomic interactions in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Table 7.1:  Asset indicators used in assessing the project-livelihood interactions 
 
Respondents were asked to state and explain the positive and/or negative impact of 
each asset indicator on the project’s ability to protect forests (asset-impact). In a 
similar way, the respondents detailed the impacts of forest protection procedures 
on the asset indicators (project impact). While considerable overlap between the 
asset-impact and project-impact was noted, structuring inquiries in this way 
improved objectivity and clarity in describing project-asset interactions. 
In assessing the asset-impact and project-impact for each of the asset indicators, an 
impact measure of +1 was assigned to any impact a respondent thought was positive 
 
Asset Category Asset indicator  
Social Forest access rules  
 
Household 
associations 
 
Land ownership 
Natural Land size 
 
Land productivity  
 
Forest use(s) 
Financial  Economic activities  
 
Income level 
Human Education level  
 
Employment status  
Physical Water access  
 Market access 
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and -1 to any adverse impact. If positive and negative impacts on a particular asset 
indicator were of equal measure to a respondent, an impact factor of 0 (no overall 
effect) was assigned. The impact factor scores were then averaged for each asset 
indicator and wealth categories for quantitative analysis while qualitative responses 
were used to understand the scores. Household data from the control site were only 
used in the project-impact analysis where site comparisons were quantitatively 
possible, but were excluded from the asset-impact analysis because respondents did 
not have any experience with the project. Certain opinions of the control group 
about asset-impact were however qualitatively highlighted while making specific 
comparisons with intervention sites.  
The asset-impact scores show the impacts of household assets on the project but do 
not reveal the relative strengths of the assets in influencing the project’s activities. 
Within the fourth part of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to rank the three 
top assets with more influence on the project activities and why.  Three levels of 
ranking minimised the difficulties respondents could face with multiple ranks. A 
rank of 1 yielded 3 points for an asset indicator, while a rank of 3 yielded 1 point 
for an indicator. Average ranking scores was calculated for each asset indicator. In 
part five of the questionnaires, respondents were asked about the ways they thought 
they could contribute to the REDD+ project and the roles they thought they could 
play in designing and implementing REDD+, given their experience with the 
Kasigau project. Respondents were also asked about their future expectations of the 
project and actions they could take in case their expectations are not met. The 
household questionnaire was triangulated with focus group discussions.    
 
7.3.3.   Focus group discussions  
Six FGDs, three in each site, were executed to triangulate the results of the 
household questionnaire and additionally construct a communal livelihood calendar 
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and discuss project dynamics in the context of the calendar. The FGD participants 
were purposefully selected and included village elders (n=12), land owners (n=11) 
and representatives of women, men and youth groups in the community (n=15). 
Village elders and community resource persons constructed community livelihood 
calendars (Ronkoli, 2006) overlaid with key livelihood assets as well as project 
activities. The village elders further clarified project interactions with gender and 
traditions that were not clearly articulated in the household interviews. Information 
from household questionnaires indicated that land tenure was a major factor for the 
project and so land owners (n=11) drawn from ranch shareholders, individual 
owners and community land trustees discussed land ownership.  Results on the 
interactions between household assets and project as well as asset ranking were 
presented to the representatives of community groups who verified the interactions 
between the project and livelihood assets and further discussed and voted on the 
asset rankings. The discussions and debates about asset ranking were particularly 
useful in explaining why certain assets are more crucial for the project than others 
(Sithole, 2002).  
 
7.3.4.   Stakeholder interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with 14 stakeholders at the 
project/local level. These were in addition to the ones undertaken with national 
stakeholders (see subsection 5.2.4). The stakeholders interviewed included project 
staff (n=6), leaders of local CBOs (n=4), local administrative authorities-Chiefs 
(n=2) and field staff of ICDPs working in the Kasigau area (n=2).  The project/local 
level stakeholders were selected through a mix of purposive and snowball sampling 
techniques as discussed in subsection 4.6.3. Project staff working on various project 
components clarified the project’s work and interactions with local assets, project 
linkages with national institutions (the State) and global REDD+, as well as policy 
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and practical challenges the project experiences. Leaders of CBOs and Chiefs were 
engaged in interviews about community engagement in project work, local 
institutional sett-up and how these local institutions interact with the project’s work. 
National level stakeholders drawn from forestry, environment and agriculture 
departments that were interviewed about national level implementation (subsection 
5.2.4) clarified the role of the State in the Kasigau REDD+ project as well.  
 
7.3.5.   Observations 
Participant observations were also employed during various community activities 
such as women group farming activities. The researcher took part in such activities 
and asked probing questions about livelihoods and influence on the REDD+ 
project. Non-participant observation was used in two community meetings, one 
where the community was making decisions on how to invest a share of the carbon 
money from the communal hills, and another consisting of ranchers and trustees for 
the communal carbon fund. These observations were crucial for understanding how 
the community perceives project activities and how equitable decision making is in 
relation to benefit sharing (also see subsection 4.7.8).  
 
7.3.6.   Data analysis  
Household questionnaire data were analysed using SPSS to generate descriptive 
statistics. In comparing project-impact, the quantitative project-impact score for the 
control group was pre-assigned on a null basis or ‘no-effect’ scale (0) to remove 
confounding factors from the site comparisons, given the possibility of wider 
livelihood changes driven by the State or other projects. Since most data here were 
not continuous, non-parametric statistical tests of Chi-squared and spearman rank 
correlation coefficient were applied (Green and Salkind, 2010). Chi-squared was 
applied to test for significant differences in the impact scores between wealth 
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categories and between sites. Spearman rank correlation coefficient was used to 
correlate the impact scores of various wealth categories. Qualitative data drawn 
from FGDs, key informants and stakeholder interviews were coded to draw out 
themes and illustrative quotes (Hopkins, 2007).  
 
7.4.   Results 
This section presents the results of the Chapter in accordance with the objectives 
outlined in section 7.1. Results of the first three objectives are first presented 
especially analysing the design and activities of the case project. The last two 
objectives are then presented and these mainly focus on how local assets impact of 
project activities and the role of the State in the project work.  
 
7.4.1.   Project design   
Project activities, institutions involved and community participation modalities are 
illustrated in Figure 7.1. The project operates under global standards of VCS and 
the Climate Community and Biodiversity Standard (CCBS). The two standards are 
technically different but have complementary procedures and requirements. The 
VCS particularly emphasises emissions reductions and does not require projects to 
produce additional environmental or social benefits. The monitoring and 
verification procedures under the VCS largely borrow from the CDM. Specific 
VCS procedures/methodologies can be developed and applied for a specific project, 
with approval from the VCS board. Under the VCS standard, the Kasigau project 
is not restricted to engage the community in a particular way. By contrast, the 
CCBS aims to ensure project designs that provide robust benefits to the local 
community. The social and economic wellbeing of communities is central in the 
CCBS and here communities are required to provide input to the project design, 
express their expectations and raise concerns about potential negative impacts of 
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the project. The project is expected to develop conflict resolution procedures and 
enhance capacity of the local community on REDD+ activities and benefits. The 
CCBS, however, does not verify emissions reduced but allows for verification 
through alternative standards like the VCS.  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Flow of activities between the project, state and local communities; 
Source : developed from project documents and staff consultations. 
 
The project targets to reduce emissions of 49,300,000 tons of carbon (Wildlife-
Works 2011) and adhere to the community engagement requirements (appendix 
1/CP16). The project sells carbon credits to international private companies such as 
Puma (EU and USA), Alliance Panapa Bank and most recently Barclays Bank 
(UK). These carbon buyers paly critical role in influencing carbon prices etting 
Project 
Standards  
VCS+CCBS 
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carbon prices through negotiations and even the volumes of CO2 that they are able 
to purchase. The project had already sold credits generated between 2006 and 2011 
and was still stocking credits from 2012 at the time of this research. 
 
7.4.2.   Local context within which the project is implemented   
The main households’ assets in both the intervention and control sites included 
communal hills, ranches, on-farm forests and trees, household associations and 
livestock, and these occurred in varying abundance and ownership claims 
depending on wealth categories (Table 7.1). Low-wealth households at the 
intervention site laid claim to communal hills as their forest resource, while the 
high-wealth households owned shares in the ranches. A livelihood calendar for the 
community (Appendix 2) revealed that households apply livelihood assets 
concurrently or in substitutes to form livelihood strategies and to respond to 
livelihood shocks such as drought or deaths. Farming is practiced across both dry 
and wet seasons but the wet season is more crucial for the productivity of crops and 
animal feed. As such, most low-wealth households who practice rain-fed 
agriculture as their main livelihood may pursue casual labour, food for work or 
charcoal burning in the communal hills as seasonal coping strategies (Table 7.2). 
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Table 7.2:  Main livelihood assets owned by different households belonging to different wealth groups. Chi squared test was used to test 
for the significant differences in asset composition between different wealth categories.  
  
Main/dominant asset composition by wealth 
(Intervention- Marungu) 
  
Main/dominant asset composition by wealth  
(Control- Mbololo) 
Asset category 
  
Low (n=24) Middle (n=16) High (n=10)   Low (n=24) Middle (n=16) High (n=10) 
Social Age  21-71 21-71 21-71  26-78 26-78 26-78* 
 Gender of h. head (majority) Female  Female Male*  Female Male Female 
 Household size (mean) 7 6 6  6 5 4* 
 Main livelihood activity (majority) Farming Business Business*  Farming Farming Business 
 Main shocks (majority) Drought Drought Death*  Drought Drought Death* 
 Main coping strategy (majority) Food for work Remittance Business*  Casual labour Casual labour Remittance* 
 Causes of crop failure (majority) Drought Drought Drought  Drought  Drought Drought 
 Number of associations (mean) 0 1 2*  1 1 2* 
 Association scope (level) Local Local Sub-national Local Local Sub national 
Natural Forest type owned  Communal hill Communal hill Ranches  None  Ranches  Ranches 
 Land size (acres) 1-2 1-4 4-10*  1-2 2-4 4-8* 
 Land acquisition (majority) Inheritance Inheritance Inheritance  Inheritance  Inheritance Inheritance 
 Proof of land ownership (majority) Elders’ consent Allot. letter Allot. Letter* Allot. letter  Title deed Title deed* 
 Crop yields (mean bags/acre) 2.01 2.13 2  2.52 2.81 2.78 
 Yield consumption period (mean months) 3 3 6*  2 3 5* 
 Main forest uses (majority) Fuel wood Fuel wood Cultural*  Fuel wood Fuel wood Cultural* 
Financial  Number of secondary income sources (mean) 0 1 2*  0 1 2* 
 Main Expenditure (majority) Food Food Food  Food Food Food 
 Number of cows (mean) 1 1 4  1 1 3* 
 Number of goats (mean) 2 4 7*  2 2 5* 
 Number of hens (mean) 2 5 18*  3 20 20* 
Human Education level (majority) Primary Primary Secondary*  Primary Primary Secondary* 
 Main employment type (majority) Casual Casual Permanent*  Casual Casual Permanent* 
Physical  Water access distance (km) 2-5 1-2 1-2*  2-5 1-2 1-2* 
 Market value to the households (majority) Buying Buying  Selling*  Buying Buying Both 
  Distance to the nearby road (km) 1-2 1-2 1-2   1-2 1-2 1-2 
*significance between wealth categories at 0.05 
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7.4.3.   Community engagement: project introduction 
The project proposer has worked with the local community since 1998.  As such, the 
task of introducing the project to the community and getting its acceptance was not 
subject to complex negotiations. The REDD+ safeguards highlight FPIC in terms of 
ensuring consultation and consent from (mainly) the local communities who are the 
custodians of land and forests. The common approach to safeguards established by 
intermediaries is however more explicit and explains that REDD+ investors or 
governments must negotiate with local communities and indigenous peoples prior to 
the development and establishment of REDD+ activities on their customary lands. In 
this, the local community retains the right to agree to the project or not once they have 
a full and accurate understanding of project’s intentions and implications.  
 
The REDD+ initiative was made known to the community through local contact 
persons, including the area chief and leaders of various CBOs. Given their elitist 
positions in the community, introducing new project through these contact persons 
has been deployed in many parts of Kenya as a way of legitimising such new projects 
among many community members.24 The contact persons specifically assisted in 
organising public gatherings such as Chiefs’ Barazas within which these contact 
people informed the community about the project. Barazas have historically been used 
as conduits for flows of resources and new development ideas from central 
government, and thus would always attract the interest of many in the community who 
would hope to be engaged and benefit from any new initiative.  
 
7.4.4.   Community engagement: implementing project activities 
Group ranches registered as private companies are the primary sources of carbon 
generating 75% of all carbon credits. However, most shareholders to the ranching 
companies/groups reside outside the local community with only about 5% of the 
shares held by the locals. Most local community members, however, participate in the 
                                                          
24 Atela  (2012) and Place et al.(2006) 
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project via organized umbrella CBOs through which the community commit their 
communal land, participate in capacity building and forest protection activities and 
bargain for benefits. Within the CBOs, community members have elected Locational 
Carbon Committees (LCCs) that directly represent community interest in the project. 
By committing their lands to the project and granting conservation rights to the 
project, the local community and ranch shareholders transferred carbon rights to the 
project proponents in accordance with free prior and informed consent procedures 
outlined in the project standards and global REDD+ safeguards. A key feature of the 
easement agreement is the flexibility involved i.e. the community and ranch 
shareholders can ratify their commitments to the project at any time. While this could 
threaten the project’s sustainability, this threat is minimal because both ranches and 
communal lands have regulations that only allow for collective land use decisions 
rather than individualised decisions.   
Other than transfer of carbon rights, committing land to the project also meant that the 
local community is restricted from accessing and using forests for livelihoods e.g. 
livestock grazing, charcoal burning, firewood collection. These forest uses were 
common before the project but their restriction allows for replenishment of payable 
carbon stocks. In collaboration with project extension, the CBOs and their respective 
LCCs coordinate trainings needed for the community to implement forest protection 
activities initiated by the project e.g. eco-charcoal factory, greenhouse tree nurseries, 
recruitment of community forest wardens. These activities employ members of the 
local community thereby providing alternative income to charcoal burning in the 
protected forest lands.  
In return, the local community is entitled to all the carbon revenue resulting from 
communal forest and additionally, benefits from one third share of carbon revenue 
from the ranches. The community share of carbon revenue is invested in a host of 
livelihood projects through an established trust fund ‘Wildlife Works REDD+ Project 
Trust Fund (WWRPTF)’. The one third community share is part of benefit sharing 
mechanism in which the other two thirds are equally divided between ranching 
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companies and project operations. The community through the CBOs decides on the 
livelihood projects to be supported through the WWRPTF. However their decisions 
have to be filtered through various institutions including the LCC and its sub-
committees on water or bursary, approval by the project proponents and assessment 
by relevant State agencies e.g. water board (Figure 7.2). Overall, the local institutional 
structures usefully coordinate community participation in the project but also exclude 
the opinions of some community members especially those not part of any group or 
CBO yet the project’s ability to protect forest depends on all community members 
whose livelihood assets link to forests in one way or another.  
 
7.4.5.   Impacts of household assets on project activities (asset-impact) 
Household assets influenced project activities (asset-impact) in different ways (Table 
7.3) and depending on wealth category (Figure 7.2).  
 
         Figure 7.2: Impact factor of assets on the project differentiated by household wealth status 
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Low-wealth households generally perceived that most of their assets – mainly water 
access and land ownership, productivity and size – negatively impacted on the 
protection of forests. Low-wealth respondents felt that their poor access to water 
resources and unreliable rainfall negatively affected their main livelihood activity of 
farming, and this raised pressure on the protected ranches and community hills (Table 
7.3). Most of these low-wealth households also lacked legitimate titles to land, and at 
the beginning of the project they feared that the project would take over the communal 
lands to which they lay claim. Household membership to an association was the only 
low-wealth asset perceived to be positively influencing the project.  
Table 7.3: Qualitative impacts of high high-rank assets on the project; [Negative 
impact (-) No impact (0) Positive impact (+1)] 
 
Asset Main impacts of the assets on the project 
Low-wealth Middle-wealth High-wealth 
Water access  (-) Unreliable 
rainfall/water sources; 
reduced land 
productivity and 
increased pressure on 
forest/tree resources 
 (-) More time spent 
in searching for 
water instead of tree 
planting 
 (-) Unreliable 
rainfall/water sources; 
carbon related trees 
drying up  
(+) Water scarcity 
enables good water 
business 
Land 
ownership 
(+) Communal land 
benefits all 
(-) No title deed; fear 
of project and rich 
people acquiring titles 
of the communal land  
 (-) Competing land 
value such as sale of 
the land to a higher 
bidder 
(+) Have land title 
deeds thus 
commitment to plant 
trees for carbon credits 
 (-) Availability of title 
deed- conversion of 
land to non-carbon 
land uses 
Land 
productivity 
(-) Decline in 
productivity; pressure 
on forest/tree 
resources to fill the 
production gap 
(-) Decline in 
productivity; more 
time in non-farm 
activities instead of 
farm/land carbon 
related activities 
(-) Decline in 
productivity; reduced 
residue volume for 
livestock resulting in 
forest based grazing 
Economic 
opportunities  
(+) Declining 
economic activities 
increase the household 
willingness to be part 
of the project  
(-) Charcoal/firewood 
gathering as economic 
activity increases 
pressure on tree/forest 
resources 
(+) Farming as an 
economic activity 
enhances on-farm 
conservation 
activities for carbon 
(+) Household with 
stable/diversified 
economic activities 
reduces charcoaling 
within the protected 
forest for REDD+ 
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Most middle-wealth respondents felt that their land size and economic activities 
influenced the project activities positively. The middle-wealth group felt that pursuing 
farming as an economic activity within their relatively large land holdings enabled 
them to undertake agroforestry practices that reduced pressure on protected forests. 
This group, however, felt that decreasing land productivity might make them change 
land uses to non-agricultural ones such as construction of shops and rentals houses or 
sell land to developers who might not have a conservation agenda, and this would 
affect the project’s emission reduction targets (Table 7.3). 
The asset-impact scores from the high-wealth households were mostly positive for 
land ownership. Most high-wealth households receive carbon revenues from their 
shares in the ranches and are motivated to commit part of their larger landholdings to 
on-farm forests for carbon.  
Overall, water access, land productivity and land ownership had the highest negative 
scores while membership to an association had the highest positive score (Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4: Overall impacts of household assets (asset-impacts) on the protection of 
forests (ranches and communal forests) for reducing emissions under the Kasigau 
REDD+ project 
 
* significance between wealth categories at 0.05 
 
 
Asset Category Asset indicator  
 
Overall 
Social Forest access rules   0.02 
 
Household association  0.38 
 
Land ownership  -0.28* 
Natural Land size  -0.1* 
 
Land productivity   -0.3 
 
Forest use(s)  -0.1* 
Financial  Economic activities   0.04 
 
Income level  -0.1 
Human Education level   0.1 
 
Employment status   -0.1 
Physical Water access  
 -0.5* 
 Market access 
 0.1* 
Aggregate   -0.1 
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The ranking of the relative influence of assets on the protection of forests for emission 
reduction shows that water access, land ownership, economic activities and land 
productivity are high-rank assets compared to others (Figure 7.3). These high-rank 
assets were mainly rated to have negative impact on the project work. These assets 
play crucial roles in diversifying communal livelihoods within the livelihood calendar. 
The calendar shows that the poor, in times of drought, sometimes pursue eco-
charcoaling activities involving charcoal making from fallen leaves and logs as an 
alternative to charcoal burning; others pursue casual labour on neighbours’ farms and 
sometimes food for work initiated by a world vision project. The food for work and 
eco-charcoaling options are largely seasonal and not open to a majority of the poor, 
who still sometimes opt to illegally burn charcoal and sell firewood from the protected 
forests. However, land owners and group representatives argued that including the 
communal land as part of the project has allowed the community to negotiate for better 
alternatives for forest dependent households, especially during dry seasons, 
reasonably reducing the potential for elite capture of project activities and benefits. 
Drawing on the project interaction with the livelihood calendar, enhancing water 
access and recognising a mix of land ownership were identified as the strategic 
enablers for the project’s ability to protect forests. Other assets such as economic 
opportunities and land productivity depend more on these strategic assets.  
 
    
 
198 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Ranking of the household assets in terms of their influence on the project’s 
activities. 
7.4.6.   Project impact on household assets (project-impact) 
The project-impact scores on the various assets and the associated explanations are 
contained in Figure 7.4 and Table 7.5 respectively. Figure 7.4 shows that the low-
wealth respondents perceived that the project has impacted on most of their assets 
more positively compared to the middle and high-wealth respondents. The project 
impact scores show that the project has impacted positively on most of the low-wealth 
households’ assets (Figure 7.4), even though these assets mostly impacted on the 
project negatively (see Figure 7.2 above). Low-wealth were positive about planned 
livelihood projects especially water projects (Figure 7.5) that would improve their 
access to water, education and food productivity. Additionally, over 50% of the 
communal share of carbon money is allocated to bursary scheme that is specifically 
targeted at needy students from poorer households (Table 7.5).  
The low-wealth households perceived that incorporating their communal land as part 
of the project improved their bargaining power for project benefits and enabled them 
to benefit from carbon revenues which they would otherwise forego with their smaller 
land sizes (Table 7.5). This contradicts the perception of the high-wealth respondents, 
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who felt that the project’s emphasis on and recognition of communal ownership 
hinders the sub-division of land into individual parcels or shares as in the ranches.  
Figure 7.4: Impact of project activities on household assets. Positive ipact fact implies 
positive average impact while negative impact factor implies negative average impact 
of project activities.   
Group representatives, however, emphasised that the project benefits have not 
adequately matched community expectations or the opportunity costs of protecting 
the communal forest, and so they expect the project to initiate more alternatives such 
as irrigated horticulture and poultry projects, among others. Livelihood expectations 
including water supply, food relief and alternative economic activities dominate 
community views during meetings aimed at disseminating the project’s intentions, 
according to the area chief.  
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Figure 7.5: A sign post indicating a planned communal water project to be supported 
by the Kasigau REDD+ project in Marungu village, Taita-Taveta county.  
According to project staff, expectations of dramatic livelihood improvement remain a 
challenge for the project. This is exacerbated by fluctuating carbon prices and buyers. 
The project has only sold credits generated until 2011 but was still sourcing for buyers 
to purchase stocks generated since 2012. During interviews, local people lay more 
emphasis on how the project helps them address livelihood needs. They would always 
refer to the funds supporting community projects as ‘carbon money’, although the 
concept behind carbon credits and offsets remains opaque to them. Pressured on 
livelihood expectations, the project is sometimes forced to allow community members 
to draw firewood from and graze animals in the forest especially during dry seasons 
and according to project staff, this is a major source of loss of carbon credits.   
The overall project-impact was higher on other assets such as education, employment 
and membership to a local association (Table 7.6). The project impact was significant 
compared to the control and the significance was high for the low-wealth (p<0.01; 
0.756) compared to middle wealth (p<0.01; 0.686) and high-wealth (p<0.05; 0.538). 
At the control site, households, group representatives and village elders reinforced the 
view that a REDD+ project may revert ownership and benefits from the state owned 
Mbololo forests to the community. They claimed that the forested hills currently 
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benefit only a few State officers and business people involved in corruption and illegal 
logging. The control households, especially the middle-wealth ones, further expressed 
fears that the project may restrict livestock grazing areas, thereby affecting their 
economic opportunities.  
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 Asset 
Main perceived and actual impacts at the intervention  site 
(Marungu) 
  Main expected impacts at the control site (Mbololo) 
 Low-wealth  Middle-wealth High-wealth Actual impact  Low-wealth Middle-wealth High-wealth 
Water access  (+)Expected 
construction of water 
projects  
(+)Expected 
construction of 
water projects  
(+) Protected water 
sources 
Ksh 3,331,551 (US$39,195) 
committed to community 
water projects  
(+) Project to fund 
water projects and 
protect forest for rains  
(+) Project to 
fund water 
projects  
(+) Project to fund 
water projects and 
protect current 
catchment 
Land 
ownership 
(+) Strengthens 
communal land 
ownership and 
benefits 
(0)No effect   (-)Hinders sub-
division of 
communal land to 
individual 
households 
Communal land recognized  (+) Change of 
ownership of State 
land to communal land  
(+) Strengthen 
communal land 
ownership and 
benefits  
No effect  
Land 
productivity 
(+)Expect rains to increase and increased 
yields  
(-) Increased number of elephants 
destroying crops 
(+) Expect access 
to irrigation from 
the project funded 
water projects   
25,000 seedlings planted in 
farmers’ fields  
(+) increase in rainfall and water access 
for better yields 
(-) protection against elephants 
destroying crops  
(+) Increased yield 
from project-initiated 
irrigation facilities  
Economic 
opportunities  
(+)Diversified 
economic activities 
from project staff 
and visitors  
(+)Diversified 
economic activities 
from project staff 
and visitors  
(-) Restricted 
grazing in ranches  
(+)Diversified 
economic activities 
from project staff 
and visitors  
Business and employment 
opportunities increased (Not 
quantified)  
Grazing in 400,000 acres 
ranches prohibited 
 
(+) Diversified 
economic 
opportunities 
 (-) Restricted 
charcoaling  
(-) Restricted 
grazing in 
ranches  
(+) Sale of tree 
seedlings and 
carbon credits  
(+)Sale of carbon 
credits from on-farm 
trees  
(+) Business 
opportunities from 
project staff  
(-)Restricted 
charcoal 
production/firewood 
collection for sale 
Education  (+)Educational 
bursaries and school 
construction 
(+)Educational 
bursaries  
(0)No effect – it 
only targets poor 
families  
Ksh 5,174,244 (US$60,873) 
committed to educate 271 
secondary school students 
and55 college and university 
students and construct two 
schools 
 (+) Bursaries and school facilities  (+)Bursaries and 
school facilities 
 (-) Children 
dropping out of 
school for project 
jobs 
Employment  (+) Community 
members employed 
by the project  
(+) Community 
members employed 
by the project  
(+) Community 
members 
employed by the 
project  
13 staff at the local CBO, 200 
casual employees and 100 
permanent employees within 
project activities  
(+) Project to offer 
jobs  
(+) Project to 
offer jobs  
(+) Project to offer 
self-employment 
opportunities such as 
businesses 
Household 
associations  
(+) Marungu Hills Conservancy and associated groups supported with administrative and activity 
funds  
(+) Increased activity for local groups 
Forest cover  (+)25,000 seedlings 
supplied to 
households  
(+)25,000 seedlings 
supplied to 
households  
(+)25,000 
seedlings supplied 
to households  
2,500 acres of communal hills 
and over 400,000 acres of 
dry-land forest conserved 
(+) increased forest 
protected area  
(+) Increased 
on-farm forest 
cover  
(+) Increased on-farm 
forest cover  
 
Table 7.5:  Impacts of high high-rank livelihood assets on the project; [Negative impact (-) No impact (0) Positive impact (+1) 
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Table 7.6: Wilcoxon matched pairs signed test for differences between project 
impacts (intervention) and expected impacts (control)  
*0.05 significance **p=0.01 significance in relation to control 
Majority of community members (about 70%) mainly drawn from the low-wealth 
said they were happy with the project. Some 28% of those interviewed, mainly from 
high-wealth households were unhappy with the project (Figure 7.6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Households’ overall perception about the project’s activities 
Household asset  Low-wealth Middle-wealth High-wealth Overall (Mean ± SE) 
   
 
 Water access  0.42** 0.08 0.14 0.18**±0.07 
Land ownership 0.08 -0.08 -0.29 -0.05±0.10 
Economic opportunities 0.21* 0.23 0.57* 0.25*±0.10 
Land productivity 0.17* 0.40** 0.00 0.09* ±0.08 
Income level -0.08 0.30** 0.43** 0.11±0.11 
Land size -0.04 -0.08 0.00 -0.05±0.03 
Education  0.42** 0.69** 0.21* 0.55**±0.08 
Local associations 0.38* 0.15 0.57** 0.34** ±0.09 
Forest use -0.04* -0.15 0.29 0.05±0.11 
Forest access rules -0.13 0.23* 0.00 0.18* ±0.10 
On-farm forest/tree cover -0.08 0.00 0.29* 0.00*±0.09 
Employment status 0.54** 0.23 0.43 0.43**±0.08 
Market access 0.17 0.38** 0.57** 0.30* ±0.08 
Overall significance in relation to control  0.756** 0.686** 0.538*   
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7.4.7.   Potential community roles in the project  
Figure 7.6 presents ways in which the community think they should be engaged in 
the project compared to the UNFCCC provisions from which the project draws its 
design.  
 
 
Figure  7.7:  Ways in which the community think they can contribute to REDD+ 
In terms of design-engagement, the community members expect to be part of 
project design, feasibility studies and also to participate in site selection processes 
(Figure 7.6). The UNFCCC is however unclear and ambiguous on the role of local 
communities in designing REDD+ projects. In terms of activity-engagement, the 
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UNFCCC favours participation during project implementation but the community 
felt that capacity building should start before the project implementation process. 
In terms of benefit-engagement, the community expects shorter benefit waiting 
periods and seasonally oriented benefits while the UNFCCC expectations 
emphasise on institutional aspects such as equity and representation, with little 
clarity on temporal leverage for community livelihoods.     
 
7.4.8.   State engagement in the project  
The engagement of the State in the ongoing demonstration projects is minimal 
because national REDD+ policies are still under preparation. As such, even though 
the State, through the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), 
initially assessed the Kasigau project for its environmental and social impacts, 
interviews reveal that this could not be adequately performed because there is little 
capacity within the government to understand the global standards upon which the 
project operates. Further, the Ministry of Environment that is charged with these 
assessments is not conversant with issues of REDD+ given their poor 
representation in the national REDD+ process (Chapter 5).    
Ideally, the State institutions are expected to support and enforce enablers of 
REDD+. However, project staff and community members blamed bureaucracy 
within the State institutions e.g. water board, lands registrar for delays in assessing 
and approving livelihood projects funded through the carbon revenue. Discussions 
revealed that laxity within State institutions to support local enablers of a REDD+ 
project is linked to resource centralisation regimes in which benefits from, and 
management decisions of the area’s wildlife resources, have historically been 
channelled to the central government with no share to the community. This 
centralisation of benefits manifests in the control community (Mbololo) who think 
that a REDD+ project could help to re-distribute, in their favour, benefits from State 
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owned Mbololo forest. The area’s Forest Officer however asserts that REDD+ 
funds that would result from the hills would be channelled to the central 
government through the Kenya Forest Service (KFS) and as outlined in the Kenya’s 
R-P. 
Project’s implementation is further complicated by sectoral fragmentation with 
regards to national level REDD+ process. Exclusion of key sectors in national 
REDD+ reduces legitimacy of REDD+ within the excluded sectors. Certain 
decisions made through the excluded sectors e.g. lands do not support the key 
REDD+ enablers. For instance, the Kasigau project partly draws its success from 
collective tenure systems (communal and group ranches) which have enabled 
inclusive participation and benefit sharing as well as simplified negotiations with 
the local community to commit their lands to the project. However, the lands 
authority plans to issue individual title deeds to ranch shareholders meaning a single 
ranch-land could be subdivided into individual ownerships of up to 50-2,500 
pieces. This means the REDD+ project will have to convince over 2,500 individuals 
to commit their parcels of land to the project a situation that could be complex and 
costly and perhaps a recipe for emission reversals in the context of diverse 
individual interests in land use.  
7.5.   Discussion 
7.5.1.   Project interaction with local assets 
This study aimed to analyse and discuss REDD+ implementation at the local level 
specifically focusing on how a particular project interact with local livelihood assets 
and State-based institutions. The study context comprises a diversity of wealth-
structured livelihoods that revolve around water access, land ownership, land 
productivity and economic opportunities, but from which the project protects a 
dryland forest for carbon credits and livelihoods. From this diversity of assets, 
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water access and land ownership were identified as the most strategic assets for the 
project due to their role in agricultural livelihoods and economic opportunities for 
the poor, who posit a greater threat to protected forests.  
The above finding  corroborates with studies that indicate that water scarcity linked 
to drought is the greatest form of vulnerability for forest ecosystems especially 
those in arid and semi-arid areas because poor community members often invade 
forests for coping with agricultural failures (FAO 2010, Nkem et al., 2012). Various 
lands including private/group ranches, communal lands host the forests targeted for 
carbon. At the same time, the lands provide crucial livelihood resources to different 
groups within the project area. Recognising the diversity of rights to access and 
benefits from these lands enhances inclusion of various groups in the REDD+ 
activities and benefits. This promotes collective commitment to REDD+ thereby 
reducing pressure on forests compared to individualized ownership. The Kasigau 
project experience with diverse and collective land tenure contrasts studies that 
have viewed enabling tenure system for REDD+ mainly in terms of titled 
private/individualised ownership (Chhatre et al., 2012).  
Supporting water access and diverse land tenure promotes pro-poor and equitable 
participation and benefit sharing for REDD+. Equity and pro-poor approaches have 
been emphasised as crucial for effective REDD+ implementation (Boyd 2007; 
Smith and Scherr, 2003) (see section 3.5.6). In the Kaigau project, ’The poorer 
segment of the community perceived that the project had impacted positively on 
most of their livelihood assets.  For instance, water is specifically critical for poorer 
households who have to walk long distances to access water compared to richer 
households with water sources, e.g. boreholes and tap water, within their 
homesteads. Due to the dry conditions of the area, the richer households often sell 
water at higher prices, which is sometimes not affordable by poorer households. As 
such, communal projects, freely accessible by the poor, are likely to improve the 
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relative welfare of the poor compared to the richer households. Additionally 
allocating a majority share (over 50%) of the communal share of carbon money to 
education bursaries targeted specifically at needy students from poorer households 
is crucial in building the capabilities of poor households to pursue different 
livelihood opportunities and to dissuade them from encroaching forests. Such pro-
poor targeting enables the poor to benefit more than the non-poor.  
Additionally, allocating majority share (over 50%) of the communal share of 
carbon money to the education bursaries targeted specifically at needy students 
from poorer households is crucial in building the capabilities of these poor ones to 
pursue different livelihood opportunities and  are dissuaded from encroaching 
forests (Mohammed, 2011). Such pro-poor targeting enable the poor to benefit 
more than non-poor (Gross-camp et al., 2012). Also reshuffling and setting up 
various local institutions to improve representation subject to the needs of local 
communities resulted in a perception that the project is transparent and consultative 
(also see chapter 8). Ribot (2011) views such institutional choices as crucial in 
allowing projects to work with democratic institutions (Ribot, 2011, Maraseni et 
al., 2014, Corbera et al., 2009).  Appropriate and inclusive local institutional 
arrangements that capture the views of the poor are critical for supporting pro-poor 
needs  (Martin et al., 2010). 
The institutional reshuffling also require that the global design procedures be 
reshuffled in particular ways to fit the local setting. For instance, global design 
standards e.g. the VCS mainly emphasise carbon delivery yet the Kasigau 
experience reveals that local livelihood needs are critical for delivering carbon. As 
such, benefit sharing with regards to livelihoods represents a key area where global 
REDD+ design interplays with local assets to influence implementation. Even 
though most carbon results from ranches owned by relatively richer land owners, 
redistributing carbon revenue equally with the poor plays out as crucial approach 
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in the project’s implementation. This redistribution is not clarified in the carbon 
standards (e.g. VCS) and REDD+ safeguards from which the project draws its 
design. However, from the Kasigau experience, this benefit redistribution 
significantly reduced pressure on the dryland forests and minimised leakage by 
injecting more support to alternative livelihoods that keep people (especially the 
poor) off protected forests.    
From a broader perspective, benefit redistribution as in the Kasigau case, is crucial 
considering that the State and other private groups control most tropical forests 
(Lyster, 2011). Local communities own only 18-25% of tropical forests (Bluffstone 
et al., 2013). Payments based on ownership could generate relatively low benefits 
to the poor in light of the burden they bear from climate change. Payments based 
on property rights could also create spaces for powerful actors to acquire communal 
land and further marginalize the poor (Lemaitre, 2011). For instance, some rich 
households in the Kasigau area view the project as an impediment to the subdivision 
of communal land into purchasable individual pieces which they could use their 
wealth to acquire at the expense of the poor.  
Despite the largely pro-poor elements observed in the project’s work, other findings 
showed that certain institutional structures e,g. CBO membership aimed at achieving 
efficiency, lock out some poorer community members unable to meet the conditions. This 
indicates that there would often be trade-offs between pro-poor strategies and institutional 
setting for building efficiency in REDD+ implementation.  The pro-poor approaches and 
equitable benefit redistribution are conditioned by other national and global factors.   
7.5.2.   Role of State and global rules in project-asset interactions  
Results revealed that State institutions and global carbon conditions are key in 
REDD+ implementation locally. The case of Kasigau specifically reveals that gaps 
within these broader policy settings remain the key impediments to effective 
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implementation of the Kasigau project. The State is the legitimate representative of 
a country to the global REDD+ process and is expected to support REDD+ 
activities in line with their climate commitments. However, this study reveals that 
bureaucracy and sectoral fragmentation within State agencies and poor linkage with 
private sector currently threatens the project’s work. The shortcomings from the 
State are attributable to national institutional gaps especially path dependencies  
where REDD+ decisions have been monopolized by the forestry sector to the 
exclusion of other relevant sectors (Atela and Quinn, 2014) (Chapter 5). This limits 
legitimacy of REDD+ agenda across sectors. As such, the water sector which is not 
represented in the national REDD+ taskforce may not appreciate the need for water 
in a REDD+ project. Similarly, the lands sector where authorities do not understand 
what REDD+ is all about may not think they are harming a REDD+ project by 
making discrete decisions on land subdivision.  
Sectoral fragmentation is an impediment to successful forest protection, in many 
developing countries (Brockhaus et al., 2013, Minang et al., 2014). However for 
any meaningful emission reduction to be achieved under REDD+, reforming 
national institutions to embrace sectoral integration is required. This is crucial 
because findings here indicate that certain enablers of REDD+ such as legalising 
tenure regimes and approving livelihood projects depend on State institutions and 
are beyond the institutional scope of sub-national private projects. While these 
private projects dominate current and future REDD+ portfolio and have the 
resources to support local implementation, their potential to do so require political 
goodwill and support from the State.  
The global institutions mainly constrain the project implementation via carbon 
standards and conditions. Equitable and pro-poor strategies in the project’s 
implementation are constrained by strict carbon requirements that limit trade-offs 
between forest livelihoods and forest protection. Tension between carbon and 
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livelihoods has been a concern in many studies e.g.  Leach & Scoones (2013); 
Pokorny et al. (2013) but in this study, this tension manifest as the key source of 
certain negative impacts community members associate the project with. Such 
perceived negative impacts include restricted livelihood activities such as grazing, 
firewood collection and charcoal burning all meant to secure carbon. While the 
project has attempted to provide alternative pro-poor livelihood support funded via 
an equal share of carbon funds, this ‘equitable’ share has not met community 
expectations in light of the opportunity costs imposed by restricted forest access 
and use. This is further exacerbated by fluctuating carbon prices and diminishing 
carbon buyers in the global carbon market. As such, while a plethora of literature 
(Jindal, 2010; Corbera et al., 2007; Asquith et al., 2002; Luttrell et al., 2012) and 
REDD+ safeguards support equitable benefit sharing and pro-poor approach as key 
REDD+ enablers, this study shows that even if projects were to do so, broader 
factors such as national institutional gaps and global carbon-based conditions e.g. 
prices and buyers could still create implementation deficits.  
In the context of policy implementation, the constraints  emanating from the 
national and global processes support assertion in Leventon and Antypas (2012) 
that multilevel policy implementation deficits often result from higher levels of 
governance. This justifies why emerging debates on REDD+ implementation 
should seek to unpack multilevel design and implementation of REDD+ to 
holistically identify sources of implementation deficits.  
 
7.6.   Conclusion 
This Chapter aimed to analyse and discuss REDD+ implementation at the local 
level focusing on the role of local livelihood assets and State institutions in a 
REDD+ project implementation. The study shows that while enabling assets align 
with livelihood interests of various wealth groups especially the poor, these assets 
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are conditioned by processes outside the local context. Locally, water access and 
integrated land tenure are key assets for REDD+ implementation due to their close 
links with livelihoods and their knock-on effects on other assets that are equally 
crucial for a REDD+ project. The water-land ownership nexus constitutes an 
important part of the landscape for REDD+ projects, driving pro-poor livelihoods 
and economic opportunities and thereby influencing the direction of deforestation. 
Communal approaches to engagement and redistribution of carbon revenue in 
favour of pro-poor livelihoods are key strategies that can improve local 
participation, collective commitment to and acceptance of the REDD+ project. 
Achieving these enabling conditions depend on the State institutions that legitimize 
actions and global carbon conditions that influence available funds to support the 
pro-poor livelihoods and project operations.  Therefore, equitable benefit 
redistribution and pro-poor livelihood support are necessary conditions for local 
REDD+ implementation but not sufficient unless national institutions are reformed 
to embrace sectoral integration and global REDD+ standards harmonised with local 
expectations.   
Other than local livelihood assets, ICDPs which have undertaken conservation and 
development activities in the localities targeted for REDD+ also posit some 
influence for REDD+ implementation.      
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Chapter 8  
Implementing REDD+ at the local level: 
lessons from integrated conservation and 
development projects 25 
 
Abstract  
There are diverse lessons that subnational projects designed to reduce emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) should learn from integrated 
conservation and development projects (ICDPs) working in developing country 
settings. This Chapter develops and applies a lesson learning framework to identify 
and analyse lessons that the Kasigau REDD+ project learns from a governmental 
ICDP (national park) and a nongovernmental ICDP (World Vision) that have been 
implemented in Taita-Taveta county, Kenya. Fieldwork and document reviews 
revealed 24 lessons drawn from both positive and negative ICDP experiences. At 
the design level, the REDD+ project maintained the commonly critiqued top-down 
intervening approach as used by the ICDPs, by excluding community input into its 
globally-linked design. At the implementation level, the REDD+ project promoted 
better community representation in project decisions and benefit sharing when 
compared to the ICDPs. A landscape approach, democratic institutional choices and 
pro-poor benefit sharing were the key interventions that enabled the REDD+ 
project to improve on the ICDP experiences. The usefulness of the ICDP 
                                                          
25This Chapter is based on one journal article under review and one published working paper by; 
 
a. Atela, J., Quinn, C., Minang, P. & Duguma, L. (2014) Implementing REDD+ in the context 
of Integrated Conservation and Development Projects: Leveraging empirical lessons. Land 
Use Policy 49, 329-340. 
b. Atela JO., Quinn C., Minang, A and Duguma L. (2014) Nesting REDD+ into Integrated 
Conservation and Development Projects: what empirical lessons can be drawn?    SRI 
WP No. 68; CCCEP WP No. 182. [Online link] 
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experiences was however weakened by a lack of lesson sharing between projects. 
The REDD+ project relied mainly on the local community to communicate their 
ICDP experiences, but this led to partial implementation deficits because it 
promoted local participation interests over global mitigation goals. Further, 
community-driven lesson learning appeared to disconnect the project from State 
institutions. The community had negative perceptions of State involvement but at 
the same time the State is the legal custodian of most assets (such as land) required 
for REDD+ implementation. ICDP lessons are therefore necessary for effective 
REDD+ implementation but can only be useful if the process of adopting lessons 
is cognisant of relevant stakeholders such as the State.      
 
8.1.   Introduction 
The previous Chapter revealed that the local socioeconomic setting (livelihood 
assets) has a significant influence on implementing a globally designed REDD+ 
project. The local setting is however diverse. The setting is not only made up of 
livelihood assets but also comprises a layered history of conservation and 
development interventions (ICDPs) with potential implications for REDD+. ICDPs 
are conservation and development initiatives that aim to achieve forest and 
biodiversity conservation alongside socioeconomic development in developing 
countries (Agrawal et al., 2008, Brandon and Wells, 2009). In their many years of 
work, the ICDPs have engaged local settings in different ways establishing varied 
participation and benefit sharing approaches that could influence the way REDD+ 
is perceived, judged or accepted (Minang and Van-Noordwijk,  2013) (subsection 
3.5.6). As such, studies have pointed out that ICDPs, could provide diverse lessons 
for adapting REDD+ to the local context  
(Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009, Blom et al., 2010). However, there is little empirical 
evidence on how ongoing REDD+ projects draw lessons from ICDPs or are 
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affected by experiences communities have had with these ICDPs.  This Chapter 
examines the implementation lessons the Kasigau Corridor REDD+ project draws 
from ICDPs operating in the same area. The Chapter aims to provide evidence on 
the lessons that Kenya’s National Park- a governmental National Park and World 
Vision- a nongovernmental project provide for REDD+ and analyse the process 
through which these lessons are adopted or corrected by the REDD+ project.  
8.2.   Description of case projects  
A description of the design and activities of the ICDP projects compared to those 
of REDD+ are presented in Table 8.1. The Kasigau REDD+ project has been 
described in the previous Chapter (Chapter 7). Here focus is given to the ICDP 
projects. The Tsavo national park and World Vision projects were selected as 
suitable ICDPs with potential lessons for REDD+. The projects’ differentiated 
institutional alignment to the State and a non-State actor is useful for comparing 
intervention approaches. The projects have also worked with the local community 
for many years supporting conservation and livelihood agendas that overlap with 
the implementation goals of REDD+. The National Park overlaps with the REDD+ 
project area over about 24,000 sq. km and comprises Tsavo East (2°S, 38°E) and 
Tsavo West (2°S, 37° E), two of the biggest wildlife protection areas in Kenya. The 
Kenyan government, through the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), is the proponent 
of the park and has deployed game wardens to guard against illegal intrusion and 
mediate community-wildlife interactions. The park engages the local community 
based on legislative provisions in the 2004 and 2007 wildlife Amendment Acts 
(Republic of Kenya, 2004, Republic of Kenya, 2007b). The provisions expect the 
community to report encroachment cases and in return, benefit from employment 
opportunities, compensation and development from national budgetary allocations. 
Parks in many developing countries are managed by governments (Peluso, 1993) 
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who are also expected to coordinate national REDD+ so lessons generated from 
this analysis could be widely applied in various contexts.  
Table 8.1:  Design comparisons between the REDD+ and ICDP projects  
 
 
Design 
components  
Kasigau Corridor REDD+  
project 
Governmental 
National park 
Nongovernmental 
World vision  
Primary 
objectives   
Global climate change 
mitigation and adaptation,  
addressing issues of leakage, 
reversals and displacement of 
emissions 
 
Wildlife/Biodivers
ity conservancy 
towards national 
development and 
cultural heritage.  
 
Charity programme 
focusing on 
sustainable rural 
livelihoods/child 
wellbeing with an 
ultimate target of 
achieving the 
Millennium 
Development Goals.  
Funds and 
conditions  
International market funds 
lobbied through multilateral 
and bi-lateral actors.  The 
funds are available on 
performance in delivering 
credible and verifiable 
emissions through an 
international standard (VCS).  
Upfront funding 
provided from the 
public/state-
budget.  Funds not 
necessarily tied to 
outputs. Outputs 
are verified using 
internal 
procedures. 
Upfront funds 
provided by Aid 
agencies. Output is 
subject to internally 
designed procedures 
and funds are  not 
conditional  on 
performance 
Community 
engagement 
in project 
design  
Indirectly informed through 
prior work by the project 
proponents.    
No engagement  Feasibility study 
carried out to 
identify needy 
households 
Community 
engagement 
in project 
implementat
ion  
Protected area with 
community consultation on 
land and carbon rights and 
consent. Subject to UNFCCC 
safeguards and UN-
declarations on the rights of 
indigenous people.  
Protected areas 
with the 
community 
expected to 
protect wildlife in 
kind subject to 
state regulations.  
 
Integrated Program 
Areas (IPAs) with 
individualised 
support to mainly 
poor households and 
engagement in 
conservation as a 
source of income 
Benefits and 
benefit 
sharing 
procedures  
Equitable benefit sharing and 
recognition of the rights of 
the community, sustainable 
co-benefits for adaptation and 
does not result in leakage  
Compensation for 
human/wildlife 
conflicts, 
development 
allocation from 
central 
government 
Pro-poor household 
asset benefits to 
communities 
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The World Vision project is implemented by World Vision, a Christian 
nongovernmental organisation operating internationally in over 100 countries. The 
World Vision project has been operating in the Kasigau area since 1999. The 
project engages individual households, groups and organisations (schools, 
churches, hospitals) in conservation and livelihood activities such as food for 
conservation, water supply projects, soil and water management, and tree planting. 
Unlike the REDD+ project and the national parks which have clearly delineated 
conservancies, the World Vision project spreads activities across households, 
groups and organisations occurring within an Integrated Programme Area. Given 
its presence in many developing countries, and that of other NGOs carrying out 
similar work, lessons from World Vision will be applicable across various contexts 
adopting REDD+.   
 
8.3.   Methods  
8.3.1.   Lesson learning framework for analysis   
This Chapter develops a lesson learning framework drawing on the policy 
implementation concept (Figure 8.1). Within the framework, policy 
implementation is defined as translating documented policy decisions into practice 
through on-the-ground activities to achieve desired implementation outcomes 
(Leventon and Antypas, 2012). In the context of REDD+, sustainable development 
is the main desired implementation outcome and this encompasses forest protection 
to deliver on global expectations for emission reductions and local expectations of 
community (and other stakeholders) participation and benefits (see subsection 
3.5.3). 
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Emission reductions here involve forest protection to capture and store carbon 
subject to standardised measures such as additionality, permanence and avoidance 
of leakage. Participation, on the other hand, refers to the contribution of local 
communities to REDD+ decisions and receipt of benefits (Angelsen et al., 2009). 
The UNFCCC safeguards (appendix 1/COP 16) specifically outline the need for 
participation of local communities to enable their knowledge and interest to be 
incorporated into REDD+ decisions and benefits (Ribot, 2009). To understand the 
interests of local communities, in line with the desired participation guidelines, we 
consulted these local communities about their specific preferences. In order to 
achieve implementation outcomes, a REDD+ project may draw from ICDP 
experiences and initiate actions that adopt, improve on and correct certain 
experiences (Blom et al., 2010). If a REDD+ project is implemented and adopts 
measures that improve on positive lessons and correct negative ones, then the 
project has the potential to achieve desired implementation outcomes and 
sustainable development (Jordan, 1999). If a REDD+ initiative repeats the negative 
ICDP experiences, then an implementation deficit occurs (Minang and van 
Noordwijk, 2013). The analysis of and implications for various lessons and their 
adoption can provide insights for policy.  
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Figure 8.1: Conceptual design of the Chapter 
8.3.2   Data collection  
One hundred out of 506 households living in each village were randomly sampled 
for interviews. The sample represented a 19.8% sampling intensity, higher than the 
rule of thumb ratio of 20-30 households for a population of 100-500 households 
recommended in Angelsen et al. (2011). To ensure that the sample had equal 
representation from the different wealth segments of the community, village elders 
in each village first stratified the households into low, middle and high wealth 
categories based on their understanding and records of household assets such as 
land size, livestock numbers and educational capabilities (Scoones, 1995). 
Households belonging to low-wealth (n=38), middle-wealth (n=33) and high-
wealth (n=29) were then randomly and proportionally drawn from the village-wide 
household list.  
The households were interviewed using semi-structured questionnaires. The 
respondents were first asked to state and explain the key ways in which the REDD+ 
project differs from each of the ICDP projects in terms of community participation 
and benefits. Allowing respondents to differentiate between the REDD+ project 
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and the ICDPs was a first step towards enabling them to clarify their ICDP 
experiences in relation to the REDD+ project. Respondents were then asked to list 
three positive and three negative experiences they had had with the ICDPs and how 
the REDD+ project was responding to these experiences. Community participation 
was operationalised as design, activity and benefit engagements: 
a. Design-engagement:  the level to which the community is consulted when 
projects are being designed and when these design activities are introduced 
b. Activity-engagement: the level to which community members are consulted and 
trained to implement projectactivities 
c. Benefit-engagement: the nature of livelihood benefits, whether direct/indirect or 
tangible/intangible and the ways in which local people access these livelihood 
benefits. 
The questionnaire also sought respondents’ views on participating in the design, 
activities and benefits of the REDD+ project. Community participation is a desired 
REDD+ implementation outcome, alongside emissions reductions.  While 
emissions reductions requirements are standardised through globally established 
carbon verification measures, participation guidelines under the UNFCCC 
safeguards emphasize that REDD+ initiatives must consult with and account for the 
interests of local communities. Therefore enquiring about the interests of local 
communities, in line with the UNFCCC participation guidelines was necessary. 
A frequency list of household experiences was generated then transcribed into 
lessons through four focus group discussions (FGDs) (Thurmond, 2004). The FGDs 
enabled collective discussion of the ICDP experiences reported by households and 
this usefully overcame the biases associated with individual households whose 
understanding of carbon issues under REDD+ was low (Sithole, 2002). The FGDs 
comprised of purposively sampled village elders, community resource persons and 
representatives of various community groups with knowledge about historical 
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activities and of community experiences with the ICDP and REDD+ projects.  
During the discussions, ICDP experiences were discussed, verified, judged and 
appropriately assigned or excluded as a logical lesson for the REDD+ project. The 
lessons were assigned to four categories (Table 8.2). In the same FGDs, the 
frequency list of community expectations for participation and benefit sharing were 
also discussed.  
Table 8.2: Categories of lessons drawnfrom the ICDP experiences 
Lessons from 
ICDP experiences 
Description  
Adopted +ve  Positive lessons that the REDD+ project has taken 
up 
Potential +ve  Positive lessons that the project has not taken up yet 
are useful in the context of REDD+ design and 
community expectations 
Corrected –ve  Negative lessons the project has taken up and 
corrected 
Uncorrected –ve  Negative lessons adopted without efforts to reverse. 
 
The FGDs also examined the process by which the REDD+ project adopted lessons 
from ICDP experiences. This involved discussing and grouping key interventions 
(approaches) initiated and the actors/stakeholders involved in executing those 
interventions. The process used by the REDD+ project to correct negative ICDP 
experiences was crucial for this study because such processes show how REDD+ 
can streamline forest governance and help mitigate the mistakes of ICDPs to 
achieve sustainable development (Minang &van Noordwijk, 2013).  
The process of adopting lessons was further verified through in-depth interviews 
with 25 stakeholders linked to the global, national and local REDD+ processes. 
Initial stakeholders were identified through purposive sampling involving 
document reviews and consultations undertaken as part of a stakeholder analysis 
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(Reed et al., 2009). Initial interviews then enabled the identification of additional 
stakeholders through snowball sampling (Reed et al., 2009). Global level 
stakeholders included seven UNFCCC staff who usefully highlighted the new 
approaches REDD+ could bring to forest governance. Three national REDD+ staff 
members and eight staff members of the REDD+ project provided insights about 
the role of national institutions in the lesson learning process. These staff members 
further discussed community expectations for participation in relation to UNFCCC 
safeguard requirements. Local stakeholders, including two ICDP project staff and 
four local level informants (Chiefs, leaders of Community Based Organisations 
(CBO) leaders and community resource persons), provided insights into 
community experiences with ICDPs and the particular strategies the REDD+ 
project is using to build on these experiences. 
8.3.3    Data analysis and biases  
Household data were analysed using descriptive statistics and Chi-squared test for 
significant differences in respondents’ perceptions(Green and Salkind, 2010). 
Qualitative data drawn from FGDs and in-depth interviews were coded using table 
matrices to draw out themes and illustrative quotes (Hopkins, 2007).  Through table 
matrices (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2009), lessons from ICDP experiences were 
linked to the expected REDD+ implementation outcomes: emission reductions and 
community participation.  
 
A key source of bias in the study design and data collection is the reliance on 
individual households as a source of experiences and lessons. The low 
understanding of carbon issues among individual households may compromise 
their ability to objectively reveal relevant experiences for REDD+. Additionally, 
experiences based on household responses could be biased towards certain interests 
e.g. livelihoods or local political affiliations. Nonetheless, I such biases were 
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minimised  by triangulating household information with community level 
discussions and numerous in-depth interviews with actors whose views are 
relatively independent of local interests.  
8.4.   Results 
8.4.1    Perceived differences between REDD+ and ICDPs 
In terms of design-engagement, a majority (51%) perceived no difference between 
the REDD+ project and the national park. Thirty eight percent also perceived no 
difference between REDD+ and the World Vision project in design-engagement. 
However, some respondents (26%) felt that World Vision was more consultative in 
design-engagement because it reportedly undertook a feasibility study to identify 
project beneficiaries (Figure 8.2). 
 
Figure 8.2: Perceived differences in design-engagement between ICDPs and 
REDD+.  
In terms of activity-engagement, the majority (52%), most of whom belonged to 
low and middle-wealth categories, felt that the REDD+ project consulted more 
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during implementation than both the ICDP projects (Figure 8.3). Individual versus 
communal engagement was a key area of difference. The REDD+ project was 
associated with a more communal approach to its activities compared to the ICDPs. 
The national park was perceived to be exclusive by the majority of all households 
(low-wealth (65%), middle-wealth (52%) and high wealth (31%)).  
 
Figure 8.3: Perceived differences in activity-engagement between ICDPs and 
REDD+.  
In terms of benefit-engagement (Figure 8.4), the national park was associated with 
no benefits compared to the REDD+ project. The World Vision project was 
perceived to have a shorter benefit waiting period compared to the REDD+ project 
(24%).  
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Figure 8.4: Perceived differences in benefit-engagement between the REDD+ 
project and ICDPs  
 
8.4.2    Lessons from ICDP experiences 
Twenty four lessons from ICDP experiences were identified (Figure 8.5). Overall, 
14 out of the 24 (58%) were lessons from negative experiences while the rest were 
from positive experiences. 
Lessons on design-engagement were all negative. Both the ICDPs were associated 
with exclusion in design-engagement and using local elites to introduce projects’ 
intentions. The REDD+ project had not corrected any of these negative lessons in 
its own engagement design (Figure 6).  
Lessons on activity-engagement were both negative and positive. Four out of the 
six (67%) positive activity-engagement lessons came from the World Vision 
project and these included using accountable and established community networks, 
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use of local labour, and flexibility in activities, amongst others. The positive lessons 
from the national park included support from the government and establishment of 
activity boundaries. Four out of the six (67%) negative activity-engagement lessons 
were linked to exclusion, mainly by the national park. Poor follow-up of activities 
and short-term unsustainable activities were the negative lessons linked to the 
World Vision project (Figure 8.5). The REDD+ project had adopted three out of 
the six positive lessons on activity-engagement and corrected four out of the five 
negative activity- engagement lessons from the ICDP projects.  
Most (60%) lessons on benefit-engagement were negative. All the positive benefit-
engagement lessons came from the World Vision project and these included a short 
benefit waiting period and pro-poor benefits aligned with household livelihood 
calendars:  
“With World Vision, we have terraces on the land and some income at the 
end of every month. The project is very helpful in needy times especially 
during drought ...Yes the projects are different because the carbon project 
does not consider helping people during hard times like World Vision. The 
carbon project is good but should consider helping people in times of 
need” [Low-wealth female respondent, Kasigau, September, 2013]   
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Figure 8.5: Key lessons from the ICDPs that households perceive the REDD+ 
adopts, avoids and reshuffles  
The national park was associated with a lack of any benefits or compensation for 
local people and so had no positive benefit-engagement lessons. Of all the lessons, 
the lack of benefits from the national park was mentioned most commonly.   
“We see so many white people pass-by on their way to see wildlife. They 
are sometimes escorted by government vehicles but we are not asked 
anything. I hear the government collects a lot of money from the white 
people who come to see wildlife. All the money is taken to Nairobi and 
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the government does not give anything to us, we hope the carbon project 
will not be the same” [Middle-wealth male respondent, Kasigau, March, 
2012] 
Short-term unsustainable livelihood activities, unfulfilled promises and 
individualised benefits were some of the negative benefit-engagement lessons 
attributed to World Vision. The REDD+ project corrected half (3 out of 6) of the 
negative benefit-engagement lessons namely: lack of livelihood benefits, 
unemployment of local people and elite-based benefit sharing (Figure 8.5). 
 
8.4.3   Process of adopting lessons: interventions and actors 
The REDD+ project both adopted positive lessons and corrected negative lessons 
from the ICDP experiences. The process of adopting positive lessons and correcting 
negative ones helps identify ways through which REDD+ can improve forest 
governance and help correct ICDP mistakes. Analysis of the REDD+ project 
implementation process revealed a number of intervening measures that could be 
used to imrove on ICDP experiences (Table 8.3).     
The project recognised and worked with multiple land tenure systems that benefit 
different social groups. Group ranches registered as private companies generate 
75% of all carbon credits. However, most shareholders to the ranching 
companies/groups reside outside the local community, with only about 5% of the 
shares held by locals. The (mostly poor) community resident in the project area had 
laid claim to communal forest, which they committed to the project. As a result 
they were entitled to all the carbon revenue resulting from this communal forest 
and additionally, benefit from one third share of carbon revenue from the ranches. 
The other two thirds are equally divided betweenranch shareholders and project 
operations. The community share of carbon revenue is invested in a host of 
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livelihood projects, e.g. communal foodprojects and educational burseries,through 
an established trust fund ‘Wildlife Works REDD+ Project Trust Fund 
(WWRPTF)’. Such a benefit sharing mechanism was perceived to be inclusive and 
contrary to the approaches applied by the ICDPs:  
 
“The REDD+ project has a greater impact than other projects because it 
serves the whole community and works in various lands” [High-wealth 
female respondent, Kasigau, August, 2013] 
 
Flexibility in local institutional choices was also observed as a means through 
which the REDD+ project improved community participation/representation in 
project activities and benefits. New locational carbon, water and bursary 
committees were elected by community members to represent them in project 
decisions. The new committees replaced certain local institutions such as State-
based locational development committees which, according to the community, 
were unaccountable and under capture by retired government employees. 
Committee membership and leadership was subject to affirmative action and 
ideally needed to include representation from youth and women. The REDD+ 
project also logistically and technically supported and worked with existing CBOs, 
such as the Marungu Hills Conservancy, that were favourably perceived by the 
community.   
 
 
 
    
 
230 
 
Table 8.3: Intervention and actors constituting the process of correcting negative 
lessons
 
Lessons from negative 
experiences  
Inteventions by the REDD+ project Actors involved in the 
interventions  
Community exclusion 
in project activities 
(activity-engagement; 
NP)  
Insitutional choices – de-recognition of 
negatively perceived local institutions and 
recognitions of positively perceived institutions 
and establishment of new ones.  
Landscape aproach to activity and benefit –
engagements.     
Project proponents 
Community members 
Lack of women 
representation in 
project decisions and 
activities (activity-
engagement; WV& 
NP) 
Gender equity in representation in activity and 
benefit-engagement committees.  
Project proponents 
Community members 
Chief 
Poor communication 
(activity-engagement ; 
WP & NP) 
Door to door campaigns, theatre on carbon 
issues 
Project proponents 
Community members 
Short term activities 
confusing the 
community (activity-
engagement; WV)  
Activity nesting and longer term project 
implementation period,  
Project proponents 
Community members 
Short notice on 
interventions (activity-
engagement; WV) 
Elected committees verify new project 
interventions  
Project proponents  
Community members 
No livelihood benefits 
(benefit-engagement 
;NP) 
Landscape approach: integrated communal and 
individual benefits. 
Pro-poor benefit sharing mechanism: a third of 
carbon revenue from ranches allocated to pro-
poor livelihood projects. 
Community members 
Project proponent  
 
No employment of 
local people (benefit-
engagement ; NP) 
Pro-poor opportunities: any unskilled labour 
must be sourced from within the local 
community. Skilled labour only sourced from 
outisde if not available within the local 
community. 
Project proponents  
Community members  
 
Elite distribution of 
resources (benefit-
engagement; WV) 
Institutional choices – de-recognition of 
negatively perceived local institutions and 
recognitions of positively perceived institutions 
and establishment of new ones.    
Project proponents 
Community members  
Chief  
Individualized benefits  
(benefit-engagement;  
WV) 
Landscape approach to activity and benefit 
engagement-recognizing diversity of land tenure 
system (communal hills, ranches, trust lands) as 
part of carbon crediting.  
Project proponents 
Community members 
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In the process of correcting and improving on ICDP experiences, little collaboration 
between the REDD+ project and the ICDPs was observed. Interviews and 
discussions revealed no established mechanism or forum to bring together the 
ICDPs and the REDD+ project to share experiences. The REDD+ project learnt and 
corrected most lessons based on community views on and experiences with the 
ICDP projects.  Limitations in sharing experiences were also apparent between the 
REDD+ project and relevant State institutions. At some point, the project abolished 
direct engagement with State-based locational development committees, largely 
due to the unfavourable experiences the community had had with the national park. 
FGD participants associated the State with centralised management and capture of 
benefits from local wildlife resources. In a voting exercise, most FGD participants 
(70%) preferred REDD+ to be implemented by the private sector as opposed to the 
government. 
 
Staff of the Kenya Forest Service (KFS), however, claimed that the negative 
perception the community had developed against the State was mainly because the 
community often looked for livelihood benefits from interventions instead of 
focusing on the content and long term goals of such interventions.  A case in point 
was when community members reportedly preferred to pursue food for work from 
the World Vision project instead of participating in a tree planting field day 
organised by the KFS:  
 
“The community here are more concerned with what they get from 
projects but not what the project does. They look out for projects for their 
livelihoods and sometimes will never give attention to a conservation 
project with no immediate livelihood benefits”  [KFS Staff, Voi,  August 
2013]. 
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8.4.4.  Lessons in relation to expected REDD+ implementation outcomes 
The relevance of the lessons was then analysed in the context of expected REDD+ 
implementation outcomes: emission reductions and community participation 
(engagement and benefits). To understand the interests of local communities in 
relation to UNFCCC participation guidelines, we consulted with local communities 
to understand their specific preferences (Figure 8.6). In terms of design-
engagement, the community expected to be part of project design, feasibility studies 
and also to participate in site selection processes for REDD+. In terms of activity-
engagement, most community members felt that capacity building should start 
before the project implementation process. In terms benefit-engagement, the 
community expected shorter benefit waiting periods and seasonally oriented 
benefits.  
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Figure 8.6: Community expectations from participation and benefits. 
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Twenty two out of 24 lessons related to community participation while only 10 of 
the 24 lessons were related to emissions reductions outcomes (Table 8.4). About 12 
(50%) lessons were purely relevant to community expectations with no clear 
resonance with emissions reductions requirements. Eight lessons, including the 
need for projects to focus on conservation and development, and the avoidance of 
elite capture, related to both participation and emissions reductions.  
Table 8.4: Linking lessons from ICDP eperiences with REDD+ implemntation 
outcomes of emissions reductions and community participation; World Vision 
(WV), National parks (NP). 
 
 
    Relevance    
Lessons from ICDP experiences  Nature of lessons 
from ICDP 
experiences 
Community 
rights/interes
ts  
Emission 
reduction   
Action by the 
REDD+ 
project  
1. Exclusion in design (NP and WV)) Design_ Eng. (-) x  Uncorrected  
2. Entry through local elites  (NP and WV) Design_ Eng. (-) x  Uncorrected  
3. Coordination and support from the national 
government (NP) 
Activity_ Eng. (+)  x Adopted  
4. Protected area approach  (NP) Activity_ Eng. (+)  x Adopted  
5. Use of local labor and resources (WV) Activity_ Eng. (+)  x x Adopted  
6. Focus on both conservation and 
development (WV) 
Activity_ Eng. (+) x x Adopted  
7. Flexible choices of activities (WV) Activity_ Eng. (+) x  Not adopted  
8. Partnership with other projects (WV) Activity_ Eng. (+) x  Not adopted  
9. Exclusion in activities (NP)  Activity_ Eng. (-) x x Corrected  
10. Poor communication (NP) Activity_ Eng. (-) x  Corrected  
11. Poor women representation in activities 
(NP&WV) 
Activity_ Eng. (-) x  Corrected 
12. Short term unsustainable activities (WV)  Activity_ Eng. (-) x  Corrected  
13. Short notices at intervention (WV) Activity_ Eng. (-) x  Corrected  
14. Poor follow-up of activities (WV) Activity_ Eng. (-)  x x Uncorrected  
15. Immediate benefits (WV) Benefit_ Eng. (+) x  Not adopted 
16. Pro-poor benefits during droughts (WV) Benefit_ Eng. (+) x  Not adopted 
17. Allow firewood collection, grazing (WV) Benefit_ Eng. (+) x  Not adopted 
18. Focus on conservation and development Benefit_ Eng. (+) x x Adopted  
19. No livelihood benefits (adaptation) (NP) Benefit_ Eng. (-) x x Corrected 
20. No compensation on damages by stray 
elephants (NP) 
Benefit_ Eng. (-) x x Uncorrected  
21. No employment of local people (NP) Benefit_ Eng. (-) x  Corrected 
22. Unfulfilled promises (WV)  Benefit_ Eng. (-) x  Corrected 
23. Elite distribution of resources (WV) Benefit_ Eng. (-) x x Corrected 
24. Individualized benefits  (WV) Benefit_ Eng. (-) x   Corrected 
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In terms of design-engagement, negative lessons such as exclusion from design, 
were related to community expectations on participation. On activity-engagement, 
a key lesson linked to emissions reductions was coordination and support from 
national governments as a means of avoiding emissions leakage. However, this did 
not relate well with community expectations because of their experiences with 
centralisation regimes. Lessons on benefit-engagement, such as a shorter benefit 
waiting periods and aligning benefits to local livelihood calendars, related more to 
community participation and do not fully resonate with emission reduction 
requirements that take time to attract payments.  
8.5.   Discussion 
8.5.1    Lessons from ICDP experiences  
The overall aim of this Chapter was to identify and discuss lessons that a REDD+ 
project could adopt from ICDP experiences in order to meet its expected 
implementation outcomes. While the primary data here is contextual and largely 
reliant on community interviews, the dynamic ways through which REDD+ adopts 
lessons, the process by which these lessons align to REDD+ expected 
implementation outcomes, and the implications of such processes for the broader 
REDD+ discourse, are all relevant to REDD+ in other developing countries. From 
the outset, a number of perceived differences between REDD+ and ICDPs were 
raised by respondents. These differences mainly revolved around the level to which 
the projects consult in their design and implementation as well as modalities of 
benefit sharing. While such perceived differences could be related to households’ 
interests, they are a reflection of how the differing design and goals of REDD+ and 
ICDPs manifest at implementation. For instance, the REDD+ project was subject 
to standardised performance checks and market conditions (e.g. delivery of carbon) 
that delay payments required to serve the livelihood needs of local communities. In 
contrast, the World Vision project received upfront funds to directly support 
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livelihoods with little or no delays imposed by market conditions, thus respondents 
associated the World Vision project with shorter benefit waiting periods compared 
to REDD+. From a broader perspective, this indicates that even though REDD+ 
and ICDPs are engaging the same communities, the differences in their goals and 
institutional arrangements necessitates careful filtering of ICDP experiences to 
reveal lessons that could fit the expected implementation outcomes for REDD+ 
(Blom et al., 2010). 
 
The REDD+ project was able to draw on a variety of lessons from the ICDPs, some 
of which complemented its work while others impeded its work and/or needed to 
be corrected. In terms of design-engagement, the need to change the top-down 
design of initiatives was a key lesson emerging from the ICDP experiences. 
However, this approach was retained in the REDD+ project as the local community 
were excluded from contributing to its design.  Community members had a general 
feeling that the REDD+ project was a package dropped from “heaven”, with new 
carbon standards that did not necessarily reflect the value this community attached 
to forest resources. REDD+ design draws from international procedures and 
standards negotiated as part of the UNFCCC process where representation of local 
views has been reportedly weak (Schroeder, 2010, Cerbu et al., 2011, Minang et 
al., 2014). Studies (e.g. Barnsley, 2009, Grifﬁths, 2008) have raised concerns that 
such top-down designs are recipes for elite capture of community participation and 
benefit rights because local communities have little understanding of the project 
contents. For instance, in its bid to gain community acceptance of the externally 
designed activities the REDD+ project used community elites such as Chiefs in the 
beginning, who then became the only legitimate entry points, shaping the nature and 
contents of initiatives to the dissatisfaction of most community members.  
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Community exclusion in REDD+ design, if not corrected, could compromise 
community participation, which is one of the implementation outcomes REDD+ is 
expected to achieve (Thomson et al., 2011; Ghazoul et al, 2010; Sikor, et al., 2010). 
As such, whilst REDD+ design is largely controlled by global processes, 
community knowledge about forest areas, tree species and even hotspots of 
deforestation could usefully inform REDD+ design prior to implementation. At 
implementation (activity-engagement), community participation in activities and 
benefits are emphasised by the UNFCCC safeguards (appendix 1/COP16) and 
project standards (CCBS) as desired implementation outcomes of REDD+ 
initiatives.  These guidelines steered the REDD+ project to initiate various 
interventions to improve on particular lessons from ICDP experiences. 
 
8.5.2    Adopting lessons from ICDPs: interventions and implications 
A number of interventions shaped the implementation of the REDD+ project. These 
approaches entailed various actions and institutional choices that improved on 
ICDP experiences. A key approach was the recognition of a variety of land tenure 
arrangements that usefully brought together, under the REDD+ project, lands 
claimed and utilised by different social groups. Approaches that consider various 
tenure regimes and social interests in emissions reductions have been 
conceptualised as landscape approaches (Minang et al., 2015). Proponents of 
landscape approaches argue that they can help REDD+ attend to the interconnections 
between forests and other land uses, as well as the socioeconomic attributes 
governing these land uses (Minang et al 2015; Freeman et al., 2015). In this study, 
this landscape approach improved on ICDP experiences where focus had been 
directed towards isolated land uses, e.g. wildlife areas (national park) or integrated 
programme areas (World Vision). Consolidating the various land uses e.g. wildlife 
corridors, group ranches, communal lands and even private lands, and social claims 
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associated with these lands into an emission reduction scheme, improved community 
participation in project activities.  In contrast to the ICDPs, this landscape approach 
also contributed towards addressing the landscape wide drivers of deforestation.   
In efforts to realize the landscape approach in practice, reshuffling of various local 
institutions was observed. A key observation was the reallocation of decision 
making power and resources to the newly formed Locational Carbon Committee 
instead of the negatively perceived State based Locational Development 
Committee. This resulted in a general perception that the REDD+ project was more 
consultative at implementation than both the ICDPs. Engaging with local 
institutions that the local community think are fair to them improved on positive 
experiences from the World Vision project and corrected the exclusion of local 
communities from decisions and benefits experienced with the national park. Ribot 
(2011) has conceptualised such institutional choices as institutional recognition or 
de-recognition where power and resources are transferred from one authority (de-
recognition) to another authority (recognition). Studies view such institutional 
choices as crucial in allowing projects to work with democratic institutions (Ribot, 
2011, Maraseni et al., 2014, Corbera et al., 2009).  
The landscape approach and institutional (de)recognition in activity-engagement 
build into benefit-engagement. Bringing together various lands under the REDD+ 
project meant that all social groups claiming these lands were entitled to benefits. 
Specifically, the benefit sharing mechanism targeted mainly the poor who pose the 
greatest threat to the forest. These poor peasants mainly laid claim to communal 
forests. Through the REDD+ project they were entitled to all the carbon revenue 
generated from these communal forests, which helped to dissuade them from 
encroaching protected forest for charcoal burning.  Additionally, while most carbon 
is generated from ranches owned by a relatively small number of richer land 
owners, redistribution of carbon revenue to the poor was a crucial indication of pro-
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poor benefit sharing mechanisms. Benefit redistribution in favour of the poor has 
been supported as a pro-poor strategy that could enhance equity and social justice 
in light of monopoly of forests by the State and other private groups (Atela et al., 
2015). In this case, pro-poor approaches usefully corrected the no-benefit (negative 
experiences) associated with the governmental national park and improved on the 
relatively positive benefit-engagement experiences associated with the 
nongovernmental World Vision project.  
 
Overall, the intervention approaches (landscape approach, institutional choices and 
pro-poor approach) through which the REDD+ project improved upon ICDP 
experiences contributed to the project’s efforts to achieve implementation 
outcomes in the context of sustainable development.  
 
8.5.3. Lessons in the context of expected REDD+ implementation 
outcomes 
Findings show that most lessons from ICDP experiences relate to community 
participation while a few could be clearly linked to emissions reductions outcomes. 
This can be linked to a poor understanding of emissions reductions goals and carbon 
commoditization under REDD+ at the local level. The emissions reductions 
outcome was designed via a top-down approach that has left little room for local 
understanding of interventions and transparency measures associated with carbon 
(Leach and Scoones, 2013). The bias of lessons identified in this study towards 
community interests can further be explained by the fact that the REDD+ project 
mainly utilised the local community as a conduit for drawing lessons from the 
ICDPs. Analysis of actors/stakeholders involved in the lesson adoption process 
could not identify a direct platform for sharing lessons between ICDPs and the 
REDD+ project.  
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The use of local communities as a lesson learning conduit appears to be cost-
effective because it additionally helps the project to adhere to the UNFCCC 
safeguards requirements on community participation in REDD+ projects. However, 
purely drawing lessons from community experiences is a source implementation 
deficit. Community members may align experiences more with their livelihood 
expectations and interests, which they understand better than global emissions 
reductions. Consequently, the project finds itself pulled between two forces; 
‘community expectations’ and ‘emissions reductions expectations’ both with equal 
significance to its activities and success.  For instance, while achieving emissions 
reductions standards such as leakage avoidance (Wunder, 2008) require that 
REDD+ be coordinated by national institutions, these State institutions are 
perceived negatively by local communities due to past experiences.  
The State is the legitimate country representative in REDD+ policy negotiations 
and is expected to be the technical and financial link between countries and 
international REDD+ processes. However, the negative perception that the Kasigau 
people had raises questions as to whether the State can ably oversee a successful 
REDD+ process. Should the Kasigau REDD+ project (and other sub-national 
projects elsewhere) limit their engagement with State institutions in line with 
community expectations? Such conflicting interests may complicate institutional 
connectedness between sub-national REDD+ projects like Kasigau and relevant 
national institutions, thereby creating implementation deficits. As such, there is a 
need for ways to ensure adequate community participation without compromising 
emission reduction goals. A starting point would be to address community 
participation and emissions reductions as trade-offs. Addressing such trade-offs 
could build on lessons that resonate with both community participation and 
emission reductions.  
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Additionally, for lessons from ICDP experiences to be informative for REDD+ 
implementation outcomes, there is a need fora lesson learning platform that goes 
beyond just community consultation. Such a platform is needed because certain 
actors, e.g. the State, that have been implementing ICDPs still control assets and 
institutions upon which REDD+ depends (Angelsen et al., 2008). If the State is not 
consulted and integrated into the lesson learning process, they may retain their 
ICDP approaches and draw REDD+ into failures associated with these approaches.  
8.6   Conclusion 
This study has examined implementation lessons that REDD+ can draw from 
ICDPs in order to adapt its global designs to the local setting. The study shows that 
ICDPs provide diverse lessons, both negative and positive for REDD+. The 
REDD+ project has usefully improved community participation in implementing 
activities but has no community input in its globally linked design and thus appears 
to be retaining the widely critiqued top-down approach used by the ICDPs.  The 
study has also shown that community consultation provides a good conduit through 
which REDD+ can learn lessons, but if utilised in isolation this could result in 
institutional disconnectedness, especially between sub-national projects and 
national institutions. Lessons from ICDP experiences are necessary for effective 
REDD+ implementation but can only be useful if the process of adopting them is 
clear and cognisant of relevant stakeholders. This is vital if subnational REDD+ 
projects are to be sustainable and informative fornational and global policies.     
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Chapter 9  
Synthesis: sources of institutional conflicts 
in REDD+ design and implementation in the 
context of sustainable development26 
 
9.1.   Introduction 
This thesis aimed to identify and discuss sources of institutional conflicts in 
designing and implementing REDD+ in the context of sustainable development.  It 
does so by examining the process of designing REDD+ rules at the global level and 
the implementation of these rules at the national and local levels drawing on 
evidence from Kenya. The previous empirical Chapters (Chapter 5-8) have pursued 
a multilevel analysis addressing specific objectives. The Chapters have shown that 
designing and implementing REDD+ in the context of sustainable development is 
determined by mutually interlinked actors, policies and socioeconomic factors 
across global, national and local levels.  Studies recommend that such multilevel 
analysis provide scientific insights and informative lessons needed for REDD+ 
effective design and implementation (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012, Corbera, 
2012, Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2013).  
This Chapter synthesises findings from the empirical Chapters. It links the key 
findings to the overall thesis aim and analytical framework ‘the Integrated 
Institutions and Development Analytical Framework’.  
 
                                                          
26 Atela JO., Minang PA. Quinn CH. and Duguma LA. (In preparation). Designing and 
implementing REDD+ in the context of sustainable development: a multilevel analysis of sources 
of institutional conflicts. In preparation for  Environmental Science and Policy. 
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9.2.   Revisiting key findings in the context of IDAF 
This section revisits the key findings in each of the four empirical Chapters 
representing objective 1-5. 
 
9.2.1. Objective 1: To explore the process of designing REDD+ at 
theglobal level with specific focus on the agency of African States inthe 
process 
This objective is addressed in Chapter 5 and constitutes the existing policy 
environment and the action arena of the IDAF. Subsection 5.3.1 shows that the 
process of designing REDD+ at the global level involves multiple actors. These 
actors apply their expertise and mode of governance to execute various roles in 
designing methodology, financial and safeguard components of REDD+. The 
global process formally recognises States as the most legitimate mode of 
governance to design and enforce REDD+ rules (subsection 5.3.2). However, the 
agency of African States targeted for REDD+ is weak partly due to economic 
limitation which impedes the continent’s institutional and technical representation 
in the global process. Even though economic constraints are commonly blamed as 
impediments to Africa’s agency in international climate regimes (Najam et al., 
2003, Nhamo, 2011, Makina, 2013), findings point to the possibility that efforts to 
secure REDD+ funds also contribute to the weak agency. In this, countries focus 
more on securing funds rather than proposing technical solutions (subsection 5.3.3). 
The findings about Africa’s weak agency in climate regimes may not be new but 
because REDD+ is spatially and institutionally targeted at Africa, this weak agency 
is a recipe for implementation deficits at the national level.  
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9.2.2. Objective 2: To analyse how global REDD+ rules are implemented 
at the  national level 
This objective is addressed in Chapter 5 and is an intercept between existing 
policies and the action arena of the IDAF. The weak agency of Africa coupled with 
interest in REDD+ funds create gaps in technical capacity and funding required for 
implementing the global rules at the national level. In Kenya, REDD+ 
implementation relies on technical solutions and funds from resource endowed 
multilateral intermediaries. However, the bid to secure the funds reinforces existing 
path dependency in national institutions. The forestry sector monopolises and 
controls REDD+ activities to the exclusion of key sectors e.g. lands and agriculture 
that are linked to deforestation (subsection 5.3.3, 5.3.4). Such sectoral exclusion is 
reportedly an impediment to institutional reforms needed to address underlying 
drivers of deforestation in many developing countries (Minang et al., 2014b). This 
Chapter further reveals that sectoral exclusion overshadows relevant cross-sectoral 
expertise required for REDD+ (subsections 5.3.3 and 5.4.2).  
The Chapter also shows poor participation of local communities in the national 
process. Studies have attributed exclusion of communities in national REDD+ 
implementation to lack of decentralisation of forest management and continued 
monopoly of forests by the State (Brown et al., 2011, Chhatre et al., 2012, Minang 
et al., 2014, Cerbu et al., 2011). On the contrary, the Kenyan case reveals that 
despite legally decentralising forest management to CFAs, local communities are 
still not involved apparently because they lack skills needed for the formulation of 
carbon requirements (subsection 5.3.3, 5.3.4). Overall, the Chapter demonstrates 
evidence on ways in which weak agency of Africa in international climate 
negotiations play into existing institutional gaps at the national level to impede 
effective implementation of REDD+. Such institutional gaps could also create 
conflicts between global REDD+ rules and existing socioeconomic circumstances.  
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9.2.3. Objective 3: To analyse the interactions between globally 
linkedREDD+ projects with sub-national socioeconomic factors 
This objective is addressed in Chapter 6 and is part of the action arena of the IDAF. 
The Chapter shows that REDD+ projects in Kenya avoid implementation within 
poor communities whose socioeconomic circumstances could impede delivery of 
carbon funds. Subsections 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 show that 13 (87.6%) of the 15 
REDD+ projects in Kenya are hosted in low-vulnerability areas while relatively 
poor areas, host only two of the projects. This finding challenges the generic notion 
that REDD+ is pro-poor simply because it targets developing countries (Angelsen 
et al., 2008c, Stern, 2006). Evolving REDD+ design rules  that focus more on 
carbon based funding appear to be mainly feasible within richer communities of 
developing countries (Brown et al., 2011). This in effect limits participation of poor 
communities in REDD+ implementation and negates poverty alleviation outcomes 
expected from implementing REDD+ (Thompson et al., 2011, Vatn and Vedeld, 
2013).  
The Chapter also shows poor involvement of the national government in the 
demonstration projects due to lack of capacity within government departments to 
design and assess the global standards to which the projects are designed (section 
6.3.4 and 6.3.5). The Chapter argues that while the private sector and consultants 
dominate the REDD+ design process and on-ground demonstrations, it is the State 
which is expected to enforce the REDD+ rules within a developing country like 
Kenya (Chhatre et al., 2012). This could result in institutional conflicts between the 
State and the private sector especially given that States expect to control REDD+ 
activities and funds (Brown et al., 20111). As revealed in the next objective, such 
conflicting interests impede State’s commitment to support enabling conditions for 
local level implementation of private REDD+ projects. 
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9.2.4.   Objective 4: To analyse the interaction between a globally linked
         REDD+project with local livelihood assets 
This objective is addressed in Chapter 7 and constitutes the action arena and the 
outcome parts of the IDAF. The Chapter builds on Chapter 6 which investigated 
the interaction of projects with sub-national socioeconomic settings.  The Chapter 
draws evidence from an ongoing REDD+ project ‘the Kasigau Corridor project’. 
Subsections 7.3.3, 7.3.4, 7.3.5 reveal that while global REDD+ rules emphasise 
carbon as a funding condition,on-ground implementation requires projects to 
support pro-poor livelihoods in order to achieve carbon and associated funds. The 
need for REDD+ to be pro-poor at implementation has been recommended in other 
studies (Boyd 2007; Smith and Scherr 2003) but this Chapter reveals specific pro-
poor strategies that projects could adopt. Such strategies include redistribution of 
carbon revenues between project proponents/rich land owners and the poor and 
investing in pro-poor assets such as water projects, education and microeconomic 
enterprises. Benefit redistribution beyond property rights is crucial considering that 
the State and other private groups control most tropical forests. Payments based on 
property rights as required by the global standards could generate relatively low 
benefits to the poor in light of the burden they bear from climate change (Lyster, 
2011).  As such, benefit sharing remains a key source of institutional interplay 
between REDD+ design and the local setting. Findings further reveal that this 
interplay is constrained by the tension between strict carbon requirements that limit 
trade-offs between forest protection and livelihoods, fluctuating carbon prices that 
create uncertainty in funds needed for project’s operations and livelihoods and most 
critically, national institutional gaps that do not support enabling conditions for 
positive interplay.  
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9.2.5.  Objective 5: To identify and analyse lessons that a globally linked
         REDD+project can draw from pre-REDD integrated conservation
         and development projects (ICDPs) 
This objective is addressed in Chapter 8 and is part of the action arena and the 
outcome part of the IDAF. The Chapter investigates how the Kasigau project 
interacts and draws lessons from ICDPs (a governmental national park and a non-
governmental world vision project).  The Chapter shows that despite differences in 
design procedures between the REDD+ and ICDP projects, the ICDPs offer diverse 
community engagement and benefit sharing lessons relevant for adapting the 
REDD+ project to the local context (subsection 8.5.2). The REDD+ project 
improved on some positive lessons such as community networking and local 
institutional choices to enhance community representation in implementing 
activities. These intervening approaches indicate the potential for REDD+ to create 
a shift in local resource governance and correct past ICDP mistakes. This finding 
relates to literature that report that community mobilization is a key achievement 
of ICDPs that could help REDD+ adapt its global designs to local context (Minang 
et al., 2013).  
The Chapter reveals that the globally-linked project design, with little community 
input, reinforces the commonly critiqued top-down intervening approach as the 
ICDPs. There was also a lack of collaborative engagements between the REDD+ 
and ICDP projects. This positioned the local community as the main conduit 
conveying lessons between the projects. Most lessons conveyed through the local 
community are however characterised with expectations that sometimes 
overshadow REDD+ design rules and most importantly, disconnect the REDD+ 
project from State institutions. The Chapter acknowledges that State institutional 
gaps enable the REDD+ project to gain legitimacy among the local people. 
However for projects to be sustainable and informative to national and global 
policies, the State should be engaged in the lesson learning process.  
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9.3.   Institutional conflicts in REDD+ design and implementation 
This section discusses the key findings in the context of the study’s aim. The study’s 
aim was to identify sources of institutional conflicts in designing and implementing 
REDD+ in the context of sustainable development. Sustainable development 
represents the outcome part of the IDAF. The discussions here identify sources of 
institutional conflicts that cut across the empirical findings and link these to 
literature and sustainable development. The findings are discussed along three 
crosscutting themes that have emerged from the empirical Chapters (1) 
representation in REDD+ decisions (2)institutional/policy divergences in REDD+ 
(3) carbon versus livelihoods in REDD+.   
 
9.3.1.   Representation of actors in REDD+ design and implementation 
Representation of actors in various REDD+ decisions determines how much varied 
policy and socioeconomic interests are accounted for in REDD+ design and 
implementation (Ribot, 2009). This study has applied representation as an indicator 
of actor participation and their agency in designing and implementing REDD+. 
Equitable representation/participation of actors is an expected sustainable 
development outcome of REDD+. 
Findings reveal that actor representation in the global design process nests into 
national level implementation and influences on-ground REDD+ activities at the 
local level. At the global level where REDD+ is designed, Chapter 5 revealed that 
Africa is technically and institutionally underrepresented and this weakens the 
continent’s agency in the design rules.  
The causes and consequences of Africa’s underrepresentation are discussed in 
section 5.4. In the analysis, the study re-emphasises views in other studies (Makina, 
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2013, Najam et al., 2003) that economic constraints causes Africa’s 
underrepresentation in REDD+ by limiting the continent’s expertise and 
delegations to the global process. Findings additionally highlight an often 
overlooked source of this underrepresentation and this involves interest in securing 
REDD+ funds for economic development or as part of climate compensation. This 
interest makes countries overlook their technical obligations in REDD+ and other 
climate regimes. In the context of literature, underrepresentation of African States 
in REDD+ challenges the generic notion that States have the ultimate authority in 
designing REDD+ and that it is mainly the local communities who are 
underrepresented (Thompson et al., 2011). Given that States are expected to govern 
the implementation of REDD+ within their jurisdictions, there is need to reinforce 
their capacity to inform the design of REDD+ and other global environmental 
regimes. This is crucial in the context of emerging powerful non-State actors who 
may use resources to shape design rules wtiht little resonance with the 
socioeconomic and policy realities of Africa (Gupta and van der Zaag, 2009). The 
consequences of underrepresentation mainly manifest at national and local level 
implementation including poor stakeholder engagements at the national level and 
conflicting institutional legitimacy at the local level.   
The Kenyan case reveals that the underrepresentation at the global level creates 
technical and institutional capacity gaps in implementing REDD+. The national 
process in Kenya relies on financial and technical support from the FCPF and 
consultants(section 5.3.3). The external expertise and funds, if adequately 
integrated with existing institutions of acountry, could promote technology transfer 
for REDD+ as expected by the UNFCCC and Rio declaration on sustainable 
development (UN, 1992).  The Kenyan case contrasts this expectation. The FCPF 
support comes with carbon-based funding conditions that play into existing path 
dependencies in Kenya’s resource management decisions. In the bid to deliver 
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carbon funding, the forestry sector monopolises the process while key sectors, local 
communities and the private sector are underrepresented in the national process yet 
these are the main actors in Kenya’s deforestation history (Ndungu Land 
Commission, 2004). 
The implications of sectoral underrepresentation for REDD+ are discussed in 
section 5.4. The analysis shows how poor sectoral representation retain status quo 
by failing to factor in underlying drivers of deforestation in the national REDD+ 
agenda (subsection 5.4.2). Additional concern is that the poor sectoral 
representation reduces legitimacy of REDD+ across sectors and this subdues 
relevant cross-sectoral expertise required for the programme. As such, while 
literature e.g. Angelsen et al. (2012), and the UNFCCC text (decision 4/CP 15), call 
on ‘external’ actors to support REDD+ capacity in developing countries, little 
attention has been paid to existing cross-sectoral expertise that is often subdued by 
sectoral underrepresentation in the national REDD+ process. Institutional reforms 
especially sectoral integration in Kenya and other African countries could be a 
crucial first step towards leveraging inbuilt cross-sectoral expertise for REDD+. 
This could minimise dependence on external expertise from consultants and 
resource endowed actors.  
At the local level, the poor expertise at the national level limits the State’s ability 
to appraise on-ground REDD+ demonstration projects (Chapter 6 and 7). 
Additionally, decisions emanating from the excluded sectors negatively affect the 
implementation of the Kasigau project. The lands sector for instance was in the 
process of discretionarily subdividing group ranches into individualised pieces yet 
it is from these group ranches that the Kasigau project draws its apparent success 
(Chapter 7 and 8). The actions by the lands sector contrasts expectations of the 
UNFCCC that States will assess and support REDD+ implementation in the interest 
of the global mitigation and local communities (appendix 1/COP. 16). Therefore, 
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cross-sectoral approach to REDD+ is crucial if capacity for REDD+ 
implementation is to be improved, deforestation curbed, emissions reduced and 
carbon money secured. 
Other than sectors, local communities are also underrepresented in the global and 
national processes. This complicates local level implementation because these 
communities are the custodians of forests targeted for REDD+. Their 
underrepresentation is a source of REDD+ implementation deficit. At the global 
level, studies (Schroder, 2010, Ghazoul et al. 2010, Sikor et al., 2010, Thompson 
et al., 2011) attribute underrepresentation of local communities to monopoly of the 
global process by the State and powerful private sector actors. Peculiar to these 
studies is that States and local communities are addressed as separate institutions 
yet these communities are expected to be part of State’s socioeconomic and policy 
agenda in the global process. Ideally, the underrepresentation of African States as 
evidenced in this study (Chapter 5) would imply that these States are unable to 
adequately represent the interests of local communities residing within their 
jurisdictions. Even though a host of international civil society groups have emerged 
to represent local communities in the global process, safeguarding communities’ 
interests in REDD+ will mainly depend on the States. The States control legal 
institutions in developing countries where these communities live.  
Strengthening representation of States in the global process may have a knock 
effect on improved representation of local communities in the global process. This 
may however depend more on how much local communities are represented in the 
national process (Schroder, 2010). This study reveals that local communities are 
underrepresented in the national process. This is not only a concern in Kenya 
(subsection 5.3.4) but also in other African countries e.g. Cameroon, Congo (Brown 
et al., 2011) and elsewhere e.g. Vietnam, Peru (Minang et al., 2014b). A key 
argument in literature is that lack of decentralised resource management and 
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monopoly of forests by State institutions are the impediments to adequate 
community representation in national resource management decisions. The Kenyan 
case slightly contests this notion. Findings reveal that despite legally decentralised 
forests management units ‘the CFAs’, local communities are still underrepresented 
mainly because they lack the necessary technical skills to inform an efficient MVR 
system for delivering carbon funds. This casts doubts on the notion that 
decentralising natural resource management automatically translates into adequate 
community representation in decision making. The role of decentralisation in 
empowering local communities in resource management requires additional 
research attention.  As discussed in subsection 5.4.3, underrepresenting local 
communities in global and national processes compromise the participation and 
benefits rights of these communities and this contradicts the Rio declaration on 
sustainable development and REDD+ safeguards.  
Underrepresentation of local communities in the national process manifests at the 
local level where the Kaigau project is being impmented. This occurs in a amanner 
that creates institutional complexities for REDD+ (Chapter 7 and 8). The poor 
representation of local communities in State decisions whether for REDD+ or other 
ICDPs such as national parks appears to shift community allegiance from the State 
to the private sector actor  ‘thye Wildlife-Works Co Ltd’ implementing the Kasigau 
project. For engaging the community in project implementation and benefits, the 
local community favourably perceived the private investor but negatively perceived 
the State for excluding them from managing and benefiting from wildlife resources 
in the area. The positive perception of the private investor takes place despite the 
fact that the local community was not represented in the project’s design process 
(subsection 8.4.3). This scenario  corroborates with claims in literature that non-
State actors, with stronger representation/agency in global regimes, could utilise 
institutional gaps within States to gain legitimacy over States (Gupta and Lebel, 
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2010). Given that the State is expected to coordinate the implementation of 
REDD+, such shifting allegiance complicates multilevel institutional arrangement 
and political goodwill for States to do so.   
As such, how to balance the UNFCCC expectations of States and community 
negative perceptions about States in most parts of developing countries (Shackleton 
et al., 2002), is a major dilemma for REDD+. 
 
9.3.2. Institutional divergence/conflicts in REDD+ design and  
        implementation 
The previous subsection indicates that representation of various actors in the 
REDD+ design and implementation may create institutional conflicts (especially 
where certain actors are underrepresented). This study shows that multiple actors 
including States and non-State actors e.g. the private sector, scientific bodies, civil 
society organisations complementarily contribute expertise, resources and 
enforcement mechanism to design REDD+ (Chapter 5). However, within the 
complementing actor roles, lie interests that create conflicts especially in the 
context of varied capabilities of actors.  
In the global design process, a key conflict is observed in the interests of African 
States to secure REDD+/climate funds at the expense of contributing 
technoclogical solutions. While Africa’s economic constraints and climate 
vulnerability necessitates support from developed countries and private sector 
actors responsible for climate change, focus on securing REDD+ finances 
overshadows Africa’s technical obligations. In this, key conflicts arise where the 
technical procedures e.g. strict carbon regulations upon which funding is based 
result in conflicting institutional processes at the national and local levels.   
At the national level, the poor representation of key sectors in the bid to deliver 
carbon funding to the forestry sector creates negative interplay between REDD+ 
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technical requirements and certain policies of the underrepresented sectors 
(subsection 5.3.5). Policies such as resettlement in the lands sector and agricultural 
mechanisation in the agriculture sector negatively interplay carbon requirements 
such as emission permanence, leakage control and additionality. Both resettlement 
and agricultural commercialisation policies are historical drivers of deforestation in 
Kenya (Ndungu Land Commission, 2004) and other African countries (Lawson, 
2014, Lovell and Moriarty, 2003). Studies have identified such conflicting sectoral 
policies as impediments to institutional transformation needed for REDD+ to work 
effectively (Alemagi et al., 2014, Brockhaus et al., 2014).  This study further 
demonstrates how and where such conflicts actually occur. 
In the context of literature, evidence on conflicting REDD+ rules with national 
sectoral policies brings a new insight into the theory of institutional interplay. The 
theory indicates that if interacting instituions/rules have similar objectives, then the 
outcome of the interactions would be positive (Young, 2002). However, this study 
demonstrates that even though interacting institutions could have similar 
objectives, a negative interplay may result from the process of designing these 
institutions. Therefore, institutional analysis in REDD+ and other regimes should 
pay attention to the process of designing rules as a source of negative interplay in 
multilevel institutional interactions.  
Another source of institutional conflict arises from competing roles between the 
State and the private sector and particularly over the control of REDD+ funds.  
While the State through the forestry sector dominates the national level REDD+ 
implementation in Kenya and other developing countries (Minang et al., 2014) and 
expects to benefit from REDD+ funds, the ongoing REDD+ demonstrations 
contrast this expectation. Most sub-national demonstration projects in Kenya are 
managed by international private and consulting companies that are able to mobilise 
resources, design and implement these projects. The State on the other hand 
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manages less than 5% of the Kenyan projects (subsection 6.3.3).  Even at the global 
level, the private sector actors dominate over 80% of forestry credits (including 
those of REDD+) and this trend is projected to persist into the future (Peters-Stanley 
and Gonzalez, 2014). 
On one hand, the private sector is a key player in mobilising the much needed funds 
for REDD+. On the other hand, Kenya and other African States expect to control 
the REDD+ funds and use these to support economic development (subsection 
5.4.2). This complicates the institutional arrangments for the flow and control of 
REDD+ funds and could have implications on effective REDD+ implementation. 
States may withdraw their political goodwill for REDD+ if most funds remain 
under the custody of the private sector. Similarly, the private sector may withhold 
resources if REDD+ funds are directly under States’ control.  Even though States 
are building their hopes on the fact that the UNFCCC COP has given them the 
legitimate authority to manage REDD+ through national MVR system (decision 
2/CP 17), the dominance of the private sector in REDD+ investments may only 
leave a meagre share of REDD+ funds for the States i.e. assessment fees, licensing 
fees rather than the actual financial flows from carbon credits. The poor 
representation of the private sector in the national REDD+ process in Kenya 
(subsection 5.3.4) and elsewhere e.g. Cameroon (Alemagi et al., 2014) leaves little 
room for harmonising the competing interests. While some studies e.g. Peskett et 
al. (2011) recommend the establishment of national REDD+ fund to harmonise 
such competing interests, this is mainly feasible if there were a balance between 
public and market based funds for REDD+. However, as it stands now, 
market/private funds dominate and are likely to remain so in the future.  
The implications of the ensuing conflict between the State and the private sector 
manifest at the local level implementation of REDD+. Given that the Kasigau 
project is a private initiative, there is little involvement of the State either in 
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collaborative activities or support to enabling assets for the project’s work. Findings 
also reveal a perception among the national REDD+ stakeholders that the Kasigau 
project is a private entity operating with its own funds and the State wouldn’t want 
to interfere (Chapter 7). The dilemma here however is that the State is the 
institutional custodian of most enablers for REDD+ whether land tenure structure, 
water supply procedures or enforcement of carbon rights. As such, private projects 
may have the resources to design REDD+ and support its enablers locally but 
realising this private sector potential would depend on the political goodwill and 
support from the State. There is need to harmonise the private sector and States’ 
interests in REDD+ but this remains a wider political issue. 
Overall, the institutional conflicts arising from both within the State and between 
the State and other non-State actors especially the private sector and local 
communities are sources of REDD+ implementation deficits. These conflicts are 
impediments to collective action for sustainable development through REDD+. 
While conflict between the State and the private sector centers more on the control 
of REDD+ funds, achieving these funds are conditioned by strict carbon 
requirements that create yet another source of conflict especially with regards to 
livelihood expectations of local communities.    
 
9.3.3.   Carbon versus livelihoods in REDD+ design and implementation 
Improved livelihoods at the local level and development at the national level 
constitute the poverty alleviation actions and sustainable development outcomes 
expected from implementing REDD+ (Appendix 1/CP. 16). However, tension 
between carbon and livelihoods is an impediment to achieving these outcomes. The 
tension emanates from the global design process and builds into local level 
implementation. At the global level, negotiations have agreed on carbon based 
funding for REDD+. Livelihood outcomes are documented as part of safeguards 
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but are not part of the funding conditions (subsection 5.3.1). Carbon based funding 
is mainly attributed to the need for credible carbon credits to ensure performance 
in mitigation and to meet the requirements of international carbon markets. While 
credible mitigation is a global need, market based carbon credits are mainly steered 
by for-profit multilateral private companies and intermediaries expecting to offset 
their emissions or as part of capital investment into an expected post-Kyoto deal 
(subsection 5.3.3). Indeed these for-profit private companies have utilised their 
strong agency/representation in the global process (subsection 5.3.1)to get the 
carbon based funding condition into the global rules. However, for the local 
communities and African States, their weak agency/representation in the global 
process might have compromised their ability to push for livelihoods as part of 
funding considerations even though their submissions suggested so (see subsection 
5.3.2).  
While the global REDD+ funding rules already expect REDD+ to achieve credible 
carbon credits, national and local level expectations lie more in development and 
livelihoods. The Kenyan case reveals that the global carbon standards and funding 
conditions have been entrenched at the national level but with little or no funding 
tied to local livelihoods. The carbon funds could positively support national level 
development if transparently managed. The strict carbon requirements however 
conflict local livelihoods particularly because these livelihoods have been 
dependent on the forests that REDD+ targets to protect.  
Scholars have cautioned that a transition to a pure carbon based approach to 
REDD+ could restrict/harm forest based livelihoods (Brown et al., 2011, Pokorny 
et al., 2013). Project investors could be unwilling to incur costs of alternative 
livelihoods for local communities, they argue. Chapter 6 (section 6.3) of this study 
shows that indeed strict carbon standards push REDD+ investments away from 
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poor communities especially those inhabiting dryland areas dominating most parts 
of Kenya. Most private REDD+ projects avoid poor communities because the 
socioeconomic circumstances of these communities’ could impede delivery of 
carbon funding and threaten their investments (subsection 6.3.3). This finding 
challenges claims in some studies that simplified standards and diversified funds 
enable REDD+ to be pro-poor compared to the CDM (Bond et al., 2009, Diaz et 
al., 2011). As such, evolving REDD+ design aimed at securing carbon funds 
appears to favour livelihood opportunities for relatively richer segment of a 
developing country but constrains livelihood opportunities REDD+ could offer to 
the poor. 
Strict carbon rules that are not feasible with the circumstances of poor communities 
could also compromise the overall forest protection and emissions reduction 
objective under REDD+. This could take place in situations where forest resources 
in poor areas are left out of REDD+ scheme thus become subjected to 
overexploitation while those in relatively richer areas are protected. Such 
inequalities constrain achievement of environmental sustainability as frontiers of 
deforestation such as charcoal production could shift from restricted forests in 
richer areas to poor neglected areas.  
Inequalities in carbon investments exacerbate social and environmental 
inequalities. This contravenes sustainable development which aims to spatially and 
temporally harmonise resource conservation with development (UNCED, 1992, 
Matthews, 2004) (subsection 3.5.5). Therefore, in preparing national climate smart 
development plans and REDD+ strategies, countries should legislate affirmative 
action on equitable distribution of REDD+ investments. Such plans should be 
informed by additional investigations into the potential opportunities and incentives 
required to support REDD+ implementation in poor areas especially those 
occurring in dryland ecosystems.  
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The tension between carbon requirements and livelihoods manifests at the local 
level. Subsections 7.3.5, 7.3.6 and 7.3.7 specifically show that while global REDD+ 
design rules and the project’s verification standard (VCS) are mainly focused on 
carbon, delivering this carbon depends more on the livelihood needs of the local 
people especially alternatives that keep them away from forests than the forest 
protection strategies themselves.  The need for REDD+ to adopt pro-poor approach 
as part of enabling condition for successful implementation at the local level has 
been emphasised in literature (Boyd 2007, Thompson et al., 2011, Vatn and Vedeld, 
2013, Pokorny et al., 2013) (see discussions in section 7.4). However, Chapter 7 
concerns that the Kasigau project’s effort to support pro-poor livelihoods is 
constrained by strict carbon requirements that limit trade-offs between forest 
livelihoods and forest protection. This tension between carbon and livelihoods is 
the key source of certain negative impacts the community associates the project 
with. Even though an equitable share of carbon revenue was channelled to local 
livelihood initiatives, this equitable share did not adequately cover for community 
expectations and opportunity costs most community members forego for not 
drawing livelihoods from the forest.  This is mainly because carbon-linked 
conditions such as fluctuating carbon prices and sometimes diminishing carbon 
buyers in the global carbon market,constrain the available funds needed for project 
transaction costs and local livelihood expectations.   
A plethora of studies (Pokorny et al., 2013,  Vatn and Vedeld, 2013, Thomson et 
al., 2011, Lederer, 2012, Luttrell et al., 2012, Schroder, 2010) have emphasised 
equity and rights as prerequisites for effective REDD+ implementation. From these 
findings however, evolving debates on equity and rights in REDD+ implementation 
should consider carbon prices and global buyer constellations as factors that 
exacerbate carbon-livelihood tension and make even pro-poor and equitable benefit 
distribution insufficient for effective implementation. 
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9.4.  Policy implications and recommndations to achieving sustainable 
    development inREDD+design and implementation 
This section provides recommendations for ways in which REDD+ design and 
implementation can move towards achieving sustainable development. The 
recommendations are mainly institutional and are focused on addressing the 
institutional conflicts that have been highlighted in the foregoing synthesis (section 
9.3). 
Representation of various actors in the design and implementation of REDD+ is 
crucial for the programme’s implementation in the context of sustainable 
development. However, evidence shows that African States and local communities 
are underrepresented in REDD+ design decisions and this creates implementation 
deficits. At the global level, reinforcing representation of African States to inform 
the design of REDD+ could improve the States’ capacity to govern the 
programme’s implementation within their jurisdiction and enhance the integration 
of local communities’ knowledge and livelihood interest in the design process. One 
way of improving Africa’s representation is by supporting additional African 
delegations to the SBSTA and COP talks. This could mean seeking financial 
support from financially endowed actors even though conditions associated with 
such financial support could further compromise the positions of the sponsored 
delegations. As such, reinforcing the role of smaller expert sessions informing 
REDD+ design with equal regional representation in would be ideal to ensure that 
COP decisions are balanced across regional, technical and socioeconomic interests. 
Otherwise decisions based on overall political bargaining at the COP will remain 
skewed in favour of resource endowed actors able to lobby and use resources to 
push for their interests among poor countries.  
If representation of States is improved, representation of local communities in the 
design process could improve as well. This would require upscaling the 
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representation of these communities in national processes so that their interests are 
embedded in national positions carried to the global process. Community 
representation in the national process could be impeded by existing path 
dependency in national decisions thus there would be need for national institutional 
reforms. 
National institutional reforms especially sectoral integration and decentralising 
forests management are crucial for effective REDD+ implementation. Sectoral 
integration in the national REDD+ process is crucial given the evidence that poor 
integration of key sectors, especially those linked to deforestation, impedes the 
ability of REDD+ to address underlying drivers of deforestation and subdues cross-
sectoral expertise required for REDD+. As such, integrating key sectors in national 
REDD+ decisions should be a key criteria in evaluating country readiness process 
under the FCPF process. Even though assessing stakeholder engagement is a 
criterion in the FCPF process, the criterion is not explicit anddoes not assess 
sectoral integration in a detailed manner. Such sectoral integration would ideally 
leverage cross-sectoral expertise and enhance inbuilt national capacity for REDD+ 
implementation. A key impediment to sectoral integration however remains in the 
competition for REDD+/climate funds. In this, REDD+ decisions, legislations and 
funds are confined within the forestry sector in Kenya and other developing 
countries. However, as the forestry sector leads the process of implementing 
REDD+, sharing REDD+ tasks and resources with other sectors linked to 
deforestation could yield positive outcomes in terms of curbing deforestation and 
generating carbon for more funds. Otherwise excluding other sectors such as 
agriculture and lands may accelerate deforestation that leads to loss of carbon funds.   
Evidence in this study reveals that forest management in Kenya has been 
decentralised to CFAs but these CFAs are not supported or engaged in exercising 
those powers in the context of REDD+. As such, decentralising forest resources 
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requires not only legislative documentation but most importantly, support for local 
communities to exercise the legislated powers. Building capacity of CFAs and 
instititonalising their participation in national REDD+ could enhance multilevel 
governance for REDD+ and promote the achievement of REDD+ safeguards. The 
support could promote linkage between national REDD+ institutions and private 
sub-national projects working with local communities through CFAs in various 
settings.  
The study has shown that alternative livelihood initiatives that keep local 
communities, especially the poor out of forests are crucial for forest protection for 
carbon. As such, emphasis on carbon as the main source of funding may not make 
REDD+ work within local communities unless part of REDD+ funding is tied to 
livelihood/development benefits. However, this study has shown that carbon funds, 
even if equally shared to support livelihoods may not cover the livelihood losses 
emanating from forest protection. This is due to fluctuating carbon prices and 
changing buyers. As such, while equitable sharing of carbon funds is necessary, 
there is need for additional upfront funding to provide livelihood safety nets 
especially in times of unstable carbon prices (also see Dougill et al., 2012).  Such 
upfront funds could be in form of grants or soft loans from the internationally 
established green climate fund. Another alternative source of upfront funds for 
livelihoods would be the UNFCCC adaptation fund that is often channelled to 
developing countries. Part of this fund could be tied to REDD+ to support and 
safeguard livelihoods strategies. National governments like Kenya also have yearly 
budgetary allocations to forest conservation. These funds could be tied to REDD+ 
activities and channelled towards supporting livelihoods. Whether sourced from the 
international community or national budgetary allocations, adaptation funds for 
REDD+ could enable synergy between mitigation and adaptation in the REDD+ 
programme. This is crucial considering that developing countries targeted for 
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REDD+ are the most vulnerable to climatic changes and need support for 
adaptation if they are to support any mitigation via REDD+. 
Evidence from this study shows that livelihood investments in REDD+ should be 
pro-poor in order to effectively safeguard forests. As such, projects should adopt 
pro-poor benefit sharing strategies that redistribute benefits in favour of the poor. 
This is because it is this poor segment of the local community that exerts the most 
pressure on forests. Evidence generated from the Kasigau project reveals that a 
communal/collective approach to sharing benefits beyond property rights is a 
crucial pro-poor strategy for REDD+.  
Another approach to pro-poor REDD+ implementation would be the landscape 
approach.  The landscape approach involves recognising the various components 
of landscapes including diverse land tenure arrangements and resource claim 
systems in REDD+. This helps in reconciling economic, social and environmental 
objectives and the interests of various land uses and social groups. Specifically, the  
landscape approach enables the recognition of the interests and entitlements of the 
poor which sometimes are excluded as ‘inferior’ or ‘traditional’ with little relevance 
to REDD+.   
Overall, the recommendations this study makes require careful and sometimes very 
hard choices to achieve. In many instances, they require new assessments and 
studies to unpack their feasibility in various contexts as well as shifts in political 
systems. Nonetheless, these choices and trade-offs reflect why REDD+ being a 
multilevel governance programme, appears to be simple as a concept but in 
practice, is complex.   
Overal, findings in this study reveal that REDD+ can change lives and livelihoods 
alongside curbing deforestation and forest degradation. REDD+ can be an 
important addition to sustainable forest management for Kenya and other 
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developing countries. Forests in Kenya make an enormous contribution to the 
country’s economy and livelihoods. They provide conducive ecosystems for the 
production of cash crops such as tea and coffee, which are the main foreign 
exchange earners for the country’s economy. Also Kenya’s industrialisation 
process is mainly driven by hydroelectric power that is generated from forested 
highlands that are popularly known as water towers. The livelihoods of more than 
70% of Kenyans living in rural areas depend of forest-driven rainfed agriculture 
and other forest products. As such, REDD+ provides an important policy 
instrument that can support Kenya’s forest protection efforts, enhance ecosystems 
services for the economy and most importantly attract foreign exchange from 
carbon credits. In this way, REDD+ can an important addition to Kenya’s and other 
developing countries’ efforts to achieve sustainable development, improve 
international relations and attend to climate change obligations under the 
UNFCCC.   
The case study of Kasigau reveals that REDD+ potential is realisable in dryland 
areas where REDD+ investments have the potential to be pro-poor. This reveals an 
important opportunity for Kenya, where 85% of land is classified as arid or semi-
arid.  Bringing these dryland areas under REDD+ could cost-effectively conserve 
dryland forests and uplift the livelihood standards of poorer people who dominate 
in these ecosystems. 
To realize the positive opportunities that REDD+ presents, a number of policy 
transformations discussed in sections 9.4 would be required. These measures are 
mainly sectoral integration, improved engagement of local communities in national 
REDD+ decisions, promoting pro-poor approaches in REDD+ strategies and 
supporting decentralised forest management systems.  These changes would not 
only support REDD+ work but also have a long lasting impact on sustainable forest 
management in Kenya.    
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9.6.   Reflections 
This study provides one of the first multilevel and interdisciplinary analyses of 
REDD+. A plethora of studies including journal articles, special issues and books 
on REDD+ exist and continue to emerge but these have focused more on specific 
REDD+ issues at particular governance levels, e.g. local implementation or 
national policies with few linkages of issues across these levels. However as 
REDD+ matures to full implementation, books (Angelsen et al., 2012, Meridian 
Institute, 2009) and journal special issues (Angelsen et al., 2012, Visseren-
Hamakers I, 2012, Corbera and Schroeder, 2011) have made a strong case for 
multilevel and interdisciplinary analysis of REDD+ such as the one presented here. 
Multilevel analysis of REDD+ is however an ambitious undertaking and requires 
bold academic commitment. A major difficulty in multilevel analysis is the fact that 
it requires time to gather information from various sources i.e. global, national, sub-
national and local levels. Additionally, it is intellectually demanding to synthesise 
and link the information collected from various levels in a coherent manner and 
generate crosscutting themes informative to science and policy. Linking issues 
across levels was complicated by the fact that the REDD+ process is still maturing 
and is characterised by a disjoint in activities linking national and local levels. For 
instance, while the State implements the global design rules at the national level, 
Kenya (and other developing countries) has not initiated local/on-the-ground State-
led interventions. Instead, most on-the-ground REDD+ activities are led by the 
private sector with little linkage to national processes.   
Despite the difficulties in pursuing multilevel analysis, the work presented here 
provides a vital starting point upon which new studies can draw concepts, research 
questions or criticisms to pursue similar multilevel analysis. Such new studies can 
utilise the integrated institutions and development analytical framework (IDAF) 
constructed and used in this study. The IDAF focuses on actor interactions in 
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making rules at the global and implementing them at the national and local levels. 
The interaction between REDD+ policy design and implementation produces 
outcomes that can be verified in the context of sustainable development. Generally, 
the IDAF can be useful in analysing global environmental regimes targeting 
national and local actions.  
The key finding from the multilevel analysis is that institutional conflicts that could 
impede REDD+ success mainly emanate from global and national level 
institutional conflicts but manifest at the local level implementation. The global and 
national processes are characterized by institutional complexities that mostly 
impede enabling conditions for implementing REDD+ locally. Globally, poor 
representation of African States impedes Kenyan government capacity to oversee 
on-the-ground REDD+ implementation, thereby compromising the necessary 
enabling institutional set up for effective implementation.  Additionally, global 
carbon conditions such as fluctuating carbon prices and buyers constrain the funds 
needed for project operations and alternative livelihood needs supportive to forest 
protection.  While local settings present diverse opportunities for REDD+ to learn, 
adapt and deliver sustainable development goals, these opportunities can only be 
realized when an enabling national institutional set up is in place and upfront 
funding provided to cushion projects and local communities from fluctuating global 
prices and buyers.  
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Chapter 10  
Conclusion and future research 
 
This chapter draws on the synthesis presented in previous chapter to make overall 
conclusions and point to future research needs.  
10.1.   General Conclusion  
This study aimed to analyse REDD+ institutional design at the global level and 
implementation at the national and local levels in the context of sustainable 
development. The study focused on Kenya as a case country to draw evidence on 
how global REDD+ policies build into national and local settings. The study is 
executed through an integrated framework ‘the integrated institutions and 
development framework (IDAF)’ within which institutional and socioeconomic 
data were gathered in the context of sustainable development. IDAF provides a new 
analytical approach for analysing global environmental regimes targeting to 
achieve sustainable development through national and local level actions. In 
applying the IDAF, this study provides one of the first multilevel analyses of 
REDD+ institutional design and implementation. The evidence generated from the 
analysis is an important contribution to literature on REDD+ governance. 
Specifically, the evidence reveals sources of institutional synergies and conflicts in 
designing and implementing REDD+ in the context of sustainable development.   
These include actor representation in REDD+, institutional coherences and tension 
between carbon and livelihoods.    
Representation of actors determines equity in influencing decisions, harmony in 
actor interests and legitimacy of REDD+ decisions among various actors. This 
study reveals how underrepresentation of actors in global REDD+ decisions nests 
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into national and local levels to create multiple implementation deficits. The case 
of Kenya reveals that this underrepresentation creates poor understanding of 
technical requirements for REDD+ and subsequently, technical and institutional 
capacity gaps within the State to implement REDD+ as expected by the UNFCCC. 
While such technical capacity gaps are of global origin, they are compounded by 
existing national institutional gaps including path dependency in which forestry 
decisions are monopolized by the forestry sector with little integration of key 
sectors, local communities and the private sector all of whom have crucial links to 
deforestation.  
Mainstreaming REDD+ activities within the forestry sector provides the necessary 
experience for REDD+ coordination but excluding other sectors in the national 
implementation creates multiple implementation deficits that studies and the 
international community have often overlooked. Evidence reveals that such lack of 
sectoral integration subdues existing cross-sectoral expertise relevant for REDD+ 
and creates the negative interplay between REDD+ rules and policies of the 
excluded sectors thereby compromising the State’s capacity to coordinate and 
support effective implementation of sub-national projects such as the Kasigau. 
Most importantly, underrepresentation of local communities in the national 
REDD+ process compromises the REDD+ safeguard requirements but also 
complicate systematic multilevel institutional arrangements for REDD+ as the 
community develops favourable attitude towards non-State actors e.g. private 
sector engaging them in on-ground demonstrations but have negative attitude 
towards the State-based centralisation regimes contrary to the UNFCCC 
expectations. The complexity in achieving systematic multilevel design and 
implementation of REDD+ is further complicated by the poor linkage between the 
State and the private sector, both in national REDD+ policy and local project 
implementation.  
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While the global and national processes are characterised by institutional gaps of 
underrepresentation and poor sectoral integration, the local settings present diverse 
lessons and opportunities including ICDP experiences, community experiences and 
diverse livelihood assets, all of which reshuffle global REDD+ design to improve 
its adaptiveness to this local context. While REDD+ projects are mainly designed 
and funded based on ability to deliver carbon, the local setting requires projects to 
support pro-poor livelihoods as a pre-condition for delivering carbon funding.  This 
makes benefit sharing geared towards livelihoods a key area of interplay between 
REDD+ design and implementation. However, the intersect between enabling 
benefit sharing strategies and the global and national policy gaps remain complex 
in light of national sectoral policies such as land allocation decisions that interfere 
with collective/communal approach to forest conservation, strict global carbon 
standards that limit trade-offs between livelihoods and forest protection and 
fluctuating carbon prices and buyers that constrain funds needed for project’s 
operations and local livelihood expectations. Therefore, national level institutional 
reforms and upfront funding for REDD+ are crucial for unlocking the opportunities 
for effective REDD+ implementation both at the national and local levels.  Overall, 
REDD+ is a simple idea in policy but a complex one in practice. Multi-actor 
interests, varying development and conservation priorities and governance norms 
make it difficult to have coherent understanding as expected in the international 
provisions on sustainable development. 
 
Finally, while the data analysed and discussed in this Chapter may be contextual, 
the dynamic ways through which REDD+ adopts lessons, the process by which the 
project aligns these lessons to the varying UNFCCC and community expectations 
and the implications of such processes to the broader REDD discourse, are key 
areas covered in this Chapter in a manner applicable to various developing contexts. 
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10.2.   Future Research  
This study is one of the first that has attempted to link the threads of REDD+ 
institutional processes from global to local levels.  The analysis has used case study 
approach to unpack key institutional conflicts in REDD+ design and 
implementation. The case study experiences presented in the study, albeit 
contextual, is indicative of lessons that point to ways in which global and national 
process influence REDD+ in practice. The lessons are particularly relevant for 
African countries participating in the readiness process.  
In the continued call for multilevel analysis from REDD+, a key research need is 
multilevel analysis of specific REDD+ components especially safeguards. The 
study shows that social safeguards are crucial for REDD+ local legitimacy yet they 
are poorly enforced. Multilevel analysis of safeguards is necessary to inform ways 
in which various actors interpret and observe these safeguards in policy and 
practice. This could inform mechanisms for reinforcing these safeguards in 
practice. Secondly, unlocking potential leverages for sectoral integration in the 
context of forests management is crucial to inform the institutional transformation 
needed to address drivers of deforestation and make REDD+ work.  Thirdly, new 
enquires that unpack whether resource decentralisation policies could generate 
equity and participation in REDD+ is necessary. Lastly, studies on the opportunities 
for REDD+ in poor communities especially those in dryland ecosystems is needed 
especially for developing countries like Kenya that target dryland forests for 
REDD+. Such analysis may include carbon stock estimations, cost-benefit analysis 
and policy incentives. Dryland ecosystems are key frontiers of deforestation in the 
developing world yet have been neglected. They need to be protected if any 
meaningful sustainable development is to be achieved through REDD+.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1:  Sample data used in Vulnerability indexing 
County  Year  Area (ha) Prod. (tons)  
Observe
d yield 
(tons/ha
) (-)0.008x 
Constant 
=0.703 
Expected 
yield (y=-
0.008x+0.
703)  
Sensitivity index 
(Expected 
yield/Observed 
yield) 
     (-)0.056x 2.753 
y=0.056x+
2.753)    
Kiambu  1975 21884.000 43786.000 2.001 0.056 2.753 2.697 1.348 
Kiambu  1976 18626.000 58672.000 3.150 0.112 2.753 2.641 0.838 
Kiambu  1977 21472.213 51694.829 2.408 0.168 2.753 2.585 1.074 
Kiambu  1978 16896.000 30410.000 1.800 0.224 2.753 2.529 1.405 
Kiambu  1979 18700.000 40500.000 2.166 0.280 2.753 2.473 1.142 
Kiambu  1980 19000.000 63000.000 3.316 0.336 2.753 2.417 0.729 
Kiambu  1981 21000.000 58800.000 2.800 0.392 2.753 2.361 0.843 
Kiambu  1982 22923.753 76503.604 3.337 0.448 2.753 2.305 0.691 
Kiambu  1983 26257.768 67778.517 2.581 0.504 2.753 2.249 0.871 
Kiambu  1984 19813.000 45579.000 2.300 0.560 2.753 2.193 0.953 
Kiambu  1985 30584.000 76460.000 2.500 0.616 2.753 2.137 0.855 
Kiambu  1986 26457.000 66130.000 2.500 0.672 2.753 2.081 0.833 
Kiambu  1987 28880.654 79481.723 2.752 0.728 2.753 2.025 0.736 
Kiambu  1988 15709.000 26705.000 1.700 0.784 2.753 1.969 1.158 
Kiambu  1989 25702.000 29784.000 1.159 0.840 2.753 1.913 1.651 
Kiambu  1990 21997.027 26853.874 1.221 0.896 2.753 1.857 1.521 
Kiambu  1991 34869.000 41832.000 1.200 0.952 2.753 1.801 1.501 
Kiambu  1992 27005.000 76286.000 2.825 1.008 2.753 1.745 0.618 
Kiambu  1993 26270.000 18386.000 0.700 1.064 2.753 1.689 2.413 
Kiambu  1994 27404.000 49327.000 1.800 1.120 2.753 1.633 0.907 
Kiambu  1995 18800.000 25380.000 1.350 1.176 2.753 1.577 1.168 
Kiambu  1996 14764.000 20463.000 1.386 1.232 2.753 1.521 1.097 
Kiambu  1997 17213.000 26339.000 1.530 1.288 2.753 1.465 0.957 
Kiambu  1998 17706.000 12916.000 0.729 1.344 2.753 1.409 1.932 
Kiambu  1999 15360.000 11844.284 0.771 1.400 2.753 1.353 1.755 
Kiambu  2000 14740.000 11439.244 0.776 1.456 2.753 1.297 1.671 
Kiambu  2001 16500.000 12790.000 0.775 1.512 2.753 1.241 1.601 
Kiambu  2002 18750.000 25408.000 1.355 1.568 2.753 1.185 0.874 
Kiambu  2003 24706.750 28121.696 1.138 1.624 2.753 1.129 0.992 
Kiambu  2004 30663.500 30835.391 1.006 1.680 2.753 1.073 1.067 
Kiambu  2005 36620.250 33549.087 0.916 1.736 2.753 1.017 1.110 
Kiambu  2006 42577.000 36262.782 0.852 1.792 2.753 0.961 1.128 
Kiambu  2007 41237.000 49047.651 1.189 1.848 2.753 0.905 0.761 
Kiambu  2008 48232.000 27376.380 0.568 1.904 2.753 0.849 1.496 
Kiambu  2009 40835.550 37877.400 0.928 1.960 2.753 0.793 0.855 
Kiambu  2010 50025.000 55191.150 1.103 2.016 2.753 0.737 0.668 
Kiambu  2011 53832.000 65471.670 1.216 2.072 2.753 0.681 0.560 
Kiambu  2012 57639.000 75752.190 1.314 2.128 2.753 0.625 0.476 
     0.016x 
Constant 
=1.570 
(y=0.016x
+1.57)   
Taita Taveta  1975 7005.380 11341.164 1.619 0.016 1.570 1.554 0.960 
Taita Taveta 1976 16955.000 29520.409 2.940 0.032 1.570 1.538 0.523 
Taita Taveta  1977 5951.500 9579.726 2.808 0.048 1.570 1.522 0.542 
Taita Taveta  1978 4834.000 7145.430 2.677 0.064 1.570 1.506 0.563 
Taita Taveta  1979 3116.600 4522.443 2.350 0.080 1.570 1.490 0.634 
Taita Taveta  1980 4169.800 5937.811 2.023 0.096 1.570 1.474 0.728 
Taita Taveta  1981 16509.000 22614.800 1.370 0.112 1.570 1.458 1.064 
Taita Taveta  1982 8082.000 8946.000 1.107 0.128 1.570 1.442 1.303 
Taita Taveta  1983 3870.000 6966.697 1.800 0.144 1.570 1.426 0.792 
Taita Taveta  1984 3511.000 7876.598 2.243 0.160 1.570 1.410 0.629 
Taita Taveta  1985 7198.000 12956.000 1.800 0.176 1.570 1.394 0.774 
Taita Taveta  1986 7715.000 12556.000 1.627 0.192 1.570 1.378 0.847 
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Taita Taveta  1987 5187.000 7271.000 1.402 0.208 1.570 1.362 0.972 
Taita Taveta  1988 6089.000 10046.000 1.650 0.224 1.570 1.346 0.816 
Taita Taveta  1989 38400.000 58560.000 1.525 0.240 1.570 1.330 0.872 
Taita Taveta  1990 45801.000 49921.000 1.090 0.256 1.570 1.314 1.206 
Taita Taveta  1991 4007.000 8146.000 2.033 0.272 1.570 1.298 0.638 
Taita Taveta  1992 8146.000 3784.000 0.465 0.288 1.570 1.282 2.760 
Taita Taveta  1993 3920.000 5155.000 1.315 0.304 1.570 1.266 0.963 
Taita Taveta  1994 4060.000 5683.000 1.400 0.320 1.570 1.250 0.893 
Taita Taveta  1995 4235.000 11188.000 2.642 0.336 1.570 1.234 0.467 
Taita Taveta  1996 4230.000 2538.000 0.600 0.352 1.570 1.218 2.030 
Taita Taveta  1997 6488.000 7765.347 1.197 0.368 1.570 1.202 1.004 
Taita Taveta  1998 6376.600 6843.564 1.073 0.384 1.570 1.186 1.105 
Taita Taveta  1999 4320.000 6313.465 1.461 0.400 1.570 1.170 0.801 
Taita Taveta  2000 8592.000 5358.416 0.624 0.416 1.570 1.154 1.850 
Taita Taveta  2001 7635.000 7559.406 0.990 0.432 1.570 1.138 1.149 
Taita Taveta  2002 7253.000 5875.518 0.810 0.448 1.570 1.122 1.385 
Taita Taveta  2003 8718.000 3487.399 0.400 0.464 1.570 1.106 2.765 
Taita Taveta  2004 5081.500 2522.052 0.496 0.480 1.570 1.090 2.196 
Taita Taveta  2005 1445.000 1556.706 1.077 0.496 1.570 1.074 0.997 
Taita Taveta  2006 1210.500 1085.793 0.897 0.512 1.570 1.058 1.180 
Taita Taveta  2007 976.000 614.880 0.630 0.528 1.570 1.042 1.654 
Taita Taveta  2008 2503.500 2899.823 1.158 0.544 1.570 1.026 0.886 
Taita Taveta  2009 4031.000 5184.765 1.286 0.560 1.570 1.010 0.785 
Taita Taveta  2010 7086.000 9754.650 1.377 0.576 1.570 0.994 0.722 
Taita Taveta  2011 11962.000 14283.765 1.194 0.592 1.570 0.978 0.819 
Taita Taveta  2012 16838.000 18812.880 1.117 0.608 1.570 0.962 0.861 
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Sample county level monthly rainfall data   
County Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
              
Kiambu 1970 56.40 9.40 272.90 203.60 136.60 6.90 53.00 21.10 47.50 34.80 81.70 46.80 
Kiambu 1971 11.10 0.00 47.40 314.10 212.90 24.80 7.40 5.30 1.80 50.40 103.90 183.70 
Kiambu 1972 27.50 120.40 30.60 48.70 94.60 44.70 6.70 1.50 38.80 117.90 127.90 18.80 
Kiambu 1973 91.80 21.70 41.60 199.30 75.80 20.10 4.30 0.30 27.70 25.30 158.20 21.30 
Kiambu 1974 0.30 7.60 113.20 319.70 32.90 65.40 97.20 40.90 0.00 45.70 114.30 23.40 
Kiambu 1975 2.50 8.30 119.10 163.80 90.80 17.60 64.00 4.00 29.40 52.00 98.40 47.30 
Kiambu 1976 15.15 25.35 131.65 93.80 35.10 61.90 5.00 0.60 71.30 43.90 212.30 62.80 
Kiambu 1977 27.80 42.40 144.20 348.50 154.40 13.20 12.60 9.70 11.20 27.90 380.60 69.30 
Kiambu 1978 83.80 64.00 171.50 198.00 47.30 10.30 13.10 2.50 59.90 150.00 138.40 72.30 
Kiambu 1979 98.30 32.70 163.00 252.90 176.80 27.70 11.90 7.80 2.70 37.10 205.30 20.50 
Kiambu 1980 79.30 1.40 91.80 95.30 219.30 4.80 1.90 16.60 1.50 37.50 267.40 12.10 
Kiambu 1981 2.30 2.10 217.10 230.80 174.90 20.70 8.90 2.90 4.20 68.00 69.00 69.80 
Kiambu 1982 0.70 0.00 118.80 149.20 37.40 7.50 24.90 7.10 7.30 248.90 198.40 67.70 
Kiambu 1983 1.00 127.30 124.30 243.50 15.00 30.30 0.00 10.10 0.40 167.50 84.40 170.20 
Kiambu 1984 5.30 1.20 23.50 67.40 0.90 0.90 29.50 2.70 76.00 157.90 125.60 81.60 
Kiambu 1985 4.50 97.70 145.60 399.60 58.50 11.90 2.00 0.00 5.20 58.40 105.70 21.50 
Kiambu 1986 15.90 0.00 123.00 346.10 125.20 12.10 1.20 1.10 1.50 45.10 227.30 72.40 
Kiambu 1987 5.70 3.60 6.30 159.90 103.30 137.50 18.60 33.90 0.00 2.80 119.80 18.60 
Kiambu 1988 48.60 19.10 173.90 271.30 118.90 48.40 13.10 8.60 35.20 62.60 136.40 189.80 
Kiambu 1989 165.60 34.10 116.80 314.90 78.90 7.40 30.30 23.00 49.60 109.40 150.20 128.60 
Kiambu 1990 68.00 79.00 318.50 268.90 97.30 3.60 3.30 4.10 61.40  178.20 172.40 
Kiambu 1991 67.70 6.20 98.00 195.20 141.00 17.80 2.70 7.40 0.30 40.80 157.50 61.20 
Kiambu 1992 4.60 0.50 13.60 324.20 78.30 7.40 31.80 1.70 5.30 32.90 173.10 110.20 
Kiambu 1993 162.80 129.70 11.60 78.30 86.50  4.00 1.60 3.80 40.70 193.20 87.70 
Kiambu 1994 0.00 28.00 54.70 187.30 56.80 9.70 5.60 20.30 6.20 167.90 318.30 56.20 
Kiambu 1995 11.40 49.20 129.90 153.70 40.00 10.70 6.20 31.00 3.60 171.20 137.30 162.50 
Kiambu 1996 20.80 76.40 161.40 52.10 49.60 36.30 28.70 1.50 0.20 0.00 375.20 63.10 
Kiambu 1997 0.00 0.00 59.30 487.20 91.80 9.80 1.80 63.60 0.90 238.80 416.60 229.00 
Kiambu 1998 297.70 236.10 180.90 176.40 356.50 131.90 61.70 8.00 2.70 10.50 92.00 13.00 
Kiambu 1999 9.70 2.60 0.00 264.30 10.30 2.30 21.80 11.10 2.60 29.10 318.80 221.60 
Kiambu 2000 3.50 0.00 18.80 74.90 29.40 5.00 5.90 2.20 7.90 11.50 136.10 62.10 
Kiambu 2001 358.40 32.70 170.20 106.00 66.50 4.60 0.80 16.10 1.70 48.70 233.20 20.70 
Kiambu 2002 16.30 22.10 227.50 313.40 250.50 3.70 2.20 5.50 80.20 83.10 137.70 243.10 
Kiambu 2003 14.20 3.00 93.50 215.90 254.30 1.00 3.60 17.30 0.00 83.30 180.90 44.20 
Kiambu 2004 40.60 74.70 47.90 376.20 120.90 1.20 0.00 0.00 20.90 78.20 129.30 98.70 
Kiambu 2005 21.40 1.00 52.30 245.10 259.20 10.90 7.50 1.90 5.50 38.10 144.80 2.10 
Kiambu 2006 17.50 27.80 100.70 196.70 185.40 9.40  21.70 22.70 33.60 374.10 226.70 
Kiambu 2007 30.80 102.90 24.10 239.30 85.00 3.30 14.70 13.70 20.20 55.90 55.90 25.60 
Kiambu 2008 104.80 27.10 100.40 271.00 7.40 6.40 28.30 7.70 10.10 95.20 87.55 59.90 
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Kiambu 2009 49.30 19.00 51.50 173.70 91.10 10.10 1.10 1.70 0.00 134.50 119.20 94.20 
Kiambu 2010 138.30 107.00 209.50 175.90 152.40 24.90 4.80 6.30 1.30 98.50 153.50 101.60 
              
Taita Taveta  1970 116.40 0.20 200.20 23.70 16.80 0.20 3.90 1.90 6.00 3.90 51.60 117.50 
Taita Taveta  1971 2.40 0.20 11.10 114.10 12.70 6.30 4.70 0.00 2.60 4.90 60.20 61.30 
Taita Taveta  1972 46.00 103.50 60.80 90.70 159.70 0.00 5.00 1.80 36.60 9.80 214.10 114.90 
Taita Taveta  1973 27.40 36.40 70.00 60.40 30.60 0.20 0.60 1.80 5.10 14.30 203.70 18.40 
Taita Taveta  1974 12.00 0.80 13.00 200.60 6.10 2.40 11.70 6.00 0.90 16.00 68.40 46.10 
Taita Taveta  1975 6.00 4.00 26.30 41.00 25.40 0.00 1.20 0.00 22.00 10.30 102.60 94.90 
Taita Taveta  1976 19.30 2.60 19.10 59.90 41.20 0.50 0.40 4.50 57.00 1.30 143.30 33.30 
Taita Taveta  1977 30.00 27.60 29.60 92.70 5.80 9.40 0.00 2.60 19.70 47.10 156.50 207.70 
Taita Taveta  1978 106.00 35.40 216.00 100.60 14.70 0.50 1.60 0.00 0.80 15.80 334.20 115.80 
Taita Taveta  1979 144.10 26.50 67.50 165.20 56.20 10.70 5.80 0.30 3.80 23.40 79.40 220.30 
Taita Taveta  1980 50.40 15.80 54.10 49.00 4.40 0.00 1.50 32.00 8.90 2.60 97.30 96.90 
Taita Taveta  1981 1.50 0.70 248.40 84.10 22.60 0.00 3.00 2.70 13.80 35.20 62.50 259.10 
Taita Taveta  1982 4.50 0.00 68.60 82.90 25.90 5.30 10.10 12.90 60.80 106.40 254.00 64.20 
Taita Taveta  1983 2.70 55.50 89.90 3.10 36.30 2.80 5.60 0.10 4.20 0.00 81.70 43.50 
Taita Taveta  1984 0.30 0.60 24.50 60.20 1.60 10.00 4.60 0.20 4.10 72.50 120.60 229.20 
Taita Taveta  1985 37.90 52.30 10.60 69.40 14.30 0.00 6.90 2.50 5.40 18.00 93.90 143.00 
Taita Taveta  1986 7.60 0.10 24.20 30.00 97.30 0.00 0.00 8.40 0.00 20.40 148.00 218.70 
Taita Taveta  1987 22.20 2.30 8.30 160.70 44.80 1.60 11.40 17.70 0.00 6.10 53.50 18.50 
Taita Taveta  1988 110.40 3.50 95.40 65.70 4.80 6.40 0.10 9.90 29.50 27.30 63.10 193.40 
Taita Taveta  1989 32.60 0.00 8.50 120.90 9.00 0.00 0.00 6.90 2.20 68.10 114.50 123.20 
Taita Taveta  1990 11.80 53.90 204.30 209.50 1.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.80 19.40 57.00 170.70 
Taita Taveta  1991 8.60 2.70 186.70 147.60 41.50 5.10 13.90 44.80 2.60 18.40 33.00 88.50 
Taita Taveta  1992 2.00 3.30 44.80 103.00 31.00 8.90 0.00 1.90 1.20 20.60 192.80 198.20 
Taita Taveta  1993 142.20 19.40 16.90 72.50 3.50 9.90 0.80 6.60 1.00 16.90 140.90 106.80 
Taita Taveta  1994 8.10 21.50 203.00 10.90 24.80 1.20 5.70 2.30 10.60 14.00 264.10 202.10 
Taita Taveta  1995 8.20 26.80 23.60 114.50 5.40 0.00 0.40 9.60 0.00 20.90 205.50 18.60 
Taita Taveta  1996 6.20 29.30 106.30 62.30 37.80 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.40 2.00 176.00 56.00 
Taita Taveta  1997 1.90 0.00 39.30 127.20 41.60 9.20 0.00 0.00 0.60 113.50 212.00 169.50 
Taita Taveta  1998 355.80 196.80 120.20 129.30 26.00 1.20 3.80 0.00 10.20 4.20 238.40 53.90 
Taita Taveta  1999 16.30 7.00 48.00 109.40 8.60 14.30 0.50 6.70 3.90 0.40 112.80 111.90 
Taita Taveta  2000 3.00 0.00 67.90 5.70 10.90 14.10 0.20 19.00 18.50 17.30 192.00 195.10 
Taita Taveta  2001 126.40 4.10 91.30 32.30 6.80 7.90 0.00 0.50 0.00 5.70 133.10 171.40 
Taita Taveta  2002 89.60 2.10 57.00 27.20 59.90 2.90 2.70 15.00 44.30 98.60 213.70 185.50 
Taita Taveta  2003 2.30 6.00 66.90 21.70 28.70 1.40 0.00 6.30 3.20 0.00 23.80 50.10 
Taita Taveta  2004 247.70 41.60 38.70 128.60 0.00 9.20 1.20 0.00 0.00 62.60 141.40 128.90 
Taita Taveta  2005 18.20 2.00 64.80 59.30 34.60 0.00 1.10 4.90 8.20 14.70 48.80 24.60 
Taita Taveta  2006 22.40 0.00 97.40 113.60 29.70 2.00 2.80 0.80 36.10 27.40 171.50 274.30 
Taita Taveta  2007 53.60 8.60 48.10 12.70 42.70 9.70 8.20 10.40 1.50 35.00 0.00 24.60 
Taita Taveta  2008 30.50 6.50 144.70 105.10 2.30 2.30 3.50 4.70 4.70 1.70 143.30 31.70 
Taita Taveta  2009 46.20 9.20 59.70 137.00 0.00 17.30 0.60 0.60 0.00 107.80 102.20 207.20 
Taita Taveta  2010 79.10 24.90 102.30 43.80 22.90 1.20 0.00 0.70 3.90 1.40 75.40 107.40 
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Appendix 2: Household questionnaire  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household Questionnaire: Intervention Sites 
for PhD Research Project:  REDD+ design and implementation  
University of Leeds 
Introduction 
You are being invited to respond to a set of study questions. The study intends to find out how 
the carbon project (Kenya Agricultural Carbon Project) work with people living in this area.  
The study is undertaken for academic purposes and specifically for a PhD degree at the 
University of Leeds in the UK.  
You have been chosen to participate in this interview because you live in this area and the 
carbon project affects your life in one way or the other.  Your experience and knowledge of 
how the project interacts with your livelihood activities is useful for this study. An additional 99 
households within this area will also be asked similar questions. At some point, selected 
members of the community will be brought together for discuss related questions.      
It is your decision to accept to respond to the questions. In that regard, you are free to withdraw 
from answering the questions if you feel uncomfortable and we assure you that nothing will be 
held against you for doing so.   We will ask you a series of questions about your livelihood 
strategies, your involvement in the carbon project, what benefits and how it has changed your 
living conditions.  The interview will take not more than 2 hours.   
All the information collected during the interview will remain confidential and various symbols 
will be used to represents names of respondents. The results of the research will be used in 
academic publications and reports for the University of Leeds and the Partnership for Tropical 
Forest Margins.  The data may also be used in subsequent research.    
Whilst there are no immediate benefits for participating in this research, it is hoped that this 
work will contribute to better implementation of the current and future projects for the overall 
benefit of the people in this area.    
If you have any further questions or clarifications after the interview, you can contact the 
student leading the research on the contacts below:  
Mr Joanes Atela, P.O Box 30677- 00200 Nairobi Kenya 
Mobile phone + 254 721 761 869 (Kernya);  +447741 052 532 (UK) 
 
Email: joanes.atela@gmail.com or eejoa@leeds.ac.uk 
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Questionnaire Summary 
Section   Number of questions Minutes per question Total minutes 
General Introduction 1 10 10 
1 10 0.5 5 
2 1 5 5 
3 24 2 48 
4 22 2 44 
5 3 2 6 
6 1 2 2 
Total  61  120 (2 hours) 
 
 
Part 1: Demographic data (descriptive statistics) 
 
Questionnaire Number   
Respondent Code   
Location /Village  
Age  
Gender  
Household size  
Main livelihood activity   
Wealth category  High                                    
middle 
                                          
Low  
 
Project household                                                                                    Non project 
household 
 
 
 
Part 2: Oral livelihood history  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please give a brief history of how the sources and amounts of   water, land, income, and education facilities 
have changed since you moved into this area?  And what do you think caused the changes?  
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Part 3: Profiling livelihood assets  
3.1. Natural assets 
3.1.1. Who owns 
this land?  
Myself  Community   State   Other (tenant)   
3.2.2. What is 
the size of 
your land 
(acres) 
 3.1.3. Do you 
have a title 
deed for this 
land? 
No 3.1.4. If no, what proof do you have to show that you 
own this land  how is the proof reiforced within state or 
traditional laws?   
Yes 
3.1.5. How did you 
acquire your land? 
 Inheritance                                                             Purchase   Rent                                     Other    
3.1.6. How 
much land 
(acres) have 
you allocated 
to each of the 
following 
purposes?  
 
Why did you 
change the 
land 
allocations to 
various uses 
and what 
changes do 
you expect in 
future and 
why?  
20 years ago 10  years ago  Currently 
     Food crops  
     Cash crop 
     Farm forest   
     Grazing land                               
     Other 
 
               Food crops  
        Cash crop 
        Farm forest  
Grazing land  
         Other 
              Food crops  
             Cash crop 
             Farm forest  
            Grazing land  
             Other 
 
   
   
   
   
   
3.1.7. How 
many bags of 
food/cash 
crops do you 
harvest from 
your land each 
year and how 
long do you 
consume the 
food 
Food crops  (list) Cash crops (list) 
1 
2 
3 
Consumption period (months) and copping 
strategy  during the yield gap 
 
3.1.8. If farming is your 
main livelihood activity 
and income source do 
you experience crop 
failure?  Please indicate 
the causes of such 
failures and how you 
cope?  
Cause of crop failure  Seasons  Coping strategy  
   
3.1.9. Do you 
apply any 
fertilizer or 
manure on 
your farm? 
Yes/No. If yes 
Farm yard manure type and amount in 
kg/acre or use any local scales 
Artificial fertilizers type and amount 
Kg/acre or use any local scales 
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state the type 
amount and 
cropping field 
to which you 
apply the 
manure/fertili
zer 
 
3.1.10. What 
other 
forest/land 
resources exist 
in the area and 
how are they 
accessed and 
owned? 
Resource  Who owns it  Who permits the use of the 
resource? 
   
3.1.11. Where 
do you get 
water and how 
do you use the 
water?  
Source and use Access (distance in km and available 
times 
1 
2 
3 
 
3.1.12. How 
do you use 
forests in this 
area? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Product/serv
ice  
Forest type 
(state/commu
nity/onfarm 
or both) 
Season (dry, 
wet, other) 
Reason  for the season 
Timber   . 
 
 
Charcoal 
 
   
Fuel wood 
 
   
Building. 
materials 
   
Medicine 
 
   
Wild fruit 
 
   
Game meat 
 
   
Farming  
 
   
 Recreation 
 
  . 
Others 
(name) 
   
3.2. Financial assets 
 Income category Type(s) Season(dry, wet etc. ) 
and abundance  
Amount (Ksh per 
day/week/month  
3.2.1. What is your 
main source of income 
1   
3.2.2. What other 
sources of income do 
you have? (upto 3 in 
order of priority) 
1 
2 
3 
  
Remittance amount and season Amount (Ksh/week or month 
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3.2.3. Do you get 
remittances from 
relatives or friends? 
Yes/No:  if yes state 
how much and during 
what times  
  
3.2.4. Do you save any 
money?  Yes/No If yes 
state how much and 
during what times  
Amount saved and saving season  Amount (Ksh/week or month 
  
3.2.5. What other 
financial assets do you 
own? 
Livestock (type) Number  Market value (Ksh) 
1 
2  
3 
  
Fixed assets Number  Market value (Ksh) 
1 
2 
3 
  
3.2.6. How much do 
you spend on the 
following items?  
Education  (Ksh/month 
or year) 
Health 
(Ksh/mon
th or year) 
Food (Ksh/month or year) 
   
3.3.  Human assets  
3.3.1. Level 
of 
education  
Primary Secondary  College/university  
Household head (tick) 
Others (give number)   
 Household  head (tick) 
Others (give number) 
 Household head (tick) 
Others (give number) 
 
   
3.3.2. How 
easy does 
your 
household 
access the   
following  
education 
facilities? 
Schools Bursaries Books 
Easily 
Moderate 
Not easily  
 
 
  
3.4.  Social assets  
3.4.1. Are you 
a member of 
any local 
associations/g
roup? Yes/No 
If Yes: Association name/type If Yes: Main activity   If Yes: Role  
1 
2 
3 
  
3.4.2. Gender 
issues: What 
roles and 
rights do men 
and women 
have over land 
resources? 
Land resource ownership  
Wife /girls rights and roles  Husband/boys rights roles  
......................................................................
......................................................................
...................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................
....................................................................................................... 
Land resource use decision   
......................................................................
...................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................
....................................................................................................... 
3.4.3. How are 
the youth 
entitled to 
land and what 
role do they 
Land ownership  
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
.............................................. 
Conservation and farming activities 
.......................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................
................................................................................... 
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play in land 
based 
conservation 
activities?  
Land use decision  
......................................................................
......................................................................
...................................................................... 
General opinion on the youth involvement in 
resource management 
.......................................................................................................
....................................................................................................... 
3.4.4. What rules and regulations exist on the use 
and/or access of forest/land 
resources.......................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
........................................................................................................... 
Who makes the rules and what is your 
role?............................................................................................
.......................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................
....................................................................................................... 
Physical assets   
How far is your hmestead from the nearby road  
(km) 
Road type distance 
  
How far is the nearby market center (km) Market  value to the 
respondent 
Market distance (km) 
  
Part 4: Project interactions with the livelihood assets  
4.1.  Project engagement: introduction and implementation  
4.1.1. How did you know about the project? 
 
 
 
4.1.2. What does the project do/ how do you understand the project/ What problems 
does the project solve? 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3. How did you learn about the problem being solved by the project and what is 
your experience with the problem? 
 
 
 
4.1.4. How are you involved with the project? (project group member, project committee member etc.) 
 
 
 
4.1.5. What role did you play in deciding the project activities before it started and during its 
operations?  
 
 
 
4.1.6. Which problems do you experience in engaging with the project? 
 
 
 
4.2. Impacts of assets on project’s work  
4.2.1. How do your livelihood assets affect your engagement with the project? Please rank the 
livelihood assets in terms of how much they affect your engagement with the project both positively or 
negatively  
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Asset base Impact :    positive effect  (+)      negative effect (-) Important impact and 
reason 
Rank 
Land tenure 
ownership 
+ 
 
  
 
- 
Land size and 
use 
+ 
 
  
- 
Land 
productivity 
- 
 
  
+ 
 
Communal or 
on-farm forest 
cover 
+ 
 
  
- 
 
Economic 
activities 
+  
 
 
 
- 
Income level +   
- 
Level of 
education 
+   
 
Employment 
status 
+   
- 
Water access 
 
+ 
 
  
- 
 
Market access  + 
 
  
- 
 
Traditions and 
local forest and 
land use rules  
+ 
 
  
- 
Local 
associations  
+ 
 
  
- 
 
Gender land  
rights  
+ 
 
  
- 
 
    
 
306 
 
4.2.2. From the above assets, which of the three assets have the most influence on the project’s efforts 
to protect forests (rank  in order of priority) 
1 
2 
3 
  
4.3. Project impacts 
4.3.1. What 
do/did you 
expect from the 
project? 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2. How does or how do you expect the project to benefit your land, water, income, local network, 
literacy status? Please rank the livelihood assets in terms of how the project impact on them either 
positively, negatively or state if there is no effect , probe for figures where possible 
Asset base Effect :    positive effect  (+)      No effect  (0) 
negative effect (-) 
Important impact and 
reason 
Rank 
Land ownership, 
size and use  
+ 
 
  
- 
 
Land size and 
use 
+ 
 
 
- 
 
Land 
productivity 
+ 
 
- 
 
Economic 
activities  
+ 
 
  
- 
 
Income level + 
 
  
 
 
 
 
- 
Education level + 
 
  
- 
 
Employment  + 
 
  
- 
Water access 
 
+ 
 
  
- 
Market access + 
 
  
- 
+   
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Traditions- local 
forest and land 
use rules  
 
- 
 
Household 
associations  
+ 
 
  
- 
 
Gender rights  + 
 
  
- 
 
Others (name) + 
 
  
- 
 
Part 5: Households’ expectation and perceptions of the project 
5.1.  Are the 
benefits meeting 
your 
expectations 
(explain)?  
 
5.2.  Suppose 
your 
expectations are 
not met in the 
next five years, 
what will you 
do? 
 
5.3. How are the 
benefits shared 
among various 
households? 
And how was 
the sharing out 
procedures 
agreed upon?  
 
5.4. Are you 
happy with the 
benefit sharing 
procedures? 
Explain your 
answer? 
 
5.5. Does the 
project prohibit 
you from 
accessing any 
resources land, 
forests, income 
activities or 
traditional ways  
If yes, explain 
how 
 
5.6. What other 
livelihoods 
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issues affect 
your lives but 
are not 
addressed by 
the carbon 
project? 
5.7. What do 
you think 
should have 
been done 
better/consider
ed in the 
project? 
 
5.8.  What risks, 
fears or 
uncertainties do 
you have with 
the project? 
 
5.9.  How does 
the project help 
create networks 
and resolve 
conflicts within 
your group? 
 
5.10. Any other 
impacts of the 
project? 
 
5.11. How do 
you expect to 
benefit from the 
project in 
future?  
 
5.12. Suppose 
the project does 
not meet these 
future 
expectations, 
what will you 
do? 
 
5.13. Suppose 
the project does 
not benefit you 
directly, would 
you still engage 
with it ? 
 
Part 6: Project interaction with layered history of land uses and livelihood interventions/ 
governance (also addressed in FGDs and interviews with project staff) 
6.1.  Past resource management regimes  
6.1.1. Which 
government and 
nongovernment
al agencies 
managed land 
based resources 
Government (names) Non government (names) 
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around this area 
in the past? 
 
6.1.2. What 
other projects 
or programmes 
have you been 
engaged in the 
past or 
currently? 
Government: names and engagement Nongovernment: names and engagement 
  
6.2.  Fitting the carbon project into the land use and livelihood governance history  
6.2.1. How are the 
engagements of the 
carbon project 
comparable to the 
initial/other current 
ICDP 
programmes/projects? 
Similarities  Differences  
  
6.2.2. How did you 
benefit from the ICDP 
projects/programmes?  
other government 
initiatives in the area? 
 
 
6.2.3. Do you think the 
carbon project is 
different from the past 
ICDP project? If yes how?   
 
7. Overall opinion of the respondent about the project and livelihood experiences in the area.   
 
 
 
 
END:  THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 
@atela 
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Appendix 3:  Focus group guide  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guide to Focused Group Discussion 
Background  
The main purpose of the FGDs is to triangulate household data with communal perspectives. 
One FGD will be held with each of the following groups (FGD groups) within each of the case 
project area.  
FGD participants  
1. Representatives of community groups working with particular project and 
extension staff 
2. Village elders  
3. Ranch shareholders/land owners from various villages  
4. Women and youth members from various groups  
General guide 
Question Target FGD  group 
Seasonal calendar of vulnerability including perception of 
exposure and sensitivity in relation to land and forest 
resources. Matrix to be derived indicating components of 
(time, shock,  exposure, sensitivity-damages,  cause of shock, 
responses) and how the project interact with these 
seasonalities  of vulnerabilities  
All FGD groups  
How do various groups within the community understand 
the projects and what narratives emanate from this 
understanding? 
 
representatives of various 
groups, Women members of 
various groups and youth 
members of various groups 
What past interventions were in place to manage forest/land 
resources in the project area and how did these interventions 
involve and benefit the community?  
village elders, ranch 
shareholders, extension staff, 
representatives of various 
groups 
How does the project fit in this layered history of forest/land  
resource use and management 
 
village elders, ranch 
shareholders/land owners, 
extension staff, representatives 
of various groups 
How do gender roles and rights implicate the project 
activities and what roles have the youth and women in the 
project implementation?   
Women members of various 
groups and youth members of 
various groups  
How do the project activities interact with livelihood assets 
(both beneficial and adverse interactions to be discussed)   
All FGD groups  
 
 
